Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, GA-1057

Background

Texas AG opinion addresses whether a House committee investigating a contemplated impeachment may punish for contempt under Gov’t Code §665.005 without violating the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers provisions.
Article II, §1 separates legislative, executive, and judicial powers; Ex parte Wolters held contempt is a judicial power absent constitutional permission.
Article III, §15 expressly authorizes each House to punish contempt for disorderly conduct or obstruction, but prior case law (Ex parte Youngblood) questioned whether committees can exercise that power.
Article XV, §7 empowers the Legislature to provide by law for impeachment procedures; the Legislature enacted Gov’t Code ch. 665, including §665.005 granting House or a committee power in impeachment proceedings to send for persons/papers, compel testimony, and punish for contempt “to the same extent as a district court.”
The Legislative Reorganization Act (subchapter B, ch. 301) separately authorizes investigatory committees, prescribes contempt referral/prosecution procedures (§301.026–.027), and contains no explicit exclusion for impeachment investigations.
The opinion concludes statutory and constitutional provisions can be harmonized: a committee may exercise contempt in impeachment investigations under §665.005, may use ch. 301 mechanisms consistent with that chapter, and contemnors receive certain statutory protections (e.g., release on recognizance under §21.002(d)).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a House committee may punish for contempt under §665.005 without violating art. II §1 (separation of powers)	§III.15 is sole source of legislative contempt; committees lack power; §665.005 improperly grants judicial power to committees	Art. XV §7 and §665.005 constitutionally authorize committees in impeachment matters to exercise contempt; harmonize provisions	A court would likely uphold committee contempt under art. XV §7 and §665.005 as compatible with art. II §1
Whether §665.005 conflicts with art. III §15’s grant/limit of contempt power	Art. III §15 limits contempt to each House as a body and precludes committee contempt	Art. III §15 does not negate committee authority to enforce impeachment powers under art. XV §7; provisions can be harmonized	A court would likely find no conflict; both provisions can be given effect
Whether committees investigating contemplated impeachments may use ch. 301 (§301.026–.027) procedures instead of §665.005 exclusively	§665.005 is the exclusive source for contempt in impeachment investigations	Ch. 301 contains general investigatory contempt/referral procedures and lacks an impeachment exception, so it applies where consistent with that chapter	A committee may exercise authority under §§301.026–.027 to the extent consistent with chapter 301, subchapter B
Whether an attorney held in contempt under §665.005 is entitled to release on recognizance and hearing under §21.002(d)	§21.002(d) applies only to trial courts; legislative contempt not covered	§665.005 authorizes punishment “to the same extent as a district court,” so attendant limitations like §21.002(d) should apply	A court would likely apply §21.002(d) protections to contempts imposed under §665.005

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Wolters, 144 S.W. 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911) (legislature lacks inherent contempt power absent constitutional permission)
Ex parte Youngblood, 251 S.W. 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923) (article III, §15 construed as grant and limit of legislative contempt; committee punishment questioned)
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (U.S. 1972) (legislatures possess inherent contempt powers but subject to constitutional limits)
Walker v. Baker, 196 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1946) (distinction between House impeachment and Senate trial powers)
Oakley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (constitutional provisions must be harmonized when possible)
Lawson v. State, 283 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009) (statutes should be construed to render them constitutional if reasonably possible)
In re Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (constitutional protections constrain contempt power)