2020 COA 49
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Dean Carbajal was criminally convicted of stalking his ex-girlfriend (a Wells Fargo teller) and later filed a civil suit (Carbajal I) against the teller, Wells Fargo, and employees for invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract; the district court entered summary judgment for defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- In 2017 Carbajal filed a new action alleging that defendants and their counsel concealed discovery in Carbajal I—information later revealed by a CFPB report about improper Wells Fargo account practices—and that the nondisclosure induced the wrongful summary judgment.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the filing was an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion; the district court construed the pleading as a Rule 60(b)(2) challenge and dismissed it as time-barred.
- Carbajal asserted his suit was an independent equitable action under Rule 60(b) (the savings clause) and also alleged fraud on the court; the district court rejected these arguments and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
- The district court also granted a permanent injunction restricting Carbajal’s pro se filings against certain lawyers; the Court of Appeals vacated that injunction order because it failed to comply with C.R.C.P. 65(d) requirements and remanded for a compliant order if an injunction is again deemed warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2017 complaint is an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion or an independent equitable action under Rule 60(b) | Carbajal: suit is an independent equitable action under Rule 60(b) (savings clause), so not subject to 182-day limit | Defendants: action attacks prior judgment and is effectively a time-barred Rule 60(b)(2) motion | Held: Court treats it as an attack on the prior judgment but rejects independent-action status because allegations are discovery violations, so time-barred under Rule 60(b)(2) |
| Whether defendants' alleged nondisclosures in discovery constitute extrinsic fraud (or fraud on the court) sufficient to support an independent action | Carbajal: nondisclosure and conspiracy to conceal constituted fraud and fraud on the court | Defendants: allegations amount to ordinary discovery violations or intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud or fraud on the court | Held: Allegations are intrinsic (discovery nondisclosure) and do not constitute extrinsic fraud or fraud on the court; independent action not available |
| Whether alleged fraud prevented Carbajal from pursuing a meritorious claim in Carbajal I (necessity for independent action) | Carbajal: withheld materials would have shown vicarious liability and otherwise altered the outcome | Defendants: Carbajal’s claims failed as a matter of law for lack of damages, disclosure to third parties, and absence of fiduciary duty; withheld material would not change legal deficiencies | Held: Even if extrinsic fraud were shown, vacating judgment would be futile because Carbajal cannot establish meritorious underlying claims |
| Whether the permanent injunction restricting pro se filings was proper and sufficiently specific under Rule 65(d) | Carbajal: injunction infringes right of access and is punitive | Defendants: injunction appropriate given Carbajal’s repetitive, verbose, meritless litigation against counsel | Held: Injunction may have been warranted on facts, but the district court’s order failed to comply with C.R.C.P. 65(d) (reasons, specificity, and detailed restrained acts); order vacated and remanded to craft a compliant injunction if appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Gance, 36 P.3d 114 (Colo. App. 2001) (discussing Rule 60(b) savings clause and independent equitable action)
- United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998) (independent actions for fraud are restricted to unusual circumstances to avoid nullifying Rule 60 time limits)
- George P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 1995) (independent-action fraud must be more than ordinary common-law fraud)
- Mantis Transp. v. Kenner, 45 F. Supp. 3d 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (nondisclosure in discovery does not support independent action under Rule 60)
- Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1989) (mere nondisclosure to an adverse party or court does not constitute fraud on the court)
- Foxley v. Foxley, 939 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1996) (example of egregious fraud on the court where sham evidence distorted judicial valuation)
- Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910 (Colo. 2002) (permitting injunctions to curb repetitious, baseless pro se litigation where other sanctions fail)
- Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Winslow, 706 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1985) (balancing right of access to courts against need to protect judicial resources from abusive pro se litigation)