474 S.W.3d 816
Tex. App.2015Background
- UIW, a private Catholic university, operates its own campus police department; a UIW officer shot and killed student Cameron Redus after a DWI stop. Plaintiffs (the Reduses) sued UIW and the officer for negligence, gross negligence, excessive force, wrongful death, and survival.
- UIW asserted governmental immunity in its answer and filed a plea to the jurisdiction (and a motion to dismiss the officer) claiming immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The trial court denied the plea and the motion to dismiss.
- UIW filed an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8), which permits appeals from orders that grant or deny a plea to the jurisdiction by a “governmental unit.”
- The core jurisdictional question: whether UIW qualifies as a “governmental unit” under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3)(D) (i.e., whether it derives its status and authority from the Texas Constitution or statutes) such that § 51.014(a)(8) authorizes the interlocutory appeal.
- UIW argued it is a governmental unit at least with respect to its law‑enforcement activities because Education Code § 51.212 authorizes private institutions to commission peace officers; the Reduses argued UIW is a private institution and cannot carve out its police function to become a governmental unit for interlocutory‑appeal purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether UIW is a “governmental unit” under § 101.001(3)(D) for purposes of § 51.014(a)(8) | UIW is a private institution but argues its police function is authorized by statute, making that function governmental and permitting interlocutory appeal | UIW is a private university created and governed independently of the State and cannot be treated as a governmental unit merely by operating a police department | UIW is not a governmental unit; interlocutory appeal under § 51.014(a)(8) is unavailable; appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction |
| Whether a university may be treated as a governmental unit only for its policing activities | UIW: statute authorizing private institutions to employ peace officers shows legislative derivation for that function | Reduses: the entity that filed the plea (UIW as an institution) must itself qualify as a governmental unit; a functional carve‑out is improper | Court rejected functional carve‑out; the university as an institution must derive status from statute to qualify |
| Whether Education Code § 51.212 transforms a private university into a governmental unit | UIW: § 51.212 grants authority to commission peace officers, supporting governmental‑unit status for police functions | Reduses: § 51.212 grants only limited authority for a specific function and requires the institution to be a private/independent institution, reflecting legislative intent to keep private schools distinct | § 51.212 is a limited grant and insufficient to make UIW a governmental unit; it weighs in UIW’s favor only slightly but is not dispositive |
| Whether Rice Univ. v. Refaey controls the interlocutory‑jurisdiction analysis here | UIW cited Rice to show courts treat private university officers as state officers for jurisdictional appeals | Reduses: Rice interpreted a different interlocutory‑appeal statute (§ 51.014(a)(5)), not the governmental‑unit definition | Rice is inapposite to § 51.014(a)(8); it does not resolve whether a private university is a governmental unit |
Key Cases Cited
- LTTS Charter Sch., Inc. v. C2 Constr., Inc., 342 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2011) (supreme court held an open‑enrollment charter school is a “governmental unit” because it is created by statute, part of public education, receives state funding, and exercises powers of public schools)
- Rice Univ. v. Refaey, 459 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. 2015) (interpreted interlocutory jurisdiction under § 51.014(a)(5) and held private university peace officers can be treated as state officers for that provision)
- City of Houston v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2012) (interlocutory appeals are permitted only when authorized by statute)
- Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) (§ 51.014 must be strictly construed as a narrow exception to final-judgment rule)
- Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) (jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo)