Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15572

Background

Carlos Vega, a tenured Hispanic math teacher in Hempstead UFSD, alleged years of discriminatory and retaliatory treatment by the District and two high‑school principals after he complained to the EEOC.
Core discrimination allegation: since about 2008 Vega was assigned classes with disproportionately many Spanish‑speaking students, requiring substantially more prep (effectively more than the District’s three‑prep policy) without extra pay.
Other factual allegations: temporary loss of regular classroom, a ‘‘University of Puerto Rico’’ banner on his door, deactivated computer password, two attempted transfers, assignment of chronically absent students (jumping from ~20% to 75%), failure to be notified of a curriculum change, an erroneous paycheck deduction, and a first‑time negative evaluation in 16 years.
Procedural posture: Vega filed an EEOC charge (Aug 8, 2011), got a right‑to‑sue, sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants; the Second Circuit vacated and remanded in part.
The Second Circuit assumed the complaint’s allegations true and evaluated timeliness, whether § 1983 permits retaliation claims, applicable pleading standards, and whether Vega plausibly alleged discrimination and retaliation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of certain claims under Title VII and § 1983	Vega argued ongoing discriminatory/retaliatory assignments continued into the limitations periods (so discrete acts within the window are timely).	Defendants contended events before the statutory windows are time‑barred and dismissed several claims as untimely.	Discrete acts before the windows are time‑barred, but alleged ongoing assignments and later discrete acts (e.g., post‑cutoff extra workload) are not time‑barred.
Whether § 1983 authorizes retaliation claims for opposing discrimination	Vega argued § 1983 retaliation claims lie where supervisors, acting under color of state law, retaliate for complaints of discrimination.	Defendants relied on precedent refusing to recognize equal‑protection retaliation claims, urging dismissal.	§ 1983 retaliation claims are actionable: retaliation for opposing discrimination can state an Equal Protection § 1983 claim against state actors.
Pleading standard for Title VII disparate‑treatment claims at motion to dismiss	Vega argued he need not plead the full McDonnell Douglas prima facie case; plausibility suffices.	Defendants and the district court applied McDonnell Douglas prima facie requirements at pleading stage and argued Vega failed to show an adverse employment action.	Plaintiff need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case; under Twombly/Iqbal and circuit guidance, he must plausibly allege an adverse action and that protected status was a motivating factor. District court applied wrong standard.
Sufficiency of pleaded discrimination and retaliation claims	Vega argued his disproportionate workload and other acts plausibly show discrimination and retaliation (timing, context, mosaic).	Defendants argued many acts were minor inconveniences, untimely, or not connected to protected activity/status.	The complaint plausibly alleged discrimination based on disproportionate workload and plausibly alleged retaliation (assignment of absent students, paycheck deduction, curriculum‑notice failure, negative eval), while other alleged slights were not independently actionable.

Key Cases Cited

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (application of plausibility standard to complaints)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment)
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete acts vs continuing violation; timeliness)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (retaliation adverse‑action standard; reasonable‑worker deterrence)
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (retaliation as a form of discrimination)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (prima facie McDonnell Douglas not required at pleading stage)
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir.) (minimal pleading burden: facts suggesting discriminatory motive)
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.) (permitting § 1983 retaliation claims tied to participation in discrimination investigations)
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.) (disproportionate workload can be an adverse employment action)
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (retaliation causation requires but‑for standard)