644 F.3d 957
9th Cir.2011Background
- Vandevere, McCombs, Hollier, and Jent hold Alaska entry permits and shore leases to fish salmon in Upper Cook Inlet.
- Board regulations since 1996 shortened seasons, narrowed areas, and shifted emphasis toward conservation, reducing permit/lease value.
- Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of Fisheries in 2007, alleging takings without compensation and due process violations.
- District court granted summary judgment for the Commissioner; Ninth Circuit reviews de novo per Ward v. Ryan.
- Alaska law authorizes the Board and the Commission to regulate entry permits and submerged-land leases; entry permits are use privileges, and leases convey limited interests.
- Leases contain contractual waivers and broad reservation of regulatory power; plaintiffs contend these reduce protection against regulatory takings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do entry permits constitute property under the Takings Clause? | Vandevere argues permits are property with value and transferability. | Vanek holds entry permits are not property interests under state law. | Not property; Vanek controls. |
| Did the leasehold interests confer protected property or were they waived as to takings claims? | Leases create a property-like interest that could be compensable if reg regulation reduces value. | Waiver clauses in the leases bar takings claims and regulation of activities falls outside compensation. | Waiver defeats the takings claim; no merits reached. |
| Did the challenged regulations violate substantive due process? | Regulations are arbitrary and irrational, infringing due process. | Regulations rationally relate to conservation and sustainability. | Not a due process violation; statute bears substantial relation to goals. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008) (entry permits are not property interests under Alaska law)
- Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir.2010) (two-step Takings framework under Lucas/Craft; state law governs property right, federal law governs process)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (property rights and regulation; background principles determine if a taking requires compensation)
- Craft v. United States, 436 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978) (state law defines property rights; process due under federal law)
- Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (state-created licenses can be treated as non-property for Takings Clause purposes)
- Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (U.S. 1946) (courts a tenant may waive rights via contract; compensation may be contractually extinguished)
- Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (U.S. 1976) (takings waiver concepts in lease contexts)
