Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479

Vartelas, a Greek native, became a lawful permanent resident in 1989 and pled guilty in 1994 to conspiracy to counterfeit securities, receiving four months in prison.
He traveled to Greece in 2003 and was treated as inadmissible on return, under the law as it existed before IIRIRA.
IIRIRA, enacted in 1996, effectively barred brief foreign travel for LPRs with qualifying crimes, potentially causing removal upon return.
The question is whether IIRIRA’s travel-admission provision governs retroactively for pre-enactment offenses or only post-enactment conduct.
Lower courts were split on retroactivity; the Second Circuit barred retroactive application, while the Fourth and Ninth Circuits held for prospective application.
The Court held that the relevant IIRIRA provision attaches a new disability to past events and does not apply to Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA conviction; his status is governed by the pre-IIRIRA regime on his brief trip.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does IIRIRA § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct?	Vartelas argues it imposes a new disability on past conduct and thus cannot apply retroactively.	IIRIRA creates a new admission framework that applies to post-enactment travel and return.	No retroactive application; provision does not apply to pre-IIRIRA conduct.
Is Fleuti's travel doctrine still controlling for short-term trips by LPRs after IIRIRA?	Fleuti governs innocent, brief excursions without affecting permanent resident status.	BIA and post-IIRIRA regime supersede Fleuti for returning LPRs.	Fleuti continues to govern short-term travel.
What is the proper focus for determining retroactivity: past misconduct or present travel?	The government turns on the travel event, implying retroactive effect on pre-existing conduct.	The new disability attaches to past misconduct; thus, the retroactivity inquiry centers on the past offense.	Past misconduct, not present travel, is targeted; the statute is prospective in application.

Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (U.S. 1963) (brief, casual travel by long-resident aliens advisory to admission)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (presumption against retroactivity; how new provisions affect pre-enactment conduct)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. 2001) (withdrawal of discretionary relief as a new disability and retroactivity)
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (U.S. 1884) (retroactivity of reentry bans when pre-enactment conduct occurred)
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (U.S. 2006) (no retroactive effect where statute turns on post-enactment action)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) (counsel duty to inform noncitizens of deportation consequences of pleas)
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (U.S. 1997) (retroactivity of removal-related provisions; new disability concept)
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. 2001) (conduct and retroactivity surrounding deportation relief)
Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2004) (prospective vs retroactive application of immigration provisions)
Camins v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007) (circuit conflict on retroactivity of § 1101(a)(13))
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (U.S. 2011) (removal law interpretation and agency deference context)
Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1933) (pre-IIRIRA considerations in admission and entry)