v. People, 2020 CO 15

Petitioner Nevik Howard (age 16) was charged in juvenile court with first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and transferred to district court under § 19-2-518. He was convicted and sentenced to six years YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC term.
Colorado law provides two ways to try juveniles as adults: direct-file (§ 19-2-517) and transfer (§ 19-2-518). The direct-file statute expressly excludes direct-filed juveniles from the mandatory-minimum provisions of the crime-of-violence statute (§ 18-1.3-406); the transfer statute does not.
The crime-of-violence statute mandates incarceration (at least the midpoint of the presumptive range) and generally makes defendants subject to it ineligible for probation except by a post‑placement modification after 119 days in DOC.
Howard argued the statutory difference created an equal protection violation: transferred juveniles face mandatory incarceration and probation ineligibility while direct-filed juveniles (who could have worse records) would be eligible for probation.
At sentencing the district court declined to apply the mandatory minimums to Howard (giving him the benefit of the direct-file sentencing floor) but concluded probation was not an initial option; the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the disparity between direct-file and transfer sentencing implicates equal protection	Howard: Transferred juveniles are subject to mandatory minimum incarceration and probation-ineligible while direct-filed juveniles are exempt from mandatory minimums and thus probation-eligible, creating unequal treatment	People: The direct-file exclusion only removes the mandatory-floor sentencing requirement; it does not make probation an available initial sentencing option	No equal protection violation on these facts: the district court declined to apply mandatory minimums and neither path makes probation an initial option for crimes-of-violence defendants, so Howard was not treated differently regarding probation or the applicable sentencing range
Whether the direct-file exclusion makes direct-filed juveniles initially probation-eligible	Howard: Excluding direct-filed juveniles from § 18-1.3-406 means probation becomes available to them	People: The exclusion removes only the mandatory-floor requirement (midpoint minimum); the crime-of-violence statute itself bars initial probation except by a later DOC-modification	Held: The exclusion permits sentencing below the statutory midpoint but does not make probation an initial option; probation remains available only via the § 18-1.3-406 post-placement modification exception

Dean v. People, 366 P.3d 593 (Colo. 2016) (explaining Colorado equal-protection principles in criminal statutes)
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995) (equal protection violated where identical conduct punished more harshly under two statutes)
Chavez v. People, 359 P.3d 1040 (Colo. 2015) (defendant subject to crime-of-violence enhancement is not probation-eligible initially)
Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Ortho, 965 P.2d 1246 (Colo. 1998) (statutory construction disfavors readings that render provisions superfluous)
Munoz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 425 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2018) (apply plain statutory language when clear)
McCoy v. People, 442 P.3d 379 (Colo. 2019) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)