2020 COA 33
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Marcello Pratarelli and his wife separated and used an informal, alternating parenting arrangement (no custody order).
- On Nov. 7, 2016, Pratarelli picked up their 3‑year‑old daughter from daycare, she fell asleep in his car, and he later drove to his estranged wife’s home and assaulted her with a stun gun.
- After the assault he drove away with the still‑sleeping daughter and ultimately traveled to Mexico; the wife negotiated the child’s return and came back with the child.
- Pratarelli was arrested and charged with crimes related to the assault and later charged with first‑degree kidnapping of his daughter; a jury convicted him of first‑degree kidnapping (as to the child) and other offenses.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the first‑degree kidnapping conviction for the child (insufficient evidence of “forcibly seizes and carries”) and affirmed the remaining convictions; remanded with directions to enter acquittal on that count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved the statutory element “forcibly seizes and carries” for first‑degree kidnapping | People argued Pratarelli’s act of putting the child in the car and driving her to Mexico showed he used power and thus forcibly seized and carried her | Pratarelli argued there was no evidence he used or threatened force against the child; he had legal custody and the child was asleep and not resisting | Vacated conviction — “forcibly” requires use or threat of power, violence, or pressure against a person and against opposition or resistance; no such evidence here |
| Whether a custodial parent can be guilty of kidnapping absent a custody order | People implicitly relied on statutory application to this case | Pratarelli relied on parental fundamental rights and Armendariz: absent court order parents share custody and a custodial parent cannot be convicted of kidnapping or second‑degree kidnapping for taking their own child | Court applied Armendariz principles: parental custody rights limit criminal liability; here parental rights undermined forcible‑seizure proof |
| Whether the court should enter second‑degree kidnapping as a lesser included offense | People asked the court to replace vacated first‑degree kidnapping with second‑degree kidnapping | Pratarelli argued Armendariz precludes convicting a custodial parent of second‑degree kidnapping absent custody order | Denied — Court declined to substitute second‑degree kidnapping because Armendariz bars convicting a custodial parent under those circumstances |
| Whether the district court violated defendant’s right to present a mental‑condition defense (denials of continuance, exam, and restrictions on testimony) | People maintained the court properly managed scheduling and procedure; no prejudice shown | Pratarelli argued denials prevented investigation of cerebral small vessel disease and impaired his defense; sought continuances, a court‑ordered exam, and to testify about memory/cognition | Denial of additional continuance and exam not an abuse of discretion; defendant had prior notice and time to investigate, failed to timely seek expert notice, journal was admitted and documented complaints, any testimonial restriction was harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (recognizing parents’ fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their children)
- Armendariz v. People, 711 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1986) (absent custody order, parents share custody and a custodial parent generally cannot be convicted of kidnapping)
- Commonwealth v. Beals, 541 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 1989) (absent custody order, a parent does not commit kidnapping by taking exclusive possession of their child)
- Lee v. People, 127 P. 1023 (Colo. 1912) (kidnapping conviction upheld where parent took child in violation of custody decree)
- People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 1996) (affirming kidnapping conviction where parent seized child in violation of custody order)
- Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007) (court may not add elements to a statute beyond the legislature’s text)
