v. Dyer
2019 COA 161
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Dyer’s mother reported alleged neglect of seven‑year‑old S.D., who has a seizure disorder; DHS caseworkers obtained an order to investigate under § 19‑3‑308(3)(b) but did not obtain a search warrant.
- Police and DHS caseworkers repeatedly attempted contact; police officers later entered Dyer’s home without a warrant or consent, observed S.D. seize, and requested an ambulance.
- Caseworkers and paramedics entered the home (without consent or a warrant); S.D. was transported to the hospital; Dyer was interviewed at the hospital by a police officer and a caseworker.
- At suppression, the trial court found the officers’ entry illegal and suppressed their in‑home observations, but admitted caseworkers’ and paramedics’ in‑home observations and the hospital interview.
- A jury convicted Dyer of first‑degree child abuse; on appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals held (as a matter of first impression in Colorado) that DHS caseworkers are governmental actors subject to the Fourth Amendment, that their warrantless entry was illegal, and that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the caseworkers’ and paramedics’ in‑home observations and Dyer’s hospital interview; conviction reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are DHS caseworkers subject to the Fourth Amendment? | Caseworkers were not police agents; their civil welfare role made Fourth Amendment analysis inapplicable or different. | Caseworkers are governmental officials and thus Fourth Amendment limits apply. | Caseworkers are governmental actors subject to the Fourth Amendment; no "social worker" exception. |
| Was the caseworkers’ entry into the home lawful? | The order to investigate under § 19‑3‑308(3)(b) authorized the investigation and justified actions taken. | The order did not authorize warrantless entry; absent consent or a search warrant, entry was illegal. | Entry was warrantless and without consent and not authorized by the investigatory order; illegal under the Fourth Amendment. |
| Must evidence from caseworkers/paramedics and the hospital interview be suppressed? | Evidence was admissible (civil context/A.E.L.); alternatively, inevitable discovery or medical‑emergency exceptions would permit admission. | Observations and the hospital interview were fruits of the illegal entry and must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. | The in‑home observations of caseworkers and paramedics and the hospital interview were direct fruits of the illegal entries and required suppression; inevitable‑discovery and medical‑emergency doctrines not resolved on this record. |
| Were Dyer’s hospital statements inadmissible under Miranda or involuntariness? | Statements were noncustodial and voluntary. | Statements were custodial/involuntary given the circumstances (and also tainted by the illegal entry). | Court did not decide Miranda/voluntariness because suppression of evidence as fruit of illegal entry made it unnecessary; on remand these issues should be evaluated under the totality of circumstances including the illegal entries. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishing custodial‑interrogation warnings requirement)
- New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (Fourth Amendment protects against arbitrary invasions by any governmental official)
- Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (Fourth Amendment requires judicial oversight of home inspections/searches)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (exclusionary rule: evidence is suppressed if obtained by exploiting illegality)
- Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351 (Colo.) (analyzing attenuation and fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree principles)
- Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207 (Colo.) (exclusionary rule as remedy for Fourth Amendment violations)
- Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir.) (no social‑worker exception to the Fourth Amendment)
- People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App.) (treated exclusionary‑rule considerations in civil dependency context)
- Perez v. People, 231 P.3d 957 (Colo.) (Miranda warnings do not cure taint of prior illegal search for fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree analysis)
- People v. Diaz, 53 P.3d 1171 (Colo.) (describing the inevitable‑discovery exception)