Victor Fourstar v. Garden City Group, Inc., 15-5049

Victor C. Fourstar Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983-like complaint in D.D.C. and sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status; the district court denied IFP and dismissed the suit as barred by the PLRA three-strikes rule.
The district court relied on three prior cases as strikes: Murlak (dismissed as frivolous/failing to state a claim), Ness (federal claims dismissed for failure to state; court declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims), and Zemyan (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; state-law claims dismissed without prejudice).
Fourstar conceded Murlak was properly a strike but argued Ness and Zemyan should not count because not all claims in those actions were dismissed on PLRA-enumerated grounds.
The government defended the district court’s counting and argued courts should be able to rely on prior courts’ strike labels; it also warned prisoners might add state-law claims to avoid strikes.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed de novo and applied the PLRA text and precedent to decide (1) whether partial dismissals with remaining state-law claims non-dismissed on PLRA grounds count as strikes, and (2) whether a later court may defer to an earlier court’s contemporaneous labeling of a dismissal as a strike.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a prior dismissal counts as a PLRA "strike" when a district court dismisses federal claims as frivolous/for failure to state but declines supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims (so not all claims were dismissed on §1915(g) grounds)	Ness and Zemyan should not count because not all claims were dismissed on the PLRA-enumerated grounds.	The dismissals of the federal claims suffice; the presence of state-law claims should not prevent strike treatment.	A case counts as a strike only if the entire action was dismissed for frivolous, malicious, or failure-to-state-a-claim grounds; declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims means the case is not a strike.
Whether a later district court may accept/ defer to an earlier district court’s contemporaneous statement that a dismissal "counts as a strike" without independently evaluating the prior dismissal	Earlier courts’ explicit strike labels should be given effect; later courts can rely on them.	Later courts must verify independently whether prior dismissals meet §1915(g)’s criteria; labels alone are insufficient.	Later courts must independently determine whether prior dismissals were on §1915(g) grounds; they may not simply defer to prior courts’ strike labels.

Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (held that a prior action only counts as a strike if the entire action was dismissed on §1915(g) grounds)
Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reiterated that partial dismissals for non-§1915(g) reasons do not count as strikes)
Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (prior dismissal qualifies as a strike only if the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim)
Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (a strike does not issue when only some claims are dismissed on §1915(g) grounds)
Daker v. Commissioner, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016) (the three enumerated grounds are the only bases for strikes)
Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (the entire action must be dismissed on enumerated grounds for §1915(g) to apply)
Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2011) (action means entire case; partial dismissals do not count as strikes)
Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2010) (a strike is incurred only when the entire action is dismissed on one of the enumerated grounds)