Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC
133 Conn. App. 1
Conn. App. Ct.2012Background
- Vidiaki, LLC leased commercial premises at 13 River Road, Lisbon, to Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC on July 31, 2007, with a five-year term ending June 30, 2009.
- Plaintiff served an April 8, 2009 notice to quit; defendant did not vacate, leading to a five-count summary process action filed April 24, 2009.
- Amended complaint (July 8, 2009) withdrew counts two and five and added count six for lapse of time termination.
- Defendant moved to strike/dismiss count six; court initially denied but later dismissed count six for lack of jurisdiction.
- Judge Goldberg conducted a trial on remaining counts (June 28–29, 2010) and held that § 47a-11 did not apply to commercial tenancies, denying count three.
- Plaintiff appeals challenging (1) application of law of the case, (2) § 47a-11 applicability, (3) dismissal of count one, (4) pleading count six in the alternative, (5) dismissal of count six; disposition: reverse as to count one, affirm otherwise.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 47a-11 applies to commercial tenancies. | Vidiaki argued § 47a-11 applies to commercial leases. | Just Breakfast contends § 47a-11 does not apply to commercial tenancies. | Not applicable to commercial tenancies. |
| Whether law of the case barred the later ruling on § 47a-11. | Law of the case required continued adherence to Young's view. | Law of the case allows departure if prior decision erroneous. | No error; court may depart from prior interlocutory ruling. |
| Whether the first notice to quit adequately apprised of lease violations, allowing dismissal of count one. | Notice tracked § 47a-23(a)(b) and was sufficient. | Notice was defective for lack of specific lease-violation allegations. | Notice adequate; dismissal of count one improper. |
| Whether the second notice to quit alleged lapse of time could survive after first notice terminated the lease. | Count six based on lapse of time should be viable despite first notice. | First notice terminated the lease; second notice based on lapse cannot survive. | Dismissal of count six affirmed; second notice cannot revive after termination. |
| Whether plaintiff should be allowed to plead count six in the alternative. | Plaintiff could plead alternative theories in one complaint. | Alternatives permissible but not when lease terminated prior to second notice. | Reversal on count one; other counts affirmed; count six appropriately dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1 (2007) (notice to quit complies with § 47a-23(a) requirements; forms tracking statutory language acceptable)
- Thomas E. Golden Realty Co. v. Society for Savings, 31 Conn.App. 575 (1993) (notice to quit language tracked statutory grounds; adequate when aligned with § 47a-23(a))
- Sproviero v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 108 Conn.App. 454 (2008) (commercial tenancy context; dicta on nuisance; not controlling on § 47a-11 applicability)
- A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 282 Conn. 434 (2007) (chapter 830 generally applies to residential tenancies; commercial applicability limited)
- Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600 (1993) (distinction between § 47a-15 notice (pretermination) and § 47a-23 notice (termination))
- Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128 (1987) (discussion of specificity requirements for pretermination notices under § 47a-15)