Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States
841 F.3d 556
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- The Oneida Indian Nation of New York (the Tribe) sought to restore sovereign jurisdiction over historically associated lands in central New York by asking the Department of the Interior to take roughly 17,000 acres (about 13,000 acres accepted) it owned into trust under § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The Secretary approved the 2008 entrustment to support tribal self-determination and the Tribe’s Turning Stone casino.
- Plaintiffs (two towns, a civic org, and local residents) challenged the entrustment as unconstitutional and beyond statutory authority, invoking APA review; the district court granted summary judgment to the United States and federal officials.
- Key statutory issues included (1) whether Congress has constitutional authority (Indian Commerce Clause / Enclave Clause / state sovereignty limits) to take land into trust within a single state, and (2) whether the Oneida Tribe is eligible under the IRA and the 1983 Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), which purported to override prior tribal opt-outs.
- The government relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedent recognizing broad federal plenary power over Indian affairs and the IRA/ILCA framework; plaintiffs relied on limits of state sovereignty, the Enclave Clause, and textual constraints in the ILCA and IRA definitions.
- The Second Circuit held (1) the federal government has constitutional authority to take land into trust for tribes (state sovereignty, the Enclave Clause, and the Constitution do not bar § 5 entrustments here), (2) the Oneida Nation qualifies as a "tribe" under § 2201(1) of the ILCA and, since it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, under § 465 of the IRA, and (3) agency action taking the land into trust was within statutory authority — therefore the district court judgments were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional authority for § 5 entrustments under the Indian Commerce Clause | Federal power is limited and does not reach intrastate land transfers to tribes; § 5 exceeds Congress’s commerce power | Indian Commerce Clause grants plenary authority over Indian affairs; § 5 is a longstanding exercise of that power | Held for defendant: Congress’s plenary Indian affairs power permits § 5 entrustments within a single state |
| State sovereignty / limits on federal displacement of state jurisdiction | Entrustment unlawfully infringes state sovereignty; state consent required | Federal power can divest state jurisdiction over land for tribal/federal purposes; precedents allow displacement | Held for defendant: principles of state sovereignty do not bar the entrustment |
| Enclave Clause (Art. I, §8, cl.17) — does federal acquisition require state legislature consent? | Enclave Clause requires state consent when federal government acquires land that ousts state jurisdiction | Enclave Clause applies only to acquisitions resulting in exclusive federal jurisdiction; land-into-trust does not create exclusive enclave | Held for defendant: Enclave Clause not implicated because trust status does not produce exclusive federal enclave |
| Statutory eligibility under IRA and ILCA (effect of 1936 opt-out) | Oneidas remain excluded because ILCA’s definition restores eligibility only to groups for which U.S. already holds trust land | ILCA §2202 restores opt-out tribes broadly; §2201(1)’s "for which...holds lands in trust" clause modifies only "community," not all enumerated terms | Held for defendant: ILCA restores eligibility; §2201(1) read to permit Oneida eligibility and §465 applies (Oneida also under federal jurisdiction in 1934) |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (equitable considerations limit reassertion of historic tribal sovereignty; recommends §5 trust route)
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (IRA §465 applies only to tribes "under federal jurisdiction" in 1934)
- United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (federal government may divest state jurisdiction over lands even where federal supervision was not continuous)
- United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (recognition of Congress’s broad, plenary power over Indian affairs)
- Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (Indian Commerce Clause provides plenary federal authority distinct from Interstate Commerce Clause limits)
- Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment limits Congress’s ability to authorize suits against states despite plenary federal powers)
- Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930) (Indian reservations are not equivalent to federal enclaves; state civil/criminal laws may still apply to non-Indians)