Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC
21 A.3d 709
Conn.2011Background
- Goodspeed Airport cleared approximately 2.5 acres of land abutting Chapman Pond within a regulated wetlands area without a permit.
- The clear-cutting occurred after negotiations with the East Haddam Land Trust and prior, nonobjection by the town’s zoning enforcement officer and commission regarding related glide path tree removals.
- The Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission of East Haddam issued a cease and desist order and later instituted an enforcement action.
- Multiple consolidated state actions and two federal actions followed, addressing due process, preemption, and related claims arising from the clear-cutting.
- The trial court granted summary judgments in favor of Ventres, the commission, and its members on several state claims based on res judicata and collateral estoppel.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the airport claims were barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata due to privity and agency considerations with the federal actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the airport's due process claims barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata? | Airport argues issues unsettled in federal actions should be relitigated. | Ventres and commission contend prior federal judgments preclude relitigation. | Barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. |
| Can Evans be bound by prior judgments in the federal actions? | Evans was not a party to federal actions, so not bound. | Evans acted as airport’s agent and is bound. | Evans bound by prior judgments. |
| Does the filing of the cease and desist order constitute retaliation or abuse of process? | Order was used for improper purposes to punish the airport for protected conduct. | Order served a legitimate purpose and cannot support abuse of process. | Abuse of process barred by collateral estoppel; retaliation claim barred by res judicata. |
| Is the airport's first amendment retaliation claim precluded? | Retaliation for protected conduct violated first amendment rights. | Claim could have been raised in federal actions and is barred. | Barred by res judicata. |
Key Cases Cited
- Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 227 Conn. 802 (1993) (collateral estoppel and res judicata principles in professional conduct contexts)
- LaSalla v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 278 Conn. 578 (2006) (scope of claim and issue preclusion; final judgments bar relitigation)
- Wade's Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556 (1980) (privity concept—agency relationship allows collaterally estopped party to bind another)
- Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799 (1997) (privity and related limitations in applying collateral estoppel)
- Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285 (1991) (privity and who may invoke res judicata and collateral estoppel)
- New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817 (2010) (identification of the issues and factual determinations for collateral estoppel analysis)