v. City and County of Denver, 2020 COA 59

In 2007 Timothy Huffman pleaded guilty to a municipal assault whose underlying facts involved domestic violence; he completed one year of supervised probation in 2008.
Huffman has had no subsequent charges or convictions since completing supervision.
In September 2018 Huffman petitioned the district court to seal his municipal conviction under § 24-72-708.
The City objected, arguing the 2017 amendment, § 24-72-708(1)(a)(II), categorically bars sealing of any municipal conviction that involves domestic violence.
The district court denied Huffman’s petition; Huffman appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding subsection (1)(a)(II) limits sealing only for petitioners who committed a new offense after the conviction sought to be sealed and does not categorically bar sealing of all municipal domestic-violence convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 24-72-708(1)(a)(II) bars sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic violence, or applies only to defendants who committed a new offense after the conviction sought to be sealed	Huffman: (1)(a)(II) is an exception to the "no new offense" rule and applies only when a petitioner has a subsequent/new offense; it does not categorically bar sealing of underlying municipal convictions that involve domestic violence	City: (1)(a)(II) should be read to categorically prohibit sealing of any municipal conviction whose underlying facts involve domestic violence	Court of Appeals: (1)(a)(II) is an exception to the no-new-offense rule and applies only when the petitioner has a subsequent/new offense; Huffman (no new offenses) may seek sealing under (1)(a)(I)

Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365 (Colo. 2009) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo; start with plain language)
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2010) (read statutory words in context and according to common usage)
People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1994) (historical treatment of sealing statutes and legislative changes)
Pena v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 117 P.3d 84 (Colo. App. 2004) (punctuation can indicate how modifying phrases attach)
Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1997) (legislative omissions are intentional and must be given effect)
People v. Owens, 219 P.3d 379 (Colo. App. 2009) (read statutes in their entirety to discern meaning)
Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007) (may not read language out of a statute)