336 F. Supp. 3d 817
E.D. Mich.2018Background
- Defendants Antoine and Austin Woods are charged in racketeering-related counts alleging a gang-motivated murder conspiracy and four separate shootings; both face § 924(c) counts for using a firearm in relation to crimes of violence.
- Defendants moved to (1) dismiss several § 924(c) counts arguing the statute’s residual-clause definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson/Dimaya, and (2) suppress cell-site location information (CSLI) obtained without a warrant under Carpenter.
- The government contends the § 924(c) predicates here fall under the statute’s elements clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)), not the residual clause, and that CSLI was obtained by § 2703(d) orders in reasonable, good-faith reliance on prevailing Sixth Circuit precedent.
- The challenged § 924(c) predicates are VICAR offenses tied to Michigan state crimes: Assault with Intent to Commit Murder (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83) and Felonious Assault (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82).
- Government obtained § 2703(d) orders for the relevant CSLI in March–May 2017, before the Supreme Court decided Carpenter; defendants limited their standing challenge to their own phone numbers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 924(c) firearm counts must be dismissed because the statute’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague | N/A (Government seeks to uphold counts) | Woods: § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is void under Johnson/Dimaya, so § 924(c) counts must fall | Denied — predicates qualify under the § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause, so Dimaya/Johnson-based attack fails |
| Whether Michigan Felonious Assault qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) | N/A | Woods: (implicit) may not categorically require violent force | Held: Felonious Assault is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) (Sixth Circuit precedent supports this) |
| Whether Michigan Assault With Intent to Commit Murder (AWIM) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) | N/A | Woods: (implicit) statutory reach could include nonviolent conduct | Held: AWIM is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); the greater offense necessarily involves violent force |
| Whether CSLI obtained under § 2703(d) must be suppressed post-Carpenter | Woods: Carpenter requires warrants supported by probable cause; suppress CSLI and derivative evidence | Government: Defendants lack standing to challenge others’ CSLI; for defendants’ own CSLI government acted in good faith and met § 2703(d) standard | Denied — court finds (1) Defendants challenge only their own CSLI so standing exists, and (2) exclusionary rule is inapplicable because government reasonably relied on binding Sixth Circuit precedent and the § 2703(d) applications met the statutory standard; good-faith exception applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied Johnson to invalidate § 16(b) residual clause)
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (CSLI generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule when officers reasonably rely on then-lawful statutes/precedent)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (exclusionary rule’s deterrence-focused balancing)
- United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2016) (categorical approach for § 924(c) predicate analysis)
- Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017) (Michigan assault with intent to do great bodily harm is a crime of violence under elements clause)
- United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2017) (Michigan felonious assault is a crime of violence under the elements clause)