Veal v. State, 301 Ga. 161

On April 15, 1997, an armed robbery at The Peoples Bank’s Lake Sinclair branch resulted in the fatal shooting of branch manager Larry Ellington; the robber took $13,525.
Evidence tied Anthony Torrence Veal to the crime: eyewitness identification near the scene, Veal driving a white Mitsubishi from which bank-wrapped cash was recovered, physical items (cap, camouflage, bucket, fishing rod) and a found sawed-off shotgun linked to Veal.
Veal was indicted (1997), tried (Aug. 1998), convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and related firearms offenses, and sentenced to consecutive life terms plus additional prison terms.
Veal filed a motion for new trial in Sept. 1998; the trial court did not rule until June 2016 — a delay exceeding 17 years. New counsel was appointed in 2016; the motion was denied after a hearing.
Veal appealed, arguing: (1) certain jurors and prospective jurors should have been struck for cause because they banked at or worked for The Peoples Bank and/or knew the victim; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike them; (3) the long delay in ruling on his motion for new trial violated due process; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue post-conviction relief timely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurors who banked at victim bank were disqualified	Bank customers were biased and per se disqualified (analogized to shareholder cases)	Customers had no ownership interest; mere banking relationship does not create per se disqualification	Not disqualified; banking relationship alone insufficient and jurors said they could be impartial
Prospective jurors who worked with victim should be struck for cause	Employment/working relationship with victim created bias	Presumption of juror impartiality; no evidence of fixed opinion or bias	No cause to strike; jurors professed impartiality and no proof of bias was shown
Ineffective assistance for failing to move to strike jurors	Counsel should have moved to strike the challenged jurors/panel members	Motion to strike would have been meritless given law and juror assurances; counsel not deficient	Counsel not ineffective because strikes would have lacked merit and no prejudice shown
Due process & ineffective assistance re: 17-year delay on motion for new trial	Delay violated due process and counsel’s failure to pursue post-conviction relief prejudiced Veal	Delay attributable largely to Veal and prior counsel; appellate-delay prejudice must be shown and was not	No due process violation; no specific prejudice shown from delay. Even if prior counsel deficient, Veal cannot show prejudice, so ineffective assistance claim fails

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (sufficiency of evidence standard)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (speedy trial/delay four-factor analysis)
Kirkland v. State, 274 Ga. 778 (juror disqualification of corporate shareholders)
Lowman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 556 (disqualification of members with corporate interest)
Cohen v. Baxter, 267 Ga. 422 (knowledge/non-familial relationship not per se disqualification)
Green v. State, 295 Ga. 108 (bias requires fixed opinion to disqualify juror)
Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707 (presumption of juror impartiality; burden on defendant)
Loadholt v. State, 286 Ga. 402 (prejudice required for appellate-delay due process claim)
White v. State, 293 Ga. 523 (successor judge’s discretion on new trial)