Victor Santiago v. Daniel Blair
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6794
| 8th Cir. | 2013Background
- Santiago, an inmate at Potosi Correctional Center, got into an argument with Lieutenant Blair during admin segregation after being ordered to strip and report for duty.
- Blair tightened Santiago’s handcuffs to the “crushing point” during the struggle to subdue him after he threatened to resist.
- Williford then restrained Santiago and nose-to-wall forcefully; Fox used pepper spray; Parsons restrained legs and dislocated Santiago’s left wrist with a sharp twist.
- Santiago received medical attention for a wrist laceration but not for the dislocation; nurse later declined further treatment and suggested a shower, which was delayed for 35 minutes.
- Santiago filed a grievance alleging excessive force; Clubbs thereafter threatened Santiago to drop the grievance and later created conditions that allegedly retaliated against him; Blair similarly threatened and placed him in a deteriorating cell.
- Santiago sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and retaliation; district court denied some qualified-immunity defenses and granted others.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force standard applicability | Santiago argues force was unnecessary and wanton. | Officers acted to subdue after threat, within reasonable force. | Remanded to apply Johnson excessive force standard. |
| Deliberate indifference to medical needs | Branch ignored wrist treatment and shower delay worsened needs. | No deliberate disregard; nurse eventually treated and later rechecked. | Branch entitled to qualified immunity regarding wrist treatment claim. |
| Retaliation in violation of First Amendment | Clubbs and Blair retaliated for filing grievances through death threats and cell conditions. | Threats and actions tied to disciplinary or security concerns; not retaliation. | Clubbs not entitled to immunity for death threats; Blair retaliation upheld; other retaliations addressed per remand. |
| Retaliatory conduct against disciplinary action false report | Clubbs filed false misconduct report to retaliate. | Report supported by some evidence and disciplinary findings. | Clubbs not entitled to immunity for this conduct-violation claim. |
| Qualified immunity for Blair for cell conditions and threats | Cell deprivation and threats constitute retaliation. | Sandin-based due-process claims not applicable to retaliation; must assess as First Amendment claim. | Blair not entitled to immunity for retaliation claims related to cell conditions and threats. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Center/Arkansas Dept. of Corrections, 12 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1993) (proper standard for excessive force in prison context)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified immunity analysis; not mandatory after Pearson)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (clarified discretionary sequencing of qualified immunity prongs)
- Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (core inquiry for Eighth Amendment excessive force)
- Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2010) (extent of injury not threshold for excessive force)
- Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (injury extent not required for excessive force claim)
- Re Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2004) (adverse action and chilling effect in retaliation claims)
- Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010) (First Amendment retaliation rights in prison context)
- Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999) (retaliation claims can rest on unsupported disciplinary actions)
- Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009) (retaliation and grievance process protections)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (retaliation against grievance filing can chill protected activity)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (due process expectations do not bar First Amendment retaliation claims)
- Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008) (retaliation claims may rely on some evidence in discipline reports)
- Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006) (serious medical need requires physician-diagnosed or obvious need)