Valenti v. Lawson
889 F.3d 427
7th Cir.2018Background
- Brian Valenti, a convicted felon and registered sex offender (convicted in California in 1993 of lewd or lascivious act with a child), lives in Indiana and is classified a "serious sex offender."
- Indiana criminalizes knowing or intentional entry by "serious sex offenders" onto school property. Valenti's neighborhood polling place is located at Blackford County High School (school property).
- Indiana permits convicted felons who are no longer imprisoned to vote, but provides alternatives for serious sex offenders (absentee voting, voting at the county courthouse a day early, or at a civic center 12 miles away) instead of voting at school polling places.
- Valenti brought an as-applied challenge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the ban on entering the school to vote infringes his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (expressive/associational and voting rights).
- The district court granted summary judgment for the state under Burdick balancing; the Seventh Circuit affirms but on different grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Valenti has a constitutional right to vote that bars the school-entry prohibition | Valenti says the ban burdens his constitutional voting and associational rights (wants to vote at neighborhood school, engage with neighbors/candidates, avoid absentee risks) | State says Valenti can vote via alternatives and felon voting rights are statutory; Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits states to limit felon voting | Held: Valenti has only a statutory (not constitutional) right to vote here; felon disenfranchisement is permitted by Richardson v. Ramirez |
| Standard of review for the statute barring serious sex offenders from school property on election day | Valenti implicitly urges heightened scrutiny (applying Burdick's balancing) because the rule burdens voting | State contends rational basis applies because no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated | Held: Rational basis review applies to the statutory restriction on school entry by serious sex offenders |
| Whether the statute survives rational basis review | Valenti argues the statute is overbroad or unsupported (citing Packingham and recidivism debates) | State asserts a legitimate interest in protecting children and a rational fit by targeting "serious" sex offenders | Held: The statute is rationally related to the legitimate objective of keeping serious sex offenders away from children on school property; it survives rational basis review |
| Adequacy of alternative voting methods | Valenti argues alternatives (absentee, courthouse, distant civic center) are insufficient substitutes for in-person voting at the neighborhood school | State notes it need not provide alternatives and offered several reasonable options that mitigate any burden | Held: Alternatives are adequate; Valenti’s complaints about community/celebration/late-breaking news do not overcome the rational basis for the rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (state may disenfranchise felons)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (voting regulation balancing framework)
- Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (rational basis test explained)
- FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (plaintiff must negat[e] every conceivable basis for statute under rational-basis review)
- Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384 (Seventh Circuit: application of rational-basis when no fundamental right implicated)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (First Amendment challenge to broad sex-offender social-media ban; distinguished on overbreadth)
- McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (recognizing sex offenders as a serious threat and recidivism concerns)
- Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (discussion of absentee voting as inadequate substitute in a different context; distinguished)