2019 COA 130
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Dearies D. A. Lee was charged with multiple counts including second-degree assault by strangulation (§ 18-3-203(1)(i)), two second-degree assault counts under the deadly-weapon subsection (§ 18-3-203(1)(b)), child abuse, and a crime-of-violence sentence enhancer.
- Prosecutors added the deadly-weapon counts and attached the crime-of-violence enhancer to all second-degree assault counts.
- After People v. Slaughter, Lee moved to dismiss the deadly-weapon counts and the crime-of-violence enhancer; the district court granted the motion.
- The court of appeals was asked whether the same manual-strangulation conduct may be charged under both § 18-3-203(1)(b) (deadly weapon) and § 18-3-203(1)(i) (strangulation).
- Legislative changes in 2016 created the specific strangulation subsection (1)(i) and removed the deadly-weapon element for strangulation prosecutions; (1)(i) carries a lower maximum sentence and is not a per se crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May identical manual-strangulation conduct be charged under both § 18-3-203(1)(b) and § 18-3-203(1)(i)? | Prosecutors may charge under both subsections (and thus plead alternative counts); Slaughter dictum suggested charging under (1)(b) remained possible. | Charging the same strangulation under both subsections creates disparate maximum penalties and violates equal protection; legislative intent was to funnel all strangulation into (1)(i). | The court held charging the same manual-strangulation conduct under both subsections is impermissible: such dual charging violates equal protection and (1)(i) was intended to be the exclusive vehicle for strangulation. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (Colorado applies stricter equal-protection scrutiny where statutes criminalize identical conduct with different penalties)
- People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (statutory classifications must be based on real differences reasonably related to criminal-law purposes)
- People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1987) (a specific statute does not necessarily preclude prosecution under a general statute absent legislative intent)
- People v. Smith, 938 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1997) (factors for determining whether a specific statute supplants a general one)
- People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988) (prosecutor may charge separate offenses for the same conduct)
- People v. James, 497 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1972) (same-conduct prosecutions under multiple enactments permitted subject to statutory limits)