Vega v. Griffin, 1:14-cv-07479

Background

June 7, 2006: Vega was arrested at the scene of a shooting; police recovered a loaded firearm and property identified by victim Joseph Nichols. Vega was indicted on attempted murder, robbery, firearm and related charges.
August–September 2007: After a Mapp suppression hearing (court adopted prior findings adverse to Vega), Vega pleaded guilty to attempted murder in exchange for a 20‑year determinate term plus five years post‑release supervision; plea colloquy reflected Vega’s acknowledgement of voluntariness and counsel’s advice.
October 2007 sentencing: Vega orally claimed at sentencing that counsel Vincent Siccardi had failed to convey a more favorable plea (variously described as 15–17–18 years), had coerced him (threats of consecutive sentences), and had provided inadequate communication; prosecutor and Siccardi denied the 15/17 offers and said an 18‑year pre‑indictment offer had been rejected by Vega.
Appellate action: The Appellate Division held Siccardi’s role as an adverse witness at sentencing required reassignment and remanded for a renewed hearing on Vega’s motion to withdraw his plea; on remand the trial court found Siccardi and the prosecutor more credible, denied withdrawal, and the Appellate Division later affirmed.
Habeas petition and disposition below: Vega filed a §2254 petition alleging ineffective assistance (failure to advise/convey plea and coercion) and that the remand court applied the wrong standard (Lafler). Magistrate Judge Bulsara recommended denying the petition, holding Vega failed to fairly present several claims to the state courts (unexhausted/abandoned), that most claims were procedurally defaulted, and recommending no certificate of appealability.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Vega)	Defendant's Argument (State/Respondent)	Held
Counsel failed to adequately advise/convey plea offers (incl. 18‑yr)	Siccardi failed to inform Vega of more favorable plea(s) and failed to explain totality of circumstances (evidence strength, suppression odds, sentencing exposure); had he done so Vega would have accepted the lower plea	Record shows Siccardi conveyed an 18‑yr pre‑indictment offer, Vega rejected it; Vega did not present many of the advice‑related factual assertions on direct appeal	Court: Vega did not fairly present these specific advice‑based claims in state court; the failure renders them unexhausted/abandoned and procedurally defaulted; habeas relief denied
Counsel coerced/ threatened Vega into plea	Siccardi threatened consecutive sentences and pressured Vega into the 20‑year plea, making plea involuntary	Siccardi and prosecutor denied coercion; the remand court credited counsel and prosecutor over Vega; Appellate Division deferred to trial court credibility findings	Court: Vega did not fairly present/coherently litigate this coercion theory on appeal/remand; claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted (except to the extent state‑law coercion finding is cognizable only if plea involuntary)
Trial court on remand erred / lacked authority to impose more favorable plea or to correct plea	Trial court found coercive statements but refused to permit withdrawal or impose 18 years, allegedly misapplying authority and law	State: whether a state court had authority is a state‑law question; remand court applied Strickland and found plea knowing and counsel effective; Appellate Division affirmed	Court: Claim that the state court lacked authority is a state‑law issue not cognizable on federal habeas; the related claim (failure to correct an allegedly coerced plea) was not fairly presented and is procedurally defaulted
Remand court applied wrong ineffective‑assistance standard (Lafler)	Remand court should have applied Lafler/related plea‑specific test to determine prejudice from counsel’s failure to advise about plea offers	Vega did not argue below that the remand court used the wrong standard; Lafler was cited only descriptively in his supplemental brief	Court: Vega failed to fairly present this claim to the state appellate court; it is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (fair‑presentation and exhaustion requirements for federal habeas)
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (state courts must be presented with the same federal claim to satisfy exhaustion)
Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (four methods for fairly presenting federal claims to state courts)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (ineffective assistance prejudice standard in plea‑offer context)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas does not lie for state‑law errors)
Ferrer v. Superintendent, 628 F. Supp. 2d 294 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (denial of motion to withdraw plea generally not reviewable unless plea was involuntary)
Sweet v. Bennett, 353 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (CPL 440.10 cannot be a substitute for direct appeal; procedural bar doctrine)
Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (limits on successive direct appeals and preservation)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (cause and prejudice standard to overcome procedural default)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (procedural default and cause/prejudice framework)
Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008) (treating exhausted claims as procedurally defaulted when state would now bar review)
Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991) (federal courts may deem claims procedurally barred)
People v. Vega, 88 A.D.3d 1022 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (remand because counsel effectively became an adverse witness)
People v. Vega, 109 A.D.3d 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (Appellate Division affirmed trial court credibility findings)