Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, KP-0033

Background

Request from Rep. Angie Chen Button on behalf of City of Rowlett about whether Tex. Transp. Code § 681.0101 permits a political subdivision to appoint or pay a private business to enforce disabled (privileged) parking laws in chapter 681.
Section 681.0101 authorizes a political subdivision to appoint a “person” to file charges for chapter 681 violations, sets requirements for appointees (U.S. citizen, good moral character, oath, training), and states an appointee is not entitled to compensation or indemnification.
The Code Construction Act defines “person” broadly but allows a different meaning when the statute’s context requires one; subsection (b)’s citizenship and oath requirements indicate a natural person is intended.
Chapter 681 otherwise authorizes only peace officers, political-subdivision designees, or certain private security officers to file charges; by contrast, Tex. Transp. Code § 707.003 expressly permits contracting for red‑light camera enforcement.
The opinion concludes chapter 681’s text and the Legislature’s silence on contracting imply political subdivisions likely may not contract with private businesses to enforce privileged parking; however, a city may contract for discrete, nondelegable ministerial acts where doing so does not impermissibly delegate the city’s police power.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 681.0101 authorizes appointment of a private business to enforce chapter 681	City (or business) contends § 681.0101 uses “person” broadly and was intended to allow businesses to perform enforcement or be paid to do so	Attorney General argues contextual reading (citizenship, oath, training) shows “person” means a natural person (volunteer), not a legal entity	Court would likely conclude § 681.0101 does not authorize appointment of a private business
Whether a political subdivision may contract with a private business to enforce privileged parking under chapter 681	City argues it can pay a business to perform these services despite § 681.0101 limiting volunteers	AG notes chapter 681 elsewhere limits who may file charges and Legislature expressly authorized private contracting for red‑light cameras but not for disabled parking	Court would likely conclude a political subdivision is not authorized to contract with a private business to enforce chapter 681
Whether a city may delegate enforcement tasks without impermissibly abdicating its police power	City argues it can contract for certain enforcement-related acts that are merely ministerial	AG emphasizes parking regulation is a governmental function and nondelegable when it cedes discretion or control; however ministerial tasks may be contracted	A city may contract for specific ministerial acts necessary to enforcement, but delegation that transfers discretionary policing authority is impermissible; fact‑specific inquiry required
Whether express authorization for private enforcement in other statutes implies prohibition here	City points to absence of express prohibition and legislative intent to allow businesses	AG points to express authorization for private enforcement of red‑light cameras as showing legislative intent to permit private contracting in that context but not in chapter 681	Silence in chapter 681, coupled with express authorization elsewhere, supports conclusion that private contracting for privileged parking enforcement is not authorized

Key Cases Cited

Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Compton, 899 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994) (private corporation not authorized to regulate traffic where statute limits authority to state/local authorities)
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adcock, 412 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. 2013) (legislative silence in one context, expression in another, suggests intentional omission)
City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth, 844 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992) (municipal exercise of police power cannot be abdicated or bargained away)
Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (municipal contracts cannot cede or disable legislative/governmental powers)
City of Austin v. Daniels, 335 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 1960) (regulation of parking is part of traffic control and police power)
Burgess v. City of Houston, 718 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1983) (duties involving discretion and public trust may not be delegated)
Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Util. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977) (municipality could not bargain away discretionary decisions concerning extension of services)