*1 attorney’s lien senior to fact that an is suggest hospital lien does not The PEOPLE of the State of Petitioner, Colorado, proportionate hospital required pay is Giving attorney’s attorney fees. share of it priority simply means that is satisfied hen hospital lien is then satisfied
first. The RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. Rafael injured payable to [the] the “net amount No. 96SC230. (1996 38-27-101, § 16A person.” C.R.S. Although hospital lien cannot be Supp.). Colorado, attorney’s lien has collected until after the En Banc. nothing in statute indicates paid,
been hospital lien is re- the amount Sept. 1997. attorney’s payment of the lien. duced Rehearing Denied Oct. injured person’s recovery not suffi- If the attorney’s satisfy both the lien and cient to hen, attorney’s hospital hen must be mean, however, first. This does not
satisfied patient longer no liable for the full hospital hospital charges. amount of any entitled to cohect deficien- would still be cy from other assets. case, attorney Trevino’s was enti- amount one-third of tled to a hen $80,000 nego- entire settlement award he funds tiated with Hartford. The settlement attorney satisfy were sufficient to both Thus, hospital hen. the defen- fees and the required look to other dants were not payment of Trevino’s medical sources for bills. appeals the court of cor- conclude that University Hospi- HHL
rectly held that attorney liable for a share of the tal were not obtaining the settlement. fees incurred appeals. affirm the court of We therefore SCOTT, J., participate. does *4 Norton, General, Attorney
Gale A. Martha Phillips Allbright, Deputy Chief Attorney^ General, Westfall, Richard A. Solicitor Geni eral, Dailey, Deputy Attorney John Daniel General, Russel, Robert Mark First Assis- General, Attorney Roger tant G. Billqtte, General, Attorney Assistant Criminal ¡En- Section, Denver, forcement for Petitioner! Vela, David F. Public De- Colorado State fender, Grimaldi, Deputy James State Public Defender, Denver, Respondent. for j Opinión delivered the Justice BENDER the Court. granted
We
certiorari
v. Rodri-
guez,
(Colo.App.1996),
appeals reversed I. suppress, holding that Rodriguez’s motion to Rodriguez constituted the detention of 30, 1992, Rodriguez September On Rodriguez’s later illegal which tainted arrest (1-70) in traveling east on Interstate 70 his holding of affirm the consent to search. We wife, van, accompanied by pregnant his employ appeals, but we different the court of toddlers, and a friend named their three reasoning. They returning from Miguel Munoz. were Nevada, Vegas, Las to their home Chica- possesses hold that when an officer go, Rodriguez was born Illinois. traffic offense has suspicion that a speaks of Puerto Rico and Commonwealth and the officer has decided been committed English. was born Mexico little Munoz give a ticket for the traffic not to the driver of Illinois. Munoz is and is now a resident offense, identifying may request the officer English. bilingual Spanish driver, such as a driv- information from the license, proof of registration, vehicle er’s a.m., approximately 7:25 as At for informa- insurance. We hold 1-70, driving winding section of *5 constitutionally permissible because tion is Vail, trooper state ob- west of a Colorado evaluated on the the officer’s conduct is to be the con- Rodriguez’s served van weave across objective The standard. officer’s basis of right by line on the shoulder tinuous white give a does subjective decision not to ticket van, approximately half the width of the then justification to strip legal not the officer the white-dashed line on cross over and touch inquiries. The circumstances make further trooper lane. The fol- the other side of its case, is, in discrepancies of this minor a mile and a approximately the van lowed registration and the lack of the Nad- the van straight highway near the half to a stretch van, doorjamb safety er label on the trooper There the exit on 1-70. Wolcott troop- for the furnished reasonable inter- stopped on the shoulder of the the van investigate further whether the van was er to was whether the driver state to determine However, ninety-minute deten- stolen. intoxicated. forced Rodriguez and the ten-mile tion by trooper that he Upon being told permissible drive in this case exceeded he weaving, Rodriguez stated that was investigatory stop. The parameters of an Vegas to family driving from Las his were into an arrest temporary detention escalated very tired. The Chicago. He said he was by probable cause to believe unsupported that Rodri- trooper it was obvious testified stolen, in violation of the that the van was drinking. trooper The guez not had been to the United States Fourth Amendment a traffic that he would not issue decided II, 7 of the and Article Section Constitution Rodriguez failure to drive citation to Rodriguez’s arrest Colorado Constitution. trooper (weaving).2 The single lane within not illegal. His consent to search was was license and requested Rodriguez’s driver’s illegal this arrest sufficiently attenuated from Rodriguez produced registration. vehicle immediately preceded his consent. which trooper and the instructed these documents Hence, that the heroin discover- we conclude trooper also in the van. The him to wait Rodriguez’s van must be in the search of ed vehicle iden- recorded the van’s observed and suppressed. affirm and remand to 18-18-405, (1996 the driver has Supp.). from such lane until be moved § 8B C.R.S. 1. See can be that such movement first ascertained (1996 42-4-1007(l)(a), 17 C.R.S. 2. Section safety. made with Supp.), provides: practica- nearly as as A vehicle shall be driven entirely single not within a lane and shall ble (VIN) another, inconspicuous location. tification from dashboard the VIN number trooper did not know the location of the looking through the side corner of The driver’s patrol He believed that a state the vehicle’s windshield. hidden VIN. specialist theft Grand Junction would auto Rodriguez’s trooper The ran a check on him able to tell where the hidden VIN be license, registration, and VIN. The license The did not could be found. want valid, regis- properly was the vehicle was on the shoulder of search for the hidden VIN name, Rodriguez’s tered under and the van the interstate because of his concern for his reported The had not been stolen. VIN safety safety occupants and for the reg- the dashboard matched the on the VIN He decided to conduct further in the van. signs istration card and showed no of altera- vestigation at a better location ten miles However, tampering. trooper’s tion or west, headquarters Eagle. patrol the state registration re- examination of the vehicle discrepancies. registration trooper approached Rodriguez, ex- vealed two plained discrepancies concerning the van’s card indicated that the letters on “CAW,” plate plate the actual numbers and the manufacture date of license were but van, requested Rodriguez plate letters on the license were “CAD.” In follow addition, registration patrol Eagle, him to the state office in card indicated model, comput- ten van the van was a 1985 while the was miles west where the was stopped opposite er check showed that the van was a 1980 direction from registration traveling. model. The hand writ- which was card was Because ten; gave English he testified little fluent he had weight registration difficulty understanding request. to the because of this Mu- noz, seat, provided sitting passenger fact. also who in the Depart- began interpret. Rodriguez, through with a document from the Illinois Mu- concerning interpreter, replied ment of Motor Vehicles his hand- noz as that he did not time, *6 trooper Eagle. written card. At this how- want to follow Rodri- ever, trooper guez they not did read the document said were too tired and wanted to impres- way troop- and later testified he was under the continue their eastward. The paper regis- Rodriguez was a sion reminder for er told that he would disable and plates against impound Rodriguez complied trants to check their the card the van unless accuracy. Eagle. with his to return to Rodri- guez agreed trooper. then to follow the At discrepancies reg- Because of the with the point Rodriguez this had been detained for trooper compare istration the decided to forty-two trooper, minutes. The followed registration from the VIN dashboard and Rodriguez, left at the roadside location 8:07 Label,” with the VIN on the “Nader which is Eagle approximately a.m. and arrived glued doorjamb a sticker that is to the on the later, During fourteen minutes at 8:21 a.m. trooper driver’s side of an automobile. The drive, trooper contacted second appears testified that this per- label on “99 trooper Eagle. and asked for assistance “only cent” of and that it vehicles takes a couple compare patrol headquarters seconds” to At 8:25 a.m. VINs. With- at requesting permission, trooper Eagle, trooper out a video the second assembled opened began videotaping the driver’s side door of the van and camera and the van and found that the van did not have a Nader the area around the van. The time and the Label. factual summaries discussed below are based part upon this video which was introduced Label, In the absence of Nader during’ hearing on Rodri- as evidence trooper compare wanted to another VIN on guez’s suppress. motion to the van to the from the VIN dashboard and registration trooper morning, card. The aware Because it was a cold the first place trooper Rodriguez’s automobile manufacturers often wife and their chil- told a.m., warm, trooper emerged At the first go nearby get diner to but 8:48 dren to to a approached the driver’s office Rodriguez Munoz to remain required he Rodriguez’s registration side of the van with trooper the first with vehicle. While trooper and other documents in hand. The telephone headquarters to went inside the explained apparent that there was an clerical regarding loca- specialist theft the auto registration card and error on the advised VIN, trooper second tion of the hidden Rodriguez “get get in and it corrected.” the van to ensure remained outside with suggested Rodriguez “talk to He some- leave. Munoz Rodriguez and Munoz did not one” about the absence of a Nader Label on explain discrepancies on the attempted to doorjamb. At 8:50 a.m. the first trooper by registration card to the second Rodriguez step instructed out of the van showing him the notice from the Illinois De- and told Munoz and the others to remain which informed partment of Motor Vehicles Rodriguez inside the van. was led to the Rodriguez, among things, other that “the vehicle, troopers rear of the where the two your current identifi- plate license number on joined by The uni- were a third. three cation card is incorrect.” conversation formed, troopers, considerably larger armed troop- Rodriguez and Munoz the second with Rodriguez, than him in a semi- surrounded er read this notice aloud at 8:32 a.m. but returned circle. first Rodri- acknowledge that this document ex- failed to him, stating, you guez’s documents to “I’ll let digit between the plained back,” the one difference Rodriguez’s if have all this and asked “okay.” following exchange In- plates van’s and the card. wife place: then took stead, the sub- changed the second ject by asking Mu- of the conversation both go Trooper 1: You’re free to now. Would respective noz their countries right it be all if we searched van? your When answered that he of birth. Rodriguez: Pardon? Rico, trooper initially in Puerto was born Trooper you if 1: Would mind we looked recognize that this entitled did your any illegal weapons? van for citizenship.3 to United States Rodriguez: Sure. trooper emerged from the head-
The first okay? Trooper 1: Would that be quarters opened of the van. the hood Contraband, any Trooper contraband? 2: quickly located a VIN under the hood He any you carrying contraband? Are located on the dash- which matched VIN Rodriguez: Huh? one written on the vehicle board and the *7 Trooper 2: Guns? Contraband? registration This final match occurred card. No, Rodriguez: no. 8:36, seventy-one minutes after Rodri- at initially stopped on 1-70. guez’s Trooper van was 2: Guns? point, trooper The first testified that at this Rodriguez: guns. No Rodriguez the he satisfied that was was Trooper guns? 2: No Nevertheless, the
rightful owner of the van. okay? Trooper 1: Is it Munoz, Rodriguez and who detention okay. Rodriguez: It’s joined by Rodriguez’s wife this time had been children, continued. All waited and three Rodriguez reached into the van and re- un- an additional fifteen minutes the van for keys ignition. the He trieved the trooper supervision pushed the opened the second rear door of the van and der the large speaker aside a stereo dominated trooper returned to the office. while the first country you Trooper: citizen. Trooper: He’s a And what are from? Uh, American, Rodriguez: yeah. Puerto Rico. Munoz: An Trooper: Puerto Rico. right, Trooper: Rico is an Ameri- That’s Puerto Rodriguez: Yes. possession, isn’t it? can Okay. you Trooper: Munoz] Are both ... [to Munoz: Yes. he a resident also? Trooper: I’ll be darned. a citizen. Munoz: He's early as dog could have been made as Rodriguez’s tion the entrance to the van. wife the roadside detention. the children to return to and were instructed street, troop- the second diner across the but suppress a motion to filed stated, [Rodriguez] stays here with er “He conducting evidentiary After heroin. us.” hearing, denied the motion the district court ruling stop initial and suppress, that the to commenced, prior but to After the search registra- request license and for driver’s troop- discovery drugs, the second of the court that were valid. The district ruled tion engaged in conversation with er a recorded registration and li- discrepancies in the trooper trooper another in which the second plate problems with the VIN cense stop highway described the initial on the as trooper suspicion for the created reasonable stop.” an “interdiction He further stated impound the van. The district court then occupants “appli- of the vehicle were that the voluntarily con- concluded enforcement,” “[t]hey’re cants for law van. The court sented to the search of the enforcement,” commenting gonna receive law it concerned that commented was Rico, other one’s that “one’s from Puerto troopers drug dog called for a detection as from Mexico.” did, nevertheless, early they as but under the circumstances, totality of the ruled minutes, the first two For the next 25 legal. search troopers a meticulous search of conducted a.m., troopers of the the van. At 9:15 one appeals The court of reversed the district speaker large removed from the stereo sev- Rodriguez’s sup- denial of motion to court’s tape. drug A eral balls of electrical trained press. stop The court reasoned balls, dog which were detection alerted to appropriate investigatory the van was an heroin. Rodri- later determined to contain stop trooper’s suspi- based on the arrested, guez Rodri- and Munoz were driving under the cion was charged guez possession was with of a sched- influence of alcohol. Once the was ule I controlled substance. satisfied that the driver was sober and decid- weaving, ed not to ticket him for the court exactly is unclear when The record as held that the lacked reasonable sus- drug dog requested by detection picion inquiries to make further of Rodri- County trooper. Eagle first Sheriffs given by guez. Subsequent information Rod- deputy transported dog who testified riguez, such as his license patrol dispatcher a.m. the at 8:00 state re- card, illegal the fruit of his detention. quested dog assistance because applied part three articu- The court test to search a vehicle. first intended Illinois, lated in Brown v. 422 U.S. deputy testified he arrived at the State (1975), S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d hold headquarters Eagle Patrol fifteen minutes Rodriguez’s that the invalid tainted con- call, receipt after of this and that when he and ruled that the heroin sent search scene, approximately arrived on the at 8:15 suppressed. in the must be seized search a.m., troopers already conducting were granted At the we According testimony their search. appeals, certiorari.4 affirm the court of *8 trooper, Eagle the first he did not return to reasoning. but differ our Rodriguez with and Munoz until 8:21 a.m. Thus, request occurred sometime be- II. tween 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. The district concerning discrepancy, searches and court did not resolve this but Our law extensively developed. re- request drug did find that the for the detec- seizures is With noted that the 4. after the officer The issues on certiorari were framed as fol- lows: defendant was not intoxicated. Officer, 1. Whether a Colorado State Patrol suspect Whether a valid detention of the 2. stop who made a a motorist for failure valid of in order to determine if he was was conducted traffic, stay single in a lane of had a valid driving vehicle. a stolen request basis to the defendant’s driver's license
1359
at the
of
by
case we
known to the officer
time
the en
the issues raised
this
speet to
counter and the rational
inferences from
States Consti-
view the Colorado and United
suspicion
these facts create a “reasonable
follow
tutions as co-extensive and therefore
activity
justify
criminal
the intrusion into
precedent
as our own. Gen-
federal
as well
security.”
personal
People
v.
defendant’s
are
erally,
searches and seizures
warrantless
Thomas,
1272, 1274(Colo.1983);
660 P.2d
see
they satisfy
per
unless
one
se unreasonable
(Colo.
H.J.,
1177,
People
P.2d
v.
931
1180
clearly ar-
specifically
established and
1997).
require-
exceptions to the warrant
ticulated
exception
One such
is an arrest based
ment.
People
ap-
contend that the court of
probable
exception
A
upon
cause.
second
peals erred in its determination that
by
investigatory stop supported
a
a brief
suspicion
lacked reasonable
to make
activity.
suspicion of criminal
See
reasonable
inquires
further
once he was satisfied that
Ohio,
1, 30-31,
Terry v.
Rodriguez was not intoxicated and he deter-
(1968).
1868, 1884-85, 20
Be-
L.Ed.2d
Rodriguez
weaving.
mined not to ticket
for
person
a
seizure of a
is autho-
cause
limited
agree.
suspicion,
rized
a standard of reasonable
probable
holding
which is less than the standard
appeals applied
The court of
(Colo.
cause,
stop
investigatory
81,
must be “brief
People Redinger, 906 P.2d
v.
duration,
scope,
1995),
trooper’s request
limited
and narrow
to invalidate
for
340,
purpose.” People Tottenhoff,
Rodriguez
691 P.2d
v.
information from
because the
(Colo.1984).
accomplished
purpose of the
when
concluded that
and decided not
to ticket him for
Stopping
implicates
a
vehicle
sober
motor
Thus,
weaving.
request
for a
An
driver’s
protections.
Fourth Amendment
officer
registration information was im
license and
may engage
investigatory stop
in an
of a car
proper
it was not
on a rea
running
because
based
question
and then
the driver without
suspicion that
had com
sonable
prohibition
Fourth Amendment’s
afoul
committing a
offense.
mitted or was
traffic
against
and seizures
unreasonable searches
(1)
request
if
for infor
The court noted that
a
provided three conditions exist:
reason
permitted
mation had been
after the
activity has oc
able
that criminal
any
traf
curred,
decided not to ticket
taking place,
or is about to take
offense,
(2)
render mean
objective
fic
would
for the in
place;
a reasonable
(3)
statutory requirement
a
ingless the
trusion;
a
connection be
an officer iden
required “to hand”
intru
driver be
and character of the
tween
Altman,
upon the officer’s reason
tifying information
objective.
People v.
sion and its
a
suspicion that
the driver committed
142,
(Colo.1997);
able
People
v.
P.2d
Davis,
(Colo.1995);
offense.5
traffic
4 n. 6
903 P.2d
(Colo.1994).
Weston,
pronouncements of our court
validity
investigato
Recent
determining
of an
clarify
States
must consider
United
ry stop,
the district court
in mak
whether,
reviewing
an officer’s conduct
totality
the circum
under the
stop,
reviewing
a
court
stances,
ing
investigatory
“specific
articulable facts”
Whether,
any peace
request-
officer who has
deten-
the same to
at the conclusion of that
tion,
voluntary
suspect gave
peace
person
consent
if such
officer
ed such
to do so
of his vehicle.
suspects
person
authorities for
search
reasonably
is com-
such
committed,
mitting,
or is about to commit
has
(1993),
42-2-113(1),
states:
5. Section
17 C.R.S.
3, 4,
6, 7,
or 8 of this
a violation of article
person
...
who has been issued a driver's
No
title.
*9
operates
... who
a motor vehicle
license
(reen-
42-2-115(1),
(1996 Supp.)
§
17 C.R.S.
Cf.
actment of above statute
state,
license ...
in such
and who has such
substantially
similar
possession
person's
shall refuse
immediate
language).
..,
billfold,
any
remove such license
cover,
purse,
to hand
or other container and
trooper pos-
weaving. We hold that the
objective analy
of
on an
base its decision
must
objectively reasonable and articula-
sessed an
suspicion
exists
sis -ofwhether reasonable
engaged in
had
suspicion
ble
upon
justify
temporary
intrusion and not
activity, namely, the traffic offense
criminal
subjective
arresting officer.
intent of the
trooper was autho-
weaving, and thus the
—
of
States,
v. United
See Whren
U.S.
identifying information from
rized
1769, 1774,
—, —,
135 L.Ed.2d
Rodriguez.
Altman,
(1996);
An offi
all hearing suppress. on a motion to beliefs at A. Sosbe, People v. See subjective (Colo.1990). An officer’s assess trooper’s Next we address whether may helpful ment of the facts be to a district investigate wheth- detention of understanding court’s of the facts confront er was stolen constituted a valid the van ing the officer at the time the search. investigatory stop. addition, subjective intentions an officer’s However, credibility. may affect his the crit During stop an a valid traffic officer Whren, holding that an illicit ical officer’s license, regis may request a vehicle driver’s will not invalidate an otherwise valid motives Reding proof of See tration and insurance. seizure, requires disapproval er, search or may P.2d at 85-86. An officer also outstanding appeals point. computer war decision of the court of on this run a check for long procedure as this does not rants so unreasonably of the tem extend the duration Here, trooper stopped Rodriguez Cobb, porary People v. detention. See suspecting him of criminal offenses: two (Colo.1984). 848, 852 These intrusions P.2d observed, weaving, which the H.J., minimal. 931 P.2d at are brief and driving troop under the influence. Once the produces a valid license 1182. Once a driver he er determined was sober operate proof that he is entitled possessed still vehicle, proceed must be allowed to “he Rodriguez committed the traffic offense being subject to further way, his without weaving. suspicion weaving His did not questioning.” delay by police for additional dissipate though even he decided to issue Mendez, 118 F.3d States v. United weaving. troop Rodriguez a citation for (10th Cir.1997). subjective er’s decision not to ticket weaving strip authority to and a Rodriguez produced did not him of his a valid license testified inquire concerning registration card. further the traffic offense valid *10 computer infor- checks on the tendered B. However, up mation “came clear.” Rodri- purpose Next we address whether the guez’s registration card con- hand-written trooper’s the detention reasonable. The irregularities. plate tained two The license purpose stated was to detain the van to by number was incorrect one letter and locate a hidden VIN. year of the van’s manufacture did not match First, purposes. A VIN three serves it computer information obtained from simplifies accuracy and increases the of recall addition, check. In no Nader Label existed (1996). campaigns.. § See 49 C.F.R. 565.1 doorjamb People on the van. (as Second, the VIN well as several other argue provided that these facts information) pieces appears on a label suspicion with reasonable to believe that the which required vehicle manufacturers are stolen, might justified car be further affix to most vehicles to assist consumers detention of for additional investi- determining which of the federal standards gation. agree. regarding safety prevention apply and theft § to their vehicles. See 49 C.F.R. 537.1 proof registration Insufficient (1996); (1994). § see also 49 U.S.C. may provide suspi for a vehicle reasonable commonly This label is referred to as the may cion to believe that the car be stolen. Third, “Nader Label.” VIN aids auto (driver’s H.J., at P.2d 1181-82 failure prevention. Department theft provide registration provided reasonable Transportation promulgated the Federal stolen); suspicion People that car was v. Standard, Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention (Colo.1996)6 Litchfield, requires manufacturers to affix the car, (during stop traffic of leased permanently major eighteen VIN onto auto- suspicion occupants tempo existed to detain parts mobile on most vehicles. See 49 C.F.R. rarily provided unsigned who two rental (1996). § purpose of the Theft Pre- agreements, only one of which matched vehi vention Standard is to “reduce the incidence cle; passenger gave inconsistent statements by facilitating of motor vehicle thefts purpose trip; as to the and vehicle was tracing recovery parts from stolen beyond geographical imposed by restrictions (1996). § vehicles.” 49 C.F.R. 541.2 agreement). rental The facts of this case appear to be unusual because the vehicle express legisla Because one of the registration accompa was hand written and yiN purposes affixing tive onto auto explaining nied an official document parts mobile to assist law enforcement registration card contained an error. We vehicles, recovering officers stolen we hold agree with the district court’s assessment trooper possessed pur a reasonable significant that “it’s that there are two dis pose temporarily detaining Rodriguez crepancies rather than one.” The two errors compare his van to the VIN obtained from registration coupled on the card with the card and the dashboard with absence of a Nader Label furnished the a hidden located on the vehicle.8 VIN suspicion with reasonable might Hence, van stolen. be we hold that C. trooper possessed suspicion a reasonable activity of criminal which authorized him to Next we address whether investigate stop, given further.7 and character of the suspicion may sup- 6. We note required that a reasonable bels are not on all vehicles. While the port investigatory protective may and even a alteration or removal of a Nader Label be vehicle, stolen, weapons probable search of a but cause an indication that the vehicle is the ab- required impoundment among for actual of that vehi- sence of a Nader Label is one factor holding cle. We limit our others to consider. Litchfield accordingly. recognize 8.We in this case emphasize, opened 7. We the fact that a vehicle the van and examined the does not the door to display Rodriguez's permission doorjamb a Nader Label is not determinative of the without troopers opened issue of reasonable because these la- that the two also and looked *11 1362 defendant.”); Place, 709, 103 462 at
intrusion, reasonably pur the U.S. related to its was (holding that an officer’s dili- investiga S.Ct. at 2645 prerequisite for an pose, the third investigation during the person gent pursuit of an stop. the must tory This seizure of determining rea- duration, a in the scope, in and detention is factor limited “brief in be investigatory stop). of an Tottenhoff, at 691 P.2d sonableness purpose.” narrow stop investigatory involves an 343. When Third, to suspect required whether the questioning, detention and more than a brief one See move from location another. arrest, which must stop into an the escalates 491, Royer, 504, 103 v. Florida 460 U.S. S.Ct. by probable cause. See supported be 1328, (1983) 1319, 75 (moving 229 L.Ed.2d Only at when the Schreyer, 640 P.2d suspect one during location another possesses probable cause arrest officer investigatory stop, safety an in absence of parameters an may he of investi exceed security reasons, scope exceeded of Davis, 4; stop. P.2d at Tot gatory 903 Mickens, 646, stop); People v. 734 P.2d 649 (citing tenhoff, People at 344 v. 691 P.2d LaFave, su (Colo.App.1986); generally see 4 160, 122, 445 Reynolds, Ill.2d 68 Ill.Dec. 94 pra 9.2(g). § (traffic (1983) ripened into N.E.2d 766 to drive alternative, an arrest when officer told defendant Fourth, whether there were station)). police follow him to available and “whether less intrusive means unreasonably failing to acted police parame To determine whether pursue Sharpe, 470 recognize [them].” or to 1575; investigatory stop 686, 105 have been ex Royer, ters of 460 at at see U.S. S.Ct. ceeded, 505, 103 we that the district court must hold at 1328. U.S. at S.Ct. at four circumstances:
consider least Here, ninety for was detained First, length of detention. a The minutes on the van important prolonged fac brevity given of intrusion “is an stolen. The this reason determining the seizure is so was that the did not know tor whether detention troop minimally justifiable VIN. If the as to be location hidden intrusive not, brevity and v. er with reasonable suspicion.” United States could intrusiveness, 709, 103 2637, 2645, Place, 696, locate another VIN on minimal 462 S.Ct. U.S. Cobb, (1983); comparison Rodriguez’s at vehicle for with L.Ed.2d 690 P.2d 77 110 see dashboard, (officer registration and the on the may computer run a check for VIN 852 authority to continue outstanding investigatory he lacked constitutional during an warrants Rodriguez. Compare Sharpe, 470 stop provided procedure that this does not detain detention); 683, 105 (twenty-minute at 1574 unreasonably gen see U.S. at S.Ct. extend Place, reasonable), LaFave, with 462 erally 4 R. and Sei detention was Wayne Search (3d 1996). 709-10, (ninety- at 9.2(f), § U.S. at 2645-46 at 58-65 ed. zure suspect’s luggage was minute detention of Second, diligently pur- whether officer scope stop), and “prolonged” and exceeded investigation during the detention. sued Hazelhurst, v. 675, Sharpe, 470 See United States (Colo.1983) thirty-minute (twenty to deten 1568, 1575, 605 84 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Mickens, stop), scope tion exceeded (1985) (“[W]e it appropriate consider to ex- (one-and-one-half hour deten 734 P.2d at pursued police diligently amine whether the stop). tion exceeded investigation likely to means of that was quickly, diligently pursue dispel suspicions or their did confirm de- necessary investigation during ninety-minute during it was which time detain (1986) (holding violate the we that an officer did not Because resolve under hood van. moving papers on the grounds, Amendment we do not reach the Fourth this case on other VIN); covering generally 1 question see these intrusions violated dashboard whether LaFave, 2.5(d), See, Class, § at Wayne R. e.g., Yorkv. Search Fourth Amendment. New Seizure ed.1996). (3d S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 81 475 U.S. reviewing engage tention. Rather than search for the courts not to hidden creative misconduct, way post police hoe evaluations of VIN at the Wolcott exit out of harm’s but interstate, only police to determine whether the acted chose to force the unreasonably given occupants Sharpe, case. See of the van to travel ten miles in *12 470 U.S. at S.Ct. at opposite direction of their destination. Eagle The forced return to was not calculat- dispel quickly
ed to summary, In troop we hold that the stolen;- van was nor did it constitute a brief Rodriguez, er’s detention of which started as Rodriguez. and minimal intrusion for The stop a traffic near the Wolcott exit on 1-70 Eagle investigation return to for further ninety and-ended minutes later and ten miles diligent investigation. not consistent with a away Eagle, investigatory stop was an Eagle, trooper In .discovered the match- require which exceeded the reasonableness a.m., ing VIN under the hood at 8:36 ment of the Fourth Amendment to the Unit dispelled suspicions his the van was ed Constitution. States Rodriguez stolen. He to detain continued family and his for min- an additional fifteen stop We hold that the traffic in this apparent returning
utes for no reason before case escalated into an troop arrest when the Rodriguez’s informing documents and Rodri- Rodriguez er forced to drive to the state guez that he was free to leave. This fifteen- patrol Eagle. discrepancies office The two delay minute also is not indicative of a dili- regarding and the absence of gent investigation. doorjamb van, a Nader Label on the computer when combined with the verifica trooper required testified that he tion that owned the vehicle and Eagle safety van to return to because of stolen, reported that it had not been did not concerns had he for searched the hidden VIN provide trooper probable with cause to on the shoulder of 1-70. The district court Hence, believe the van was stolen. Rod agreed, stating presents the interstate riguez’s right arrest violated his free of be certainly arguable “[i]t’s “risks” and that unreasonable searches and seizures. His ar things going it’s nicer to do that are to take a illegal. rest was little bit of time in town where there’s a street, right restaurant across the whether IV. not,
you it or use rather than out an However, highway.” investiga- interstate Next we address whether the heroin dis- tory permit prolonged traffic does not sup- covered in the been van should have point detention intrusive to the where the pressed illegal as the fruit of this arrest as occupants of a vehicle are forced to wait in a held, whether, appeals the court of as or restaurant. The detained argued by People, Rodriguez’s consent to near the exit Assuming Wolcott of 1-70. sufficiently the search attenuated the taint of issue, safety was an compelled and we feel illegal analysis arrest. We affirm the note that the detained appeals. the court of forty over highway minutes on the interstate conclusion, coming before to this then the Evidence as a direct re obtained appropriate measure was to move off of the illegal sult of an search or seizure is inadmis interstate at the Wolcott exit to conduct fur- States, Wong 371 sible. See Sun v. United investigation. ther 415, 471, 484, 407, 9 L.Ed.2d U.S. 83 S.Ct. investigation (1963) (articulation conclude at the poi Wolcott 441 of “fruit of the doctrine”). exit was an available alternative to the forced sonous tree To determine wheth Eagle. drive back to unreason- er as a direct result of evidence was obtained ably recognize pursue failed to or police illegality, inquiry this alter- the relevant reaching by exploi native. this conclusion we are the evidence was “come at whether warning illegality mindful of the Court’s or instead means tation of that 1364 “only if it is is admissible purported consent
sufficiently distinguishable purged to be 488, consent was both volun at primary Id. at 83 S.Ct. determined taint.” prior tary exploitation of the the evidence and not an 417. If the connection between illegality illegality.” as States v. Melendez-Gar is “so attenuated United (10th Cir.1994) (em taint, cia, 1046, not be the evidence will 28 1055 dissipate F.3d (a added) LaFave, 487, (citing supra at 417 3 suppressed.” Id. at phasis Traubert, 8.2(d)); not taint state- illegal People § arrest did v. 199 Colo. defendant’s see (1980); voluntarily 342, came to 322, ment v. when defendant P.2d 346-47 Arcila 608 ar- police days State, after the (Tex.Crim.App. station several 834 S.W.2d Lowe, raignment); Brown, Colo. 1992); at also see cf. (1980) 470, 476, (prosecu- (a confession must be both S.Ct. at *13 prove tape-recorded state- tion failed prior police voluntary and attenuated from thirty-five ille- minutes of ment taken within if a defendant’s consent illegality). Even taint gally free of the obtained statement was will not be ad voluntary, then the evidence illegal questioning). of the initial represents “an unless the consent missible purge pri of will the [sufficient]
act
free
a
illegal police
precedes
Sun,
action
When
mary
police illegality. Wong
taint” of
search,
defen
the
486,
Conversely,
defendant’s consent
at
at
S.Ct.
371 U.S.
83
may
of
dissipate the taint
dant’s later consent
illegality
consent and the
the fact that
the
hand,
police illegality.
the
On the other
preclude
possibil
are
does not
attenuated
illegality may fatally taint the consent.
police
will
on
ity that the evidence
be inadmissible
507-08,
at
Royer, 460
at
103 S.Ct.
U.S.
grounds that the consent was not volun
(later
by illegal sei
tainted
1329-30
consent
of
tary.
prosecution
the burden
The
bears
part
Royer
as
of
zure of
undertaken
proving both attenuation and voluntariness
attempt
gain
search
his consent to
officer’s
seeking admission of evidence discover
when
deciding
a
Royer’s luggage).
Brown,
whether
422
during a
search. See
ed
consent
“sufficiently an act
was
604,
2262; Traubert,
defendant’s consent
at
95
at
199
U.S.
S.Ct.
purge
primary
of
will to
taint
329,
free
vening particularly, go now. all You’re free Would it be of the official miscon purpose flagrancy your right if searched van? we (citations omitted); People see v. Id. duct.” (Colo.1994) Breidenbach, 879, intervening P.2d 890 circumstances occurred be- No holding illegal (applying the Brown test and tween the arrest and the consent. Cf. interrogation Padgett, given in viola 816-17 consent after v. (Colo.1997). Arizona, tion of 384 U.S. Miranda (1966), taint S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 694 was misconduct, are Focusing police we LaFave, by illegality); generally ed this see guided by the statements United ed.1996). (3d 8.2(d), supra § at 659-62 concerning pur- “the States flagrancy pose of official misconduct.” obtained We hold that evidence here, moreover, a illegality had The improper by purported a that follows consent quality purposefulness. improprie- by test: police must two-fold conduct meet obvious; (1) ty of arrest awareness of exploi was through the consent obtained was (2) virtually by conceded the two fact was prior illegality; and was tation of the they by repeatedly when acknowl- voluntary? obtained detectives consent Evidence testimony, by edged, purpose police illegali- in their but instead was tainted ty and investigation” or therefore is ineffective. Because of of their action was “for holding, arrest, question our we do not reach the “questioning.” both de- execution, Rodriguez’s voluntary. whether consent sign investigatory. upon expedi- The detectives embarked hope
tion for that some- Y. evidence thing might up. turn The manner possesses We hold that when an officer gives arrest Brown’s was affected that a traffic has offense appearance having been calculated been committed and the officer has decided surprise, fright, to cause and confusion. give not to the driver a ticket for the traffic offense, may request the officer identifying Brown, at at 2262. S.Ct. driver, information from the such as a driv- Rodriguez’s “consent” was obtained in a license, proof er’s vehicle fright, surprise, manner calculated to cause insurance. We hold this for informa- and confusion. While was still constitutionally permissible tion is because custody, troopers, aware that the officer’s conduct is to be evaluated on the spoke English, intentionally separated little objective basis of an standard. The officer’s Munoz, interpreter, from his subjective give decision not to a ticket does van, taking him to the back of the where *14 strip legal justification not the officer of to uniformed, troopers, three armed and sur- inquiries. make further The circumstances troopers Rodriguez rounded him. The told case, is, of this discrepancies minor in go that he was free to but at the same time registration the van and the lack of the Nad- they asked if he “would if mind” searched his safety doorjamb van, er label on the of the question van. Other facts call pur- into the suspicion troop- furnished reasonable for the pose prolonged troop- this detention: the investigate er to further whether the van was requested drug dog, perhaps ers a detection However, ninety-minute stolen. the deten- early detention, clearly as as the roadside but tion of and the ten-mile forced request well before the for the “consent to permissible drive in this case exceeded the given; search” was one characterized parameters investigatory stop. of an Rodriguez, the family, detention his his temporary detention escalated into an arrest and an stop”; van Munoz as “interdiction unsupported by probable cause to believe further stated that and stolen, that the van in was violation of the “applicants Munoz were for law enforce- Fourth Amendment to the United States “they’re gonna ment” and receive law en- II, Constitution and Article 8 of the Section forcement,” commenting that “one’s from Rodriguez’s Colorado Constitution. arrest Rico, Puerto the other one’s from Mexico.” illegal. was His consent to search was not aptly The district court observed: “You sure sufficiently illegal attenuated from this arrest question have a as to whether this vehicle immediately preceded which his consent. really number is what the worry- officers are Hence, we conclude that the heroin discover- ing about.” Rodriguez’s ed in the search of van must be Rodriguez, family his and Munoz were de- suppressed. affirm to and remand ninety tained for minutes and forced to drive appeals court of to return this to the ease Eagle troopers to so that the could ascertain proceedings district court for further consis- any drugs up. whether would turn The de- opinion. tent with this sign and execution of this arrest was investi- VOLLACK, C.J., part in and concurs gatory, resembling police conduct condemned MULLARKEY, J., joins part, dissents in and Royer, in Florida v. in the concurrence and dissent. Royer where the seizure of was undertaken part as attempt gain of the officer’s his concurring in Chief Justice VOLLACK luggage. consent to a search of his part dissenting part: in and Rodriguez’s majority part
We hold that opinion consent holds in II of its was sufficiently arrest, illegal possesses attenuated from his that when an officer reasonable 30-31, justify at 1884-85. To com- Id. at a traffic offense has been stop, must give investigatory three conditions not to an
mitted the officer has decided and (1) offense, the officer must have reasonable ticket the traffic exist: the driver a occurred, identifying activity has may suspicion that criminal officer nevertheless occur; (2) I occurring, concur with is information from the driver. or about reasonable; majority’s opinion. part purpose this of the of the detention must be (3) scope and character the deten- majority part opinion, III of its in tion must reasonable when considered be (a) troop- holds that in the current case: People v. light purpose. of its See Suther- suspicion that the possessed a er (Colo.1994). land, 886 P.2d stolen; drove van (b) pur- trooper possessed a reasonable held This court has that conditions which detaining Rodriguez pose temporarily person investigato justify subjecting a to an compare the the van’s VIN on judged objective ry stop against must be VIN card the dashboard with hidden takes into consideration the standard that part I with this located on the van. concur known to the officer facts and circumstances However, ma- majority’s opinion. at the time of the intrusion evaluates scope jority further holds scope, and character of the intru purpose, case not rea- investigatory in this People v. light of those facts. See sion sonably purpose. I dissent related its (Colo.1985). Savage, P.2d 1334-35 I part majority’s opinion this because person limited seizure of the Because a under circumstances of believe that a standard less than that of authorized on case, investigatory stop was duration, cause, probable it must be brief reasonably purpose related of estab- to its purpose. scope, limited and narrow lishing was stolen. whether van (Colo. Tottenhoff, People v. *15 1984). majority part in of its The further holds IV Rodriguez’ his opinion consent to search Despite established standard Colorado’s sufficiently search van did attenuate the scope an determining whether the for stop; trooper’s illegal investigatory from the reasonably investigatory stop is related to its majority suppression thus the the affirms majority forth a new test purpose, the sets the part I to this the evidence. dissent making Specifical- for a determination. such my view, Rodriguez’ majority’s opinion. In ly, majority holds four must the factors sufficiently attenu- consent to search his van determining in the considered whether be any prior illegality so as ated search from the investigatory stop an have parameters illegality. Con- dissipate the taint of such (1) length of the deten- been exceeded: erro- sequently, appeals I the court of believe (2) tion; diligently pur- whether officer neously as a ruled that the evidence obtained detention; during the investigation sued sup-
result of the search should have been (3) suspect required whether pressed. (4) another; location move from one alternative, less there were intrusive whether part I in dissent Accordingly, concur police acted available and whether the means part. in failing unreasonably recognize pur- or
maj. op. such means. See at-. sue
I.
view,
my
adopt
In
this court should not
Ohio,
1,
1868,
litmus-paper
if
for
this test
it becomes a
test
Terry
In
U.S.
88 S.Ct.
392
(1968),
determining
of an investi-
the United States
whether
889
L.Ed.2d
gatory stop
proper. As the United States
Supreme
law enforcement
Court held that
stated,
has
there
no “lit-
may,
compliance
Supreme
personnel
with
...
Amendment,
investiga- mus-paper
determining
for
when
test
Fourth
conduct brief
investiga-
of an
suspicion.
exceeds
bounds
tory
seizure
stops based on
491,
stop."
Royer,
mg that
Specifi-
tive
Florida v.
460 U.S.
time were also reasonable.
506,
1319, 1326,
cally,
103 S.Ct.
the hidden VIN could be found. The
patrol
also decided that
headquar-
the state
A.
ters would be a better location to conduct
Place,
majority
cites
States v.
United
any
investigation
requested
further
and thus
2637,
696,
mately ninety minutes to conduct a “canine dog. sniff’ a narcotics detection Place, Additionally, majority cites “although Court stated that we de- 77 L.Ed.2d adopt any cline to outside time limitation for holding diligently its did not permissible [investigatory] stop, ...we pursue investigation in the current case. [approve length cannot of the detention] Place, the defendant had aroused the presented by on the this case.” Id. at facts suspicion of law enforcement officers at Mia- added). 709-710, (emphasis at 2646 S.Ct. Airport. mi International Because the Mia- Thus, holding fact-specific Place is mi officers did not have time to detain the forth does not set a time limitation for a *16 flight departed defendant before his to New proper investigatory stop. York, they in contacted officers New York to distinguishable The current case is from relay suspicions their about the defendant. First, ways. although Place in several the subsequently The officers in New York de- investigatory stop ap- entire here lasted for tained the defendant at York’s La Guar- New minutes,1 proximately eighty-five the initial Airport. Supreme dia held that Court forty-two minutes this detention involved in the New York officers that case did not license, obtaining Rodriguez’ driver’s vehicle diligently pursue investigation their of the registration, trooper and VIN. The then dis- defendant because the officers “knew the discrepancy covered a in the VIN and was at [the time of scheduled arrival defendant’s] unable to determine whether the van was [Airport], ample La Guardia had time to majority stolen. the acknowledges, As the investigation arrange for their additional at trooper’s during forty- actions these initial location, thereby mini- that could have two reasonably minutes were related to the mized the intrusion on [the defendant’s] purpose investigatory stop. of the 709, at Fourth Amendment interests.” Id. Thus, Supreme forty-three As to at 2645. the the latter S.Ct. minutes investigatory stop, trooper’s holding regarding the actions dur- in Place the offi- Court’s stopped approximately approximately 1. was at 7:25 8:50 a.m. a.m. and was told that he was to leave at free Stevens, holding People in 183 Colo. specific the court’s diligence to
cers’ lack of (1973). 407, 1336, In P.2d facts of case. that Stevens, moving a sus this court held that case, majority holds the In the current during another an pect from one location to Eagle for inves- return further that to “[t]he stop regardless of investigatory proper, in- diligent tigation with a is not consistent Place, safety 462 U.S. at concerns. also Maj. the con- vestigation.” op. at 1363. To 705-06, (holding at 2643-44 103 S.Ct. Eagle was trary, that the return to I believe police may during investigatory stop, trans it investigation part diligent because of a location). to port property another seized a trooper efficiently contact allowed the to patrol specialist who could state auto theft could be him the hidden D.
tell where VIN trooper for possible made it found. This majority Finally, Sharpe cites for its Rodriguez’ efficiently determine whether case, holding in the current there were diligent a van and thus constituted was stolen alternative, intrusive means available less investigation. unreasonably trooper he failed to which However, Sharpe, recognize pursue. C. Supreme expressly Court the United States reviewing not en- warned that courts should Moreover, majority Royer, cites post police gage in creative hoc evaluations of holding its conduct, simply but should determine wheth- concerns, moving a safety in the absence reasonably police given in a er the acted during suspect one location another 686-87, Sharpe, at case. See 470 U.S. investigatory stop the reasonable an exceeds (1985). Here, although at S.Ct. 1575-76 However, Royer, the scope stop. the- trooper have could conducted remainder record Supreme simply held that “the investigatory stop at the Wolcott exit sup reflect-any which would not facts [did] headquarters patrol instead at the state finding legitimate law en port a Eagle, Court’s admonition justified purposes the de forcement precludes Sharpe imposing this court from first furthered tention instance were trooper post requirement pursue hoc that the by removing” the a different defendant Rather, inquiry an such alternative. Thus, at at location. Id. S.Ct. reasonably in acted con- whether holding facts of Royer specific investigatory ducting the remainder of the provide does a definitive that case and patrol headquarters. at As the state during moving suspect effect of rule above, I believe that discussed investigatory stop. reasonably investigation by in his mov- acted case, majority, holds the current ing headquarters. the van to the proper exceeded *17 summary, majority the holds the In that by Rodriguez investigatory stop moving anof trooper possessed a reasonable that highway of the state from the side the to purpose and the van was stolen a reasonable However, Eagle. I patrol headquarters in detaining Rodriguez. temporarily This a within properly that such move was believe holding that Rodriguez’ is on the fact based light of investigatory stop the scope the registration and con- vehicle was handwritten patrol the trooper’s the decision that state discrepancies, along with the fact tained two headquarters to would be a better location not on the that a Nader Label was found con- investigations, as conduct further such Nevertheless, majority jamb. the van’s door tacting patrol specialist auto a state theft investigato- scope of the determines hidden trooper tell the where the who could stop reasonably its Furthermore, ry not related to the ma- was be found. YIN could disagree I during purpose. I because believe jority’s rejection moving suspect case, this the under the circumstances of investigatory stop conflicts with an
1369 search, stop voluntary if it investigatory the was reason- the'consent is is the purpose establishing product of free choice and not the ably related to its result of duress, coercion, threats, promises whether the van was stolen. or
are calculated to flaw the free and uncon- nature the Savage, strained decision. See II. P.2d at 698 1334. Whether consent to search voluntary question is a of fact to be deter- Additionally, disagree majority’s I with the totality mined from the of the circumstances. Rodriguez’ conclusion that consent to search Carlson, 310, People v. 677 P.2d See 318 sufficiently attenuate the his van did not (Colo.1984). presents Where the record con- prior investigatory stop from the search. Al- evidence, flicting the trial court’s factual find- investigatory stop though I maintain that the ings are entitled to deference find- unless the proper, was I believe that even if this case ings support are so erroneous as find no stop improper, Rodriguez’ consent to was People, the record. See Salazar v. 870 P.2d sufficiently search his van attenuated ' (Colo.1994). investigatory stop from the search. case, In the current indicated If evidence is obtained as a result of a investigatory search, evidence is admissi- consent to such completed returning Rodriguez’ driver’s (a) ble if the consent is determined to be not telling license and vehicle and (b) exploitation prior illegality; him that he was free to leave. The Traubert, voluntary. People v. 199 Colo. then if he asked could search Rod- (1980). 342, 322, 329, The first 608 P.2d van, riguez’ consented. When recognized prong has been as the attenuation Rodriguez gave his consent to search the van doctrine, exception is an to the exclu- leave, being that he free to after told he justifies sionary rule admission of evi- intervening created an event which sufficient- though dence even the evidence is derived ly investigato- dispelled the link between the from information obtained violation of the facts, ry stop and the search. Under these Burola, People Fourth Amendment. See v. the evidence obtained as a result of the (Colo.1993). 848 P.2d Under the significantly search was free from contamina- attenuation doctrine: investigatory stop tion and the taint of the prosecution any if can show con- had been removed. illegality official and the nection between Moreover, totality of the circumstances
prosecution’s evidence has “become so at- Rodriguez’ given taint,” indicate that consent was dissipate tenuated as to voluntarily. suppression hearing, At evidence will be admissible. testimony from both Rodri- trial court heard (Colo.1992) Jones, People v. 828 P.2d ability guez Rodriguez’ as to States, (quoting Wong Sun v. United English. Rodri- speak and understand 471, 491, 407, 419, 9 L.Ed.2d ability guez testified that due to his limited (1963)). Whether the taint of consti- English, he speak and understand did dissipated deter- tutional violation has trooper’s statement that Rod- understand the by examining intervening mined events trooper’s riguez was free to leave or the and the evidence between violation contrast, request his van. to search T.C., sought to be introduced. See Rodriguez appeared trooper testified that (Colo.1995). If the interven- trooper’s to search understand ing dispelled link so events have causal Additionally, videotape his van. *18 significantly free that the offered evidence is Rodriguez’ trooper’s request to search van contamination, then the taint Rodriguez’ response introduced into constitutional violation has been removed. evidence, the trial evidence. Based on this See id. understood the court found trooper’s request to search his van. Because prong admitting evi- As to the second finding supported the trial court’s factual a result of a consent to dence obtained as record, defer to the this court should of Rodri- finding on issue trial court’s trooper’s ability re-
guez’ to understand the quest. Rodriguez understood Given that van, the facts trooper’s request to search his voluntarily gave his indicate Here, the search. consent for Rodriguez if he could search Rodri- asked van, Rodriguez responded, “Sure.” guez’ request by his then reiterated Rodriguez again okay?” it asking, “Is okay.” Rodriguez then ob- responded, “It’s keys opened the the van and tained his of the van without back door is no asking him to do so. There evidence duress, threats, trooper used or promises Rodriguez’ consent obtain van. The facts of this case thus
search his Rodriguez’ indicate that consent was sup- product free and the record choice finding Rodriguez’ ports the trial court’s voluntary. consent was Rodriguez’ Accordingly, I con- believe that voluntary and sent search his van was stop from the sufficiently attenuated the any prior as to remove taint of search so illegality. The obtained as result evidence therefore Rodriguez’ consent search should be admitted. reasons, part foregoing I concur in
For the say part. I am authorized to and dissent joins in MULLARKEY this con- that Justice currence and dissent. Pamela
In re the MARRIAGE OF ALDRICH, Pamela n/k/a Petitioner, Thompson, Wayne Aldrich, Respondent. R.
No. 96SC317. Colorado,
En Banc. Sept.