Van Liew v. Stansfield
474 Mass. 31
| Mass. | 2016Background
- Van Liew and Stansfield are Chelmsford residents; Stansfield was a local planning board member and Van Liew an active local political participant and 2012 candidate for selectman.
- At a February 1, 2012 public campaign “meet and greet,” Stansfield and Van Liew exchanged words; Stansfield reported Van Liew said, “I’m coming after you,” and sought a harassment prevention order the same day.
- Stansfield’s District Court complaint alleged four incidents: the meet-and-greet threat, past mailings accusing her of being “corrupt and a liar,” similar statements during a 2011 recall campaign, and an earlier loud, insulting telephone call. A temporary ex parte order issued but was vacated after a full hearing.
- Van Liew sued Stansfield for abuse of process and malicious prosecution; Stansfield moved to dismiss under the anti‑SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H. A District Court judge granted the special motion; the District Court Appellate Division vacated that allowance and remanded for trial. Stansfield appealed to the Appeals Court; the SJC transferred the case to itself.
- The SJC addressed (1) whether interlocutory appeals from allowance/denial of § 59H motions in District Court may be taken directly to the Appeals Court, and (2) whether Stansfield’s harassment petition constituted constitutionally unprotected speech sufficient to support a G. L. c. 258E harassment prevention order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Van Liew) | Defendant's Argument (Stansfield) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper appellate forum for interlocutory § 59H orders | Appeals from allowance/denial should follow statutory route to Appellate Division; lack of finality bars Appeals Court jurisdiction | Interlocutory appeals of § 59H orders must go directly to the Appeals Court to protect anti‑SLAPP rights and ensure uniformity | Interlocutory appeals from allowance/denial of § 59H motions in District Court may be filed directly in the Appeals Court (SJC follows Fabre reasoning) |
| Whether Stansfield’s petition was protected petitioning activity under § 59H | The harassment petition was a valid petitioning activity; temporary order shows factual support | Petition was devoid of reasonable factual support and lacked legal basis; Van Liew suffered actual injury | The petition was petitioning activity but was devoid of reasonable factual support (except possibly the meet‑and‑greet incident) and thus § 59H dismissal was inappropriate |
| Whether the alleged statements amounted to harassment under G. L. c. 258E (three acts causing fear) | The four alleged acts together established harassment and justified the order | The mailings and campaign statements were political speech; telephone insults did not amount to fighting words or true threats; only the meet‑and‑greet might qualify | Only the meet‑and‑greet statement could be assumed to qualify; the other incidents were political speech or insults and did not meet statutory harassment (no three qualifying acts) |
| Whether Van Liew proved actual injury to defeat § 59H motion | Van Liew incurred attorney’s fees and costs defending at the District Court hearing, evidencing actual injury | Stansfield argued bills were charged to a corporation and temporary order/modification showed reasonable basis | Van Liew proved actual injury by showing attorney’s fees; the temporary ex parte order did not cure the lack of factual support after a full hearing vacated it |
Key Cases Cited
- Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (recognizing immediate appeal to the Appeals Court from denial of a § 59H special motion as necessary to protect anti‑SLAPP rights)
- Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156 (discussing scope and purpose of the anti‑SLAPP statute)
- O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (defining excluded categories of unprotected speech for G. L. c. 258E: fighting words and true threats)
- Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148 (standards for showing petitioning activity was devoid of factual support under § 59H)
- Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58 (application of c. 258E’s harassment elements and limits on protected speech)
- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (First Amendment protection for political speech)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (robust protection for criticism of public officials)
- Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229 (distinguishing political hyperbole from true threats)
- Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627 (attorney fees and costs as cognizable damages for wrongful petitioning)