Vijaya Boggala v. Jefferson Sessions III
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14682
4th Cir.2017Background
- Vijaya Boggala, an Indian national and U.S. lawful permanent resident, entered a North Carolina deferred prosecution agreement after online chats with an undercover officer posing as a 14‑year‑old and his subsequent arrest for soliciting a child by computer.
- At the deferred‑prosecution hearing Boggala signed the criminal Information, waived indictment, and answered “yes” when the court said he was "admitting responsibility and stipulating to the facts to be used against you."
- DHS charged Boggala as removable for (1) conviction of an aggravated felony and (2) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; Boggala argued the deferred prosecution is not an INA "conviction."
- The IJ found the deferred prosecution amounted to an INA conviction (admission of sufficient facts), that the offense was a crime involving moral turpitude, denied a §212(h) waiver (applying a heightened standard as the crime was “dangerous”), and ordered removal.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ; Boggala appealed to the Fourth Circuit raising four claims: (1) no INA conviction; (2) "crime involving moral turpitude" is void for vagueness; (3) not an aggravated felony; (4) not "violent or dangerous" for heightened waiver standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the North Carolina deferred prosecution constitutes an INA "conviction" | Boggala: his deferred prosecution and colloquy did not include admissions of facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt | Government: Boggala stipulated to the facts in the Information at the hearing and thus admitted sufficient facts under INA §101(a)(48)(A)(i) | Court: Affirmed conviction—Boggala stipulated to the Information’s facts at the hearing, satisfying the INA definition |
| Whether "crime involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague | Boggala: phrase is void for vagueness and cannot support removability/inadmissibility | Government: established precedent supports constitutionality; phrase is workable | Court: Rejected vagueness challenge, relying on Jordan v. De George and contrast to clauses invalidated in Johnson |
| Whether the offense is an aggravated felony (removability ground) | Boggala: offense does not qualify as an aggravated felony | Government: IJ found aggravated‑felony ground (alternative) | Court: Did not decide because removability was supported by crime involving moral turpitude conviction (no need to reach aggravated‑felony question) |
| Whether the offense is "violent or dangerous" for heightened §212(h) waiver standard | Boggala: offense not "violent or dangerous," so heightened waiver standard shouldn't apply | Government: IJ found offense "dangerous" and applied heightened standard | Court: Declined to resolve because waiver was alternatively denied in the exercise of discretion (unchallenged), so the "violent/dangerous" finding was unnecessary to the outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (upheld use of "crime involving moral turpitude" in the fraud context; rejects vagueness challenge)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (explains vagueness doctrine that invalidated the ACCA residual clause)
- Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2011) (interpreting INA §101(a)(48)(A)(i) narrowly where no admission of facts was present)
- United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1991) (upheld sufficiency of signed and verified statement of facts supporting plea)
- Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for BIA legal questions)
- Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007) (scope of reviewing both IJ and BIA reasoning)