URQUHART-BRADLEY v. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC., 1:18-cv-02213

Background

Nicole Urquhart-Bradley was President of Valuation & Advisory (V&A) for the Americas at Cushman & Wakefield (C&W); she led efforts to retain staff during the 2016–17 "Newmark Siege," securing large retention payments for others and receiving positive performance evaluations.
After John Busi left for a competitor in 2016, Urquhart-Bradley assumed his role; she later met with Americas CEO Shawn Mobley on December 13, 2017 to discuss retention and protective contract language (not additional pay).
On December 14, 2017 she emailed Mobley seeking written assurances and asked for a week to let counsel review before declining outside offers; Mobley considered the email a "retrade."
Mobley terminated Urquhart-Bradley in mid-January 2018; C&W internally and to the EEOC at times characterized her departure inconsistently (resignation vs. termination).
Three days after termination her counsel informed C&W they represented her for discrimination claims; months later (March 2018) Matthew Buow, former HR head, spoke with a recruiter about Urquhart-Bradley, which she alleges chilled a subsequent opportunity.
Procedural posture: Urquhart-Bradley sued under Title VII, §1981, and the DCHRA for race and gender discrimination and retaliation; the court denied summary judgment on discrimination counts (I–X) and granted summary judgment for defendants on the retaliation counts (XI–XIII).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were defendants entitled to summary judgment on discrimination claims arising from her termination?	Urquhart-Bradley says termination was pretextual and motivated by race/gender; points to inconsistent explanations, comparator treatment, and statements/events showing bias.	C&W/Mobley say they fired her for loss of trust after she allegedly reneged and negotiated while seeking retention for subordinates.	Denied — genuine disputes of material fact exist requiring a jury (Counts I–X survive).
Is John Busi a valid comparator to show disparate treatment?	Plaintiff: Busi (white male predecessor) occupied the same role and was counteroffered a large retention package when he entertained competitor offers.	Defendants: Busi not similarly situated; different supervisor and decisionmakers.	Held: Busi could be similarly situated; jury could find meaningful comparison.
Do inconsistencies in C&W's explanations and other evidence permit an inference of pretext?	Plaintiff: Multiple inconsistent statements (resignation vs termination), praise of prior performance, plus alleged biased comments and conduct by decisionmakers support pretext.	Defendants: Inconsistencies are minor/semantic; termination was non-discriminatory and based on trust/behavior.	Held: Inconsistencies and other evidence raise triable issues of pretext; summary judgment inappropriate.
Were the retaliation claims (negative reference by Buow) viable at summary judgment?	Plaintiff: Counsel’s January letter so alerted C&W generally; temporal proximity and internal communication could have put Buow on notice.	Defendants: Counsel’s letter was too generic to be protected activity; Buow swears he had no knowledge of the complaint.	Granted for defendants — plaintiff failed to show she engaged in protected activity or that Buow knew of it (Counts XI–XIII dismissed).

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment claims)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute and sufficiency of evidence at summary judgment)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s entitlement to summary judgment when nonmovant lacks essential evidence)
Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment in D.C. Circuit)
Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (pretext evidence examples and inference of illicit motive)
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (false statements by defendant may evidence consciousness of guilt)
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (third‑step McDonnell Douglas focus at summary judgment)
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (retaliation claims follow McDonnell Douglas framework)
Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (protected activity must allege unlawful discrimination to be actionable)
Simmons v. Cox, 495 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2007) (elements for adverse action via negative reference)