USA V. DAVID LINEHAN, 56 F.4th 693

Linehan developed a decades-long vendetta against Florida State Trooper David Sims after a 1989 accident; Sims later testified against Linehan in prior prosecutions.
While serving a federal sentence for earlier threats, Linehan solicited a fellow inmate (who cooperated with the FBI) and an undercover agent to send a bomb to Sims’s home and offered payment ($200 up front, $25,000 on confirmation).
Recorded communications showed Linehan’s intent that the explosive be used to "kill, injure, or intimidate."
Indictment: Count 1 (18 U.S.C. §1513, witness retaliation) — acquitted; Count 2 (soliciting transportation of an explosive, 18 U.S.C. §§373(a) & 844(d)) — convicted; Count 3 (soliciting use of facilities of commerce for murder, 18 U.S.C. §§373(a) & 1958(a)) — convicted.
District court denied motions to dismiss and for acquittal; sentenced to consecutive 60‑month terms on Counts 2 and 3 (total 120 months). On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed Count 2, reversed Count 3, and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a completed violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (transport/receipt of an explosive with knowledge/intent it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate) is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a).	§844(d) either involves actual/attempted/threatened physical force and thus qualifies as a predicate crime of violence.	Linehan: attempted-transport language and mens rea mean §844(d) might not categorically require the use/attempted use/threat of physical force (invokes Taylor re: attempted offenses).	Affirmed as to Count 2: §844(d) categorically requires at least the "attempted use" of violent physical force (transporting a readied explosive with intent/knowledge is a substantial step toward violent force).
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (use of interstate facilities with intent that a murder be committed for pecuniary consideration) is a "crime of violence" under § 373(a).	§1958(a) is tied to murder and thus qualifies as a crime of violence.	Linehan: §1958 can be violated without an agreement, attempt, or any use/attempted/threatened physical force.	Reversed as to Count 3: Government conceded (and court agreed) that §1958(a) does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A); guides treatment of attempted offenses under the elements clause)
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (elements clause requires targeting another person; mens rea limits applicability)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (elements-clause force need only potentiality to cause physical injury)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (use of the categorical approach when comparing offense elements)
United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1997) (mailing an item with intent to injure qualifies as use/attempted use of physical force under a similar elements clause)
Grzegorczyk v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2580 (2022) (Solicitor General conceded §1958 does not require entering a murder‑for‑hire agreement or any attempt/commission of the contemplated murder)