2019 COA 27
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Darius Slaughter was charged with second-degree assault by strangulation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(i) for allegedly strangling a victim with his hands.
- The People moved to add a "crime of violence" sentence enhancer under § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), alleging the defendant used his hands as a deadly weapon; the district court initially granted then later dismissed that enhancer on equal protection grounds.
- The 2016 Legislative amendments created § 18-3-203(1)(i) specifically criminalizing strangulation without requiring proof of serious bodily injury or that hands are a deadly weapon; previously prosecutors relied on § 18-3-203(1)(b) (deadly weapon) or § 18-3-202(1)(g) (serious bodily injury) to reach felonies.
- A conviction under § 18-3-203(1)(i) with the crime-of-violence enhancer carries mandatory minimums (e.g., 5-year minimum and increased maximum), while conviction under § 18-3-203(1)(b) (deadly weapon) may permit probation due to § 18-3-203(2)(c)(II).
- The statutory interplay thus permits materially different punishments for the same strangulation conduct depending only on the prosecutor’s charging choice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether charging § 18-3-203(1)(i) (strangulation) together with a crime-of-violence enhancer violates equal protection under the Colorado Constitution | Prosecutor may charge under any applicable statute and add enhancer; legislative scheme permits enhancer | Charging § 18-3-203(1)(i) plus enhancer creates dramatically harsher penalties for identical conduct based solely on charging choice, violating equal protection | The court held the proposed combination is unconstitutional as applied to Slaughter and affirmed dismissal of the enhancer |
| Whether the statutory distinctions between § 18-3-203(1)(b) (deadly weapon) and § 18-3-203(1)(i) (strangulation) provide reasonably intelligible standards to justify disparate penalties | The legislature enacted the provisions and did not expressly prohibit adding an enhancer to § 18-3-203(1)(i) | There is no real-in-fact, reasonably related distinction between the offenses such that disparate punishment is justified | The court held there is no intelligible standard distinguishing the punishments here; disparate sentencing based on charging discretion violates equal protection |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (Colorado equal protection requires statutory crime classifications be based on real and reasonably related differences)
- United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (U.S. 1979) (interpreting federal double-jeopardy and related concerns; distinguished by Marcy)
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (different penalties for identical conduct deny equal protection absent reasonable distinctions)
- People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1986) (similarly situated persons must receive like treatment under equal protection)
- People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1982) (a more severe penalty for conduct indistinguishable from conduct carrying a lesser penalty violates equal protection)
- People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1987) (discusses limits of prosecutorial charging choices under overlapping statutes)
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (U.S. 1985) (courts are generally hesitant to review prosecutorial charging decisions)
- People v. Richardson, 983 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1999) (reiterating equal protection principles for criminal classifications)
- People v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975) (classifications in criminal law must be reasonable, not arbitrary)