v. Ross, 2021 CO 9

Background

In 2015 Phillip L. Ross responded to online ads placed by two females (C.W. and M.O.) offering sexual services; the ads indicated ages of at least 19 and two-adult encounters.
Ross texted both, negotiated payment; he asked M.O. her age and she said 20; C.W.’s photograph appeared in ads.
Ross was charged with four counts of soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)–(b) (one (a) and one (b) count per girl).
At trial the court held § 18-7-407 barred defenses based on lack of knowledge or reasonable belief about the victim’s age but required the People to prove the defendant’s purpose was prostitution "of a child or by a child." The court acquitted the counts related to M.O. for lack of evidence of that purpose.
The Court of Appeals treated "for the purpose of" as equivalent to specific intent (with intent) and affirmed the acquittal as to M.O.; the People appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ result but on different grounds: the mens rea (whether with intent or knowingly) applies to every element of subsections (a) and (b), including that the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution, and § 18-7-407 does not shift that burden to strict liability for the victim’s age.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the phrase "for the purpose of" impose a culpable mental state (mens rea) and, if so, which one?	"For the purpose of" does not state a mens rea; impute "knowingly" under § 18-1-503.	The phrase expresses mens rea equivalent to "with intent" (specific intent to effect child prostitution).	The Court did not decide between "with intent" vs "knowingly" here, but held that whichever mens rea applies covers all elements, including the "child" qualification of the purpose element.
Must the People prove the defendant’s purpose was specifically prostitution "of a child or by a child," or is it enough to prove a purpose of prostitution generally plus that the victim turned out to be a child?	§ 18-7-402(a)/(b) can be read to require only a general purpose of prostitution and strict liability for victim age (so proof prostitution + victim-child suffices).	The statute requires proof that the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution specifically; victim-age is not a separately strict-liability element.	The Court held the phrase must be read together: the People must prove the defendant’s purpose was prostitution of or by a child; proof of general prostitution plus the fact the victim was a child is insufficient.
Does § 18-7-407 (no defense of lack of knowledge or reasonable belief about age) convert the victim-age aspect into a strict-liability element that the People need not mens rea-qualify?	§ 18-7-407 creates strict liability regarding the victim’s age for prosecutions under §§ 18-7-402–407.	§ 18-7-407 only eliminates certain defenses; it does not relieve the People of proving the mens rea-applicable purpose element (child prostitution).	The Court held § 18-7-407 bars the defendant’s age-defense but does not relieve the People of proving the defendant’s purposeful intent that the prostitution be "of a child or by a child."

Key Cases Cited

Thompson v. People, 471 P.3d 1045 (Colo. 2020) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; give effect to legislative intent).
Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 457 P.3d 568 (Colo. 2020) (interpret statutes harmoniously and give effect to all parts).
People v. Stellabotte, 421 P.3d 174 (Colo. 2018) (plain-meaning rules and avoiding conflict among statutes).
People v. Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1991) (crime of soliciting for prostitution completes upon solicitation/arrangement for that purpose).
People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982) (soliciting for prostitution complete when offender solicits or arranges/offers to arrange a meeting).
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (discussion of the constitutional-avoidance canons).