Background - Victor L. Smith, who has epilepsy, had a seizure while driving in Troy, Ohio, left his car, and was found disoriented holding a fence; a neighbor called police. - Miami County Deputy Phillip Osting arrived first, asked Smith to return to his car; Osting grabbed Smith’s hand and back, pried his fingers from the fence, and used a leg sweep to take him to the ground and then handcuffed him. - Troy Officer Scott Gates arrived, ordered Smith to put his hands behind his back, then used a taser in drive-stun mode repeatedly (8 activations totaling 48 seconds) while other officers secured Smith’s legs; Smith was never told he was under arrest. - Smith alleges he was in and out of consciousness due to seizures, did not remember struggling or being tased, and later suffered PTSD; he sued individual officers, the City of Troy, and Miami County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the ADA, and asserted state-law claims. - The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; on appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Whether Deputy Osting used excessive force in leg-sweep takedown and handcuffing | Osting used unreasonable, excessive force on a non-criminal, passively resisting, disabled person (seizuring) | Osting acted reasonably to gain control because Smith was noncompliant and possibly under influence | Reversed as to takedown and forcible handcuffing: genuine disputes and clearly established law preclude immunity for Osting | | Whether Officer Gates’ repeated taser deployment was excessive | Gates tased Smith repeatedly with little time to comply, making force excessive and unconstitutional | Gates reasonably tased Smith to subdue and secure him because Smith resisted handcuffing | Reversed as to excessive taser use: repeated rapid tasings could be unreasonable and Gates not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity | | Whether Officers Hohenstein and Madigan are liable for excessive force or failure to intervene | They participated and failed to prevent or stop excessive force | They arrived after takedown and lacked realistic opportunity to prevent tasing | Affirmed for Hohenstein and Madigan: no liability (no realistic opportunity to prevent conduct) | | Whether municipalities (City of Troy, Miami County) liable under Monell and whether Title II ADA claim succeeds | Municipalities failed to train/ratified conduct; officers discriminated against Smith due to disability | No pattern or notice of deficient training; no intentional discrimination because of disability | Affirmed for municipalities on §1983 (no pattern/causal policy); ADA claim affirmed for defendants (no intentional discrimination). District court’s dismissal of state claims reversed and remanded for reconsideration | ### Key Cases Cited Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (establishes qualified immunity standard for government officials) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (clarifies ‘‘clearly established’’ right requirement for qualified immunity) Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (two-step qualified immunity framework) Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (requires precedent to place constitutional question beyond debate for qualified immunity denial) Kent v. Oakland Cty., 810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.) (use-of-force standards; excessive taser deployments and passive resistance analysis) Shreve v. Jessamine Cty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.) (passive resistance does not justify substantial force) Hagans v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir.) (tasing justified where officer unaware of prior events and suspect resisting) Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy/custom causation) Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (municipal liability for hiring/retention requires obviousness of risk) Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir.) (standards for failure-to-train liability and need for pattern/notice) * Thompson v. Williamson Cty., 219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir.) (Title II ADA requires intentional discrimination)