United States v. Willie Diggs, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18406

Diggs pled guilty with a plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine and admitted supplying wholesale quantities to co‑defendants.
The district court used PSR findings to attribute 5.7 kg crack and 2 kg powder cocaine, base level 38, plus two two‑level enhancements for dangerous weapon use and leadership.
Diggs sought cooperation credit, but the government argued it was not fruitful due to alleged tips to co‑conspirators; court treated cooperation as a mitigating factor.
Advisory guidelines would have produced a 360‑month to life range; the court sentenced Diggs to 282 months based on totality of circumstances.
After Amendment 750 retroactively lowered the base offense level for the offense, Diggs moved to reduce his sentence to 214 months arguing the 78‑month downward variance should apply to the amended range.
The district court denied the motion under § 1B1.10 as inapplicable to a sentence below the amended minimum; the appeal followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1B1.10 retroactivity policy violates ex post facto.	Diggs argues Amendment 750 would have yielded a more lenient result if applied earlier.	Diggs contends the policy increased punishment retroactively; the government argues no increased punishment and no fair notice issue.	No ex post facto violation; amendment merely limits retroactive reductions, not increases punishments.
Whether the Commission exceeded its authority by amending § 1B1.10.	Diggs claims the policy forced withdrawal of his 78‑month variance.	Commission properly issued a policy statement under 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) guiding retroactive reductions.	Commission did not exceed its authority; policy statement within its statutory duty.
Whether § 1B1.10 carve‑out for substantial‑assistance credits impermissibly elevates the assistance factor over § 3553(a) factors.	Diggs argues the carve‑out reorders sentencing factors.	Court must first determine § 1B1.10 applicability before considering § 3553(a) factors.	Carve‑out does not override but acts as threshold, preserving § 3553(a) analysis.
Whether Diggs is entitled to retroactive application of Amendment 750 under the old guideline range.	If § 1B1.10 had been in effect at the time, Diggs would receive a 78‑month downward variance.	No entitlement to retroactive reduction; policy applies to eligible defendants.	No entitlement to retroactive reduction; policy applied to limit reductions.

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (ex post facto concerns focus on notice and restraint, not retroactive leniency per se)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (no constitutional entitlement to retroactive application of a subsequent guidelines amendment)