v. Sosa
2019 COA 182
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Feb 28, 2016: a drive-by shooting at a Pueblo bar injured two and killed one; Angelo Salas and Timothy Trujillo were identified as suspects.
- Police later found Sosa’s rental car with Salas inside; Sosa admitted she knew of outstanding warrants and had been staying with the suspects after the shooting.
- Sosa was charged as an accessory to first- or second-degree murder; to facilitate a plea she pleaded guilty to accessory to second-degree murder (heat of passion) and the first count was dismissed.
- The prosecution sought (and the district court ordered) joint-and-several restitution against Sosa for victims’ medical bills, lost wages, funeral and related expenses, and payments to the Victim Compensation Fund.
- On appeal, after the Colorado Supreme Court decided Cowen v. People, the court of appeals considered whether restitution may be ordered for losses caused by conduct for which a defendant was never charged (or for dismissed counts).
- The court held, as an extension of Cowen, that restitution cannot be imposed for pecuniary losses proximately caused by uncharged or dismissed conduct; it reversed the restitution order as to Sosa and remanded to determine restitution tied only to her accessory conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a court order restitution for pecuniary losses proximately caused by conduct for which the defendant was never charged (or for dismissed counts)? | Restitution is proper if the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the loss; statutory definitions focus on conduct, not on the formal charge. | Restitution is limited to losses caused by conduct for which the defendant is charged/convicted; ordering restitution for uncharged/dismissed conduct violates due process and the presumption of innocence. | Extended Cowen: restitution may only be imposed for losses proximately caused by conduct for which the defendant is an "offender" (i.e., charged/convicted or admitted in plea). Restitution for uncharged or dismissed conduct is prohibited absent express plea agreement. |
| Does a plea agreement that says dismissed counts will be considered for sentencing/restitution permit restitution for losses caused by the underlying uncharged/dismissed crime? | The plea’s language (dismissed counts may be considered) supports ordering restitution for losses tied to dismissed or underlying severe conduct. | The plea bound Sosa only as to the accessory charge(s); dismissed first-degree murder count was still an accessory charge and did not constitute agreement to pay for losses caused by the murder itself. | A plea can authorize restitution for uncharged/dismissed conduct if the defendant expressly agrees; here the plea did not admit guilt for the murder or otherwise authorize restitution for losses proximately caused by the shooting itself. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96 (Colorado Supreme Court holding restitution may not be imposed for losses resulting from conduct forming the basis of an acquitted charge)
- People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010) (defines proximate cause for restitution and limits restitution to losses stemming from defendant’s conduct)
- People v. Borquez, 814 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1991) (plea-based restitution can be upheld where defendant acknowledged the conduct and loss)
- People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1987) (defendant cannot disavow restitution agreed to at plea)
- Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (due process limits on imposing monetary exactions on those adjudged not guilty)
- People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1989) (appellate presumption that omitted transcript portions support the judgment)