Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, KP-0072

In 2015 the Texas Legislature amended Tax Code § 11.13 via S.B. 1 to increase the school homestead exemption and added § 11.13(n-1), which bars a school district, municipality, or county that adopted a local-option exemption for 2014 from reducing or repealing that exemption through the 2019 tax year. The subsection expires December 31, 2019.
S.B. 1 and the related constitutional amendment (S.J.R. 1) raising the homestead exemption became effective November 3, 2015 after voter approval of the amendment.
The question presented was whether a local taxing unit could reduce or repeal its local-option homestead exemption for the 2015 tax year before § 11.13(n-1)’s effective date, and whether application of § 11.13(n-1) to invalidate such earlier repeals would be unconstitutional as a retroactive law.
The Attorney General analyzed statutory text, legislative purpose (property tax relief and economic stimulation), and the three-part test for unconstitutional retroactivity from Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.
The opinion considered the strength of the public interest, the nature of the prior right claimed by taxing units to collect revenue, and the extent of impairment, including statutory state hold-harmless provisions for school district revenue losses.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a school district, municipality, or county may reduce or repeal a local-option homestead exemption that was adopted for the 2014 tax year for tax years through 2019	Local units could repeal or reduce the exemption prior to § 11.13(n-1)’s effective date and those actions should stand	Legislature plainly set a floor in § 11.13(n-1) making repeals/reductions ineffective for 2014–2019	§ 11.13(n-1) prohibits repeal or reduction of the 2014-adopted local-option exemption through 2019
Whether § 11.13(n-1) is unconstitutionally retroactive under Tex. Const. art. I, § 16	Applying § 11.13(n-1) would retroactively void repeals/reductions made before its effective date and thus impair vested rights / act retroactively	The law serves a strong, statewide public interest (tax relief); taxing units had notice when S.B. 1 passed; state mitigations limit impairment	Applying the Robinson three-part test, § 11.13(n-1) is likely not unconstitutionally retroactive

Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2013) (statutory-construction principles and legislative intent)
Tex. Adjutant Gen.'s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. 2013) (plain‑language guide to legislative intent)
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010) (three‑part test for evaluating unconstitutional retroactivity)
Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2014) (definition and treatment of retroactive statutes)
Tenet Hasps. Ltd. v. Rivera, 445 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. 2014) (application of Robinson framework)
Gribble v. Layton, 389 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (timing of tax collection rights and ripeness)
Corpus Christi People’s Church, Inc. v. Nueces Cty. Appraisal Dist., 904 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1995) (context on exemption determination timing)