United States v. Yahir Lara
590 F. App'x 574
6th Cir.2014Background
- Lara pleaded guilty in 2014 to illegal reentry after removal following a 2009 Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction under § 39-14-403.
- Probation classified the prior conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), recommending a sixteen-level enhancement.
- Lara argued that § 39-14-403 is not a generic burglary of a dwelling because Tennessee defines habitation broadly under § 39-14-401(1).
- District court overruled the objection and imposed a sentence with the enhancement; Lara appealed asserting the statute is not a dwelling-based crime of violence.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding § 39-14-403 is not categorically a crime of violence, and remanded for limited resentencing without the enhancement; eight-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) may apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 39-14-403 categorically a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)? | Lara contends ‘habitation’ is broader than ‘dwelling’ thus not generic. | Government argues it is a generic burglary of a dwelling under Nance and similar authorities. | Not categorically a crime of violence. |
| Does Tennessee's ‘habitation’ include unattached structures for § 39-14-403 to qualify as a dwelling? | Habitations can include unattached structures like sheds that belong to the main dwelling. | Statute should be read to cover only attached or habitable structures. | § 39-14-403 is not limited to attached structures; appurtenant structures may qualify. |
| May the court apply the modified-categorical approach to determine whether Lara pleaded to a generic dwelling? | If divisible, records (Shepard documents) could show a generic burglary. | Statute divisible; government may use Shepard documents to prove generic dwelling. | Remand denied for Shepard-based inquiry; government forfeited the right to supplement on remand. |
| Should Lara receive resentencing without the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement? | Since § 39-14-403 is not categorically a crime of violence, enhancement must be removed. | Modify on remand to apply other allowable enhancements. | Remand for limited resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement; eight-level enhancement may apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2007) (aggravated burglary treated as a generic burglary for ACCA not controlling § 2L1.2)
- United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2005) (Texas-like aggravated burglary treated as crime of violence; limited persuasive value here)
- United States v. McFalls, 592 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2010) (generic burglary of a dwelling requires habitation element under 4B1.2)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical vs. modified-categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (concurring discussion on evidence standards for sentencing decisions)