976 F.3d 228
2d Cir.2020Background
- Jeremy Zullo joined a drug conspiracy as a teenager, was indicted at 20, and sentenced at 22 to a 15-year mandatory minimum after resentencing (original concurrent sentence vacated following Abbott).
- Zullo sought compassionate release under the First Step Act after exhausting administrative remedies; the district court denied relief relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Application Note 1(D).
- Historically, BOP controlled compassionate-release motions; the Sentencing Commission’s § 1B1.13 largely referenced the BOP Director as the arbiter of what counts as "extraordinary and compelling."
- The First Step Act (2018) permits defendants to move directly in court for sentence reductions after administrative exhaustion or a 30-day lapse, shifting decisionmaking power in many cases from BOP to courts.
- The Sentencing Commission has not updated § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act; Application Note 1(D) still ties the catch-all to the BOP Director.
- The Second Circuit held that after the First Step Act § 1B1.13 (and specifically Application Note 1(D)) is not "applicable" to defendant-filed motions, vacated the district court order, and remanded for reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts may independently determine what counts as "extraordinary and compelling" under § 3582(c)(1)(A) after the First Step Act | Zullo: First Step Act allows defendants to move and courts to consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons; Guideline §1B1.13 is not applicable to defendant-filed motions | Government: Application Note 1(D) still controls; only BOP may determine most extraordinary and compelling reasons (severability of conflicting Guideline text) | Court: §1B1.13 (and Note 1(D)) is not "applicable" to defendant-filed motions; courts may consider any extraordinary and compelling reasons absent updated Commission guidance |
| Whether the conflicting portions of §1B1.13 should be severed so Note 1(D) remains binding | Zullo: Not necessary; read Guideline to apply only to BOP motions | Government: Sever the incompatible language so BOP retains defining role | Court: No severance needed because the Guideline can be read as limited to BOP motions; even if severed, congressional intent shows courts gain discretion when BOP does not act |
| Whether remand was required because the district court exercised sufficient discretion or any grant would be an abuse of discretion | Zullo: District court applied constraining rule, not free discretion; remand needed | Government: District court exercised discretion; alternatively any relief would be an abuse of discretion on these facts | Court: District court applied a binding rule (not discretion); remand required so the court can consider all factors and exercise discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (textualist principle: statutory text controls interpretation)
- United States v. Williams, 558 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2009) (precedent on concurrent mandatory sentences later abrogated)
- Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010) (mandatory §924(c) sentences must run consecutively)
- United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (legal questions reviewed de novo)
- United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (district courts have broad sentencing discretion)
- United States v. Smith, 945 F.3d 729 (2d Cir. 2019) (severability principles and legislative intent analysis)
- United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1991) (interlocutory rulings may be reconsidered)