University of Texas at Arlington v. Sandra Williams and Steve Williams
459 S.W.3d 48
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Sandra Williams attended her daughter’s high-school soccer game at UTA’s 12,500‑seat Maverick Stadium; after the game she went down to the field to sign a release form and leaned against a gate that unexpectedly opened, causing a five‑foot fall and injuries.
- Williams sued the University of Texas at Arlington (UTA) for negligence and gross negligence based on defective gate/latch and inadequate chain/lock.
- UTA asserted sovereign immunity and invoked Texas’s recreational use statute, arguing Williams was a recreational user (spectator) and thus UTA’s liability is limited absent gross negligence.
- The trial court denied UTA’s plea to the jurisdiction; the court of appeals affirmed. UTA appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
- The central legal question: does the statutory definition of “recreation” (including a catchall for “any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors”) reasonably include spectating at competitive sports events or the act Williams was performing when injured?
- The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals: the recreational use statute does not apply to this activity (and thus does not bar Williams’ ordinary negligence claim), though justices wrote separate concurring and dissenting opinions on reasoning and scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williams was engaged in "recreation" under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.001(3) when injured | Williams: she was not engaged in a recreational activity at the time of injury (she was retrieving/signing release forms) | UTA: attending/ spectating a soccer game is an outdoor recreational activity and fits within the statute’s catchall (subpart L) | Court: statute does not cover this activity; recreational use statute does not bar the ordinary negligence claim |
| Scope of catchall phrase “any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors” (ejusdem generis) | Williams: catchall must be read in light of listed activities and does not reasonably include spectating or unrelated ancillary acts | UTA: catchall is broad enough to include spectators at outdoor sports in stadiums | Court: apply ejusdem generis; catchall limited to activities similar to listed examples and not broad enough to include spectating at organized stadium events |
| Whether the statutory definition should be read by ordinary meaning (broad) or limited by context/history | Williams: context and statutory history narrow the term; listed items show focus on natural/outdoor pursuits | UTA: ordinary meaning of recreation is broad and includes sports and spectating; legislature’s additions broadened scope | Court: although ordinary meaning is broad, legislative text and history limit application; birdwatching addition does not imply inclusion of stadium spectating |
| Effect of governmental immunity / interaction with Tort Claims Act re: waiver of immunity | Williams: not squarely argued below | UTA (and some concurring opinions): implication that if statute applies it limits Tort Claims Act waiver and immunity | Court: primary holding is statute doesn’t apply; separate opinions debate whether waivers should be strictly construed but resolution of immunity interaction not necessary for outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2002) (interpreted catchall for recreation to include playground swinging; held analysis focuses on activity causing injury)
- State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. 2006) (explains recreational use statute limits landowner liability and raises plaintiff’s burden)
- Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2007) (discusses interlocutory appeal limitations and precedential scope of court of appeals decisions)
- Mills v. Commonwealth, 633 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1993) (construed Pennsylvania recreational statute narrowly to exclude fully developed recreational facilities)
- Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1969) (canon: statutes that abrogate common law rights are strictly construed)
- Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (noting statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed narrowly)