United States v. Williams
179 F. Supp. 3d 141
D. Me.2016Background
- Defendants Douglas, Williams, and Lara are charged in an indictment that includes § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) counts alleging use/carrying/brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime and a "crime of violence" (Counts Six, Four, Seven), with the Hobbs Act conspiracy (Count Two) alleged as the crime-of-violence predicate.
- Douglas moved to dismiss the § 924(c) allegation as failing to state an offense, arguing (1) Hobbs Act conspiracy/robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), and (2) the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague after Samuel Johnson.
- Williams and Lara joined Douglas’s motion as to the corresponding § 924(c) allegations in their counts.
- The court applied the categorical/modified-categorical framework (Taylor/Descamps) to determine whether Hobbs Act robbery (and conspiracy to commit it) qualifies under the § 924(c)(3)(A) “force clause.”
- Key contested legal questions: whether § 1951 (Hobbs Act) is divisible for Descamps purposes; whether the means listed in § 1951(b)(1) (including “fear of injury”) require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent/physical force; and whether conspiracy charges alter the categorical analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery/conspiracy is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Gov: Hobbs Act robbery requires taking by actual/threatened force, violence, or fear of injury, thus meets force-clause element | Douglas: "Fear of injury" can encompass non-physical threats; conspiracy elements don't require physical force; Hobbs Act too broad | Held: § 1951 is divisible; Hobbs Act robbery (and conspiracy to commit it) necessarily involves the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical (violent) force and thus qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether § 1951 is divisible (so modified categorical approach applies) | Gov: § 1951 comprises alternative versions (robbery, extortion, violence) — divisible | Douglas: robbery/extortion are alternative means, not elements — indivisible | Held: § 1951 is divisible because robbery and extortion are discrete alternatives; modified categorical approach applies; indictment specifically charges conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery |
| Whether “fear of injury” in § 1951(b)(1) includes only non-physical/intangible threats (so not "physical force") | Douglas: fear can be produced without threatened physical force (e.g., threats of abandonment/heat) | Gov: "fear of injury" must be read with surrounding terms (actual/threatened force, violence) and common-law robbery to require fear of injury from physical/violent force | Held: "fear of injury" in Hobbs Act robbery is fear of injury from the use (direct or indirect) of physical/violent force; Castleman and Curtis Johnson support reading physical force broadly to include indirect means |
| Whether the court should decide residual-clause vagueness (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) | Douglas: Samuel Johnson renders similarly worded residual clauses void for vagueness; § 924(c)(3)(B) therefore invalid | Gov: not necessary if predicate qualifies under force clause | Held: Court did not reach vagueness challenge because it found the Hobbs Act predicate satisfies the force clause; motion denied on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes categorical approach comparing statutory elements to generic offense)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits consideration to elements; permits modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (force can be indirect—use of poison still counts as physical force)
- Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague; prompted challenges to similar residual clauses)
- United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2007) (conspiracy under Hobbs Act treated as a crime of violence under the residual-clause reasoning)
- United States v. Morales-Machuca, 546 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2008) (Hobbs Act violation has been treated as a crime of violence for § 924(c) purposes)