United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141

Zhang was indicted in EDNY for murder-for-hire (Feb 12, 2019 killing); government alleges Zhang drove the getaway car and later received $30,000 wired to a company he controlled.
Arrested May 10, 2022; a California magistrate initially granted release on bond, but the government appealed to the Eastern District of New York.
On May 19, 2022 the EDNY district court ordered Zhang detained, finding he posed both a danger and a flight risk based on strong evidence, foreign ties, prior threats, and weak sureties; the court stated it assumed the DOJ would not seek the death penalty.
On June 29, 2022 the Attorney General formally directed the U.S. Attorney’s Office not to seek the death penalty; Zhang moved on July 22 to reopen the detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and proposed a $5 million bond.
The district court denied the motion to reopen (Aug 3, 2022), finding the DOJ decision was not material because the court had already assumed no death penalty, and reiterating that § 3142(g) factors (including strong evidence, foreign ties, threats, and inadequate bond) supported continued detention.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen and that weighing the strength of the evidence in a detention analysis does not violate the presumption of innocence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Zhang)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether the district court erred by refusing to reopen the detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) after DOJ confirmed it would not seek the death penalty	DOJ's formal declination was new, material information that could change the availability of release conditions and therefore required reopening	The court had already assumed no death penalty in its initial ruling, so the DOJ confirmation was not material; reopening is discretionary	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion — DOJ decision was not material because the district court had already assumed no death penalty
Whether the district court improperly relied on the "weight of the evidence" such that it undermined the presumption of innocence	Giving significant weight to the strength of the evidence impermissibly prejudges guilt and undermines the presumption of innocence	The weight of the evidence is a cognizable § 3142(g) factor and may be considered in assessing danger and flight risk; presumption of innocence is a trial right and does not bar such pretrial assessments	Affirmed: court may assign substantial weight to the evidence in detention analysis; doing so does not violate presumption of innocence

United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2020) (deferential clear-error review of district bail determinations)
United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1986) (abuse-of-discretion standard for refusing to reopen bail hearing)
Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2016) (defining abuse-of-discretion framework)
In re Worldcom, Inc., 708 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 2013) (interpretation that "may" confers discretionary authority)
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (severe potential sentence increases flight risk)
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1979) (presumption of innocence is a trial right, not a bar to regulatory pretrial decisions)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S. 1987) (pretrial detention is regulatory and may be constitutionally permissible)
United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting weight-of-evidence is a § 3142(g) factor; often treated as less important)
United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) (courts may make pretrial factual findings for procedural rulings)
United States v. Kostadinov, 721 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983) (weight of the evidence may be considered in bail determinations)