United States v. Yong Jun Li, 643 F.3d 1183

Li, Zhong, and Li were convicted or charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) for attempting to enter the United States by boat from the CNMI to Guam during the CNRA transition period.
CNRA extends U.S. immigration law to the CNMI, with a transition period ending December 31, 2014; the transition began November 28, 2009.
The district court denied motions to dismiss, ruling CNMI was not yet fully part of the United States for immigration purposes during the transition.
Li and Zhong entered conditional guilty pleas (reserving appeal of the denial of the motions), Shi Guang Li was convicted after a bench trial, all with probation sentences.
The government argued CNMI is part of the United States for §1325(a)(1) and that travel from CNMI to Guam could constitute entry, despite international waters.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding CNMI is part of the United States for §1325(a)(1) and that traveling from CNMI to Guam does not constitute entry when movement is through international waters.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is CNMI part of the United States for §1325(a)(1)?	CNMI is subject to U.S. immigration law under INA and CNRA.	CNMI remains outside the United States during the transition period for immigration purposes.	CNMI is part of the United States for §1325(a)(1).
Does traveling from CNMI to Guam through international waters constitute entry into the United States under §1325(a)(1)?	Travel through international waters could trigger entry into the United States.	Entry is not satisfied when moving within U.S. territory via international waters; no entry occurs.	No entry occurs when traveling from one U.S. part to another through international waters; §1325(a)(1) not violated.

United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1929) (entry requires arrival from foreign port/placing; no entry on sea voyage within U.S.)
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1947) (intercoastal voyage continued would not constitute entry)
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1954) (no entry when traveling from abroad prior to independence act context)
United States ex rel. Alcantra v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (9th Cir., 1955) (early interpretation of entry for residents traveling by sea)
United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690 (9th Cir., 2002) (distinguishing definitions of entry/admission post-IIRIRA)
United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir., 2003) (settled meaning of entry informs post-IIRIRA interpretation)
Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir., 2010) (incorporates established meaning of entry when terms have settled meaning)
United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d 594 (9th Cir., 2002) (interpreting 'enter' in §1325 by long-standing judicial understanding)