Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn v. Sewell R. Brumby
663 F.3d 1312
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Glenn, born biologically male, has GID diagnosed in 2005 and sought gender transition; she was hired as an editor in the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel in 2005.
- Brumby, head of OLC, fired Glenn in 2007 citing that Glenn’s intended gender transition would be disruptive and uncomfortable for coworkers.
- Glenn claimed sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause based on gender non-conformity; Glenn also claimed discrimination based on her medical condition (GID) but the district court ruled for Brumby on that claim.
- The district court granted Glenn summary judgment on sex discrimination and Brumby summary judgment on GID discrimination; on appeal, the court analyzes gender stereotyping and heightened scrutiny.
- The panel affirms the district court’s ruling for Glenn on the sex-discrimination claim, holding firing a transgender employee for gender non-conformity violates the Equal Protection Clause; no need to address the GID cross-appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether firing for gender non-conformity violates the Equal Protection Clause | Glenn argues Brumby fired her for gender non-conformity (transgender status) rather than a legitimate goal. | Brumby contends his decision was based on disfavor of transition and potential disruption, not on gender stereotypes. | Yes; firing based on gender non-conformity constitutes sex discrimination under heightened scrutiny. |
| Whether Brumby’s stated justification shows an exceedingly persuasive governmental interest | Glenn contends Brumby’s justification is pretextual and not sufficiently important. | Brumby asserts concern about coworker discomfort/lawsuits as the governmental interest. | No; Brumby failed to show an sufficiently important governmental interest tied to the discriminatory action. |
| Whether the restroom-use justification could sustain the action under heightened scrutiny | N/A | Hypothetical restroom-litigations justification lacks support in the record. | Rejected; hypothetical justification insufficient under heightened scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (gender stereotyping is prohibited under sex discrimination analyses)
- Virginia v. Virginia? (Virginia, 518 U.S. 515), 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (heightened scrutiny requires substantial relation to important governmental objective)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (strict standard for irrational classifications; heightened scrutiny guidance)
- Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex-based classifications treated with heightened scrutiny)
- Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender classifications require heightened scrutiny due to incongruence with public policy expectations)
- Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (gender-based classifications risk reinforcing stereotypes; heightened scrutiny applicable)