Vickers, Kenneth Craig
PD-0578-15
Tex. App.Jul 27, 2015Background
- Kenneth Craig Vickers was indicted for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping for events on April 20, 2013.
- Vickers entered an open guilty plea and elected that the trial court assess punishment; the court sentenced him to 50 years and entered an affirmative deadly-weapon finding.
- The indictment and written plea paperwork did not explicitly state a deadly-weapon allegation; the State relied on theories (aggravated assault) that can imply a deadly-weapon issue.
- At punishment hearing, victims and Vickers (who admitted heavy meth use that day) testified; the judge remarked that he previously presided over and sentenced Vickers’ co-defendant, Jake (Royce) Sewell, and compared the two.
- Vickers appealed, arguing (1) his plea was involuntary because he lacked notice of a deadly-weapon finding, (2) the trial judge relied on extraneous knowledge about the co-defendant (bias), and (3 in filings) ineffective assistance of counsel; the court of appeals affirmed and the judgment was appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plea voluntariness / notice of deadly-weapon finding | Vickers says oral and written admonishments failed to notify him that the State sought a deadly-weapon finding, so his plea was not knowing and voluntary. | The State/appeals court says the indictment charged burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault (a theory that necessarily notifies defendant that a deadly-weapon finding may be sought), and Vickers received and pled to that charge. | Held: Affirmed — the aggravated-assault theory put Vickers on notice such that the plea was voluntary and notice adequate. |
| Judicial impartiality / reliance on extraneous information | Vickers argues the judge was partial because he relied on personal knowledge of co-defendant Sewell (having previously sentenced him), so punishment was not based solely on the evidence. | The State/appeals court says the judge’s knowledge came from prior proceedings (not extrajudicial) and the judge’s comments reflected comparisons and mitigating considerations; the sentence was supported by the evidence presented. | Held: Affirmed — record does not show clear bias; judge relied on evidence and permissible observations; no due-process violation found. |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (raised below) | Vickers contends counsel coerced plea, failed to investigate lesser offenses, mischaracterized witness issues, and failed to advise about deadly-weapon exposure. | The State/record: the appellate opinion did not find record support sufficient to overturn; primary opinion addresses plea notice and judicial impartiality. | Held: Not adopted as a basis for reversal by the court of appeals; judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary)
- Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (standard for knowing and voluntary plea)
- Blount v. State, 257 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (when aggravated-assault charged, defendant is on notice that a deadly-weapon finding may be sought)
- Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (State must provide notice before trial if seeking an affirmative deadly-weapon finding)
- Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (appellate review for clear evidence of judicial bias)
- Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (judge’s prior knowledge from related proceedings may not be extrajudicial bias)