United States v. William Whyte, 691 F. App'x 108

In July 2012 William R. Whyte and his company Armet Armored Vehicles were criminally indicted for fraud related to U.S. defense contracts.
In October 2012 a former Armet employee filed a qui tam civil suit alleging the same conduct; the United States declined to intervene.
A jury in the civil qui tam trial found Whyte and Armet not liable in June 2015.
In October 2016 Whyte moved in the criminal case to dismiss the indictment based on collateral estoppel (claim preclusion from the civil verdict).
The district court denied the motion; Whyte appealed the denial as an immediately appealable collateral order.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding the denial was not an appealable collateral order because collateral estoppel is a defense to liability, not an immunity from prosecution, and Whyte had not previously been placed in jeopardy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court's denial of Whyte's collateral estoppel motion is an appealable collateral order	Whyte argued the denial conclusively resolved an important issue separate from the merits and was effectively unreviewable on final judgment, permitting immediate appeal	Government argued the denial is not an appealable collateral order because collateral estoppel is a defense to liability, reviewable after final judgment	Denied appellate jurisdiction; the order is not an appealable collateral order and appeal dismissed
Whether Whyte's collateral estoppel claim functions as an immunity (pretrial right not to stand trial) allowing immediate review	Whyte attempted to analogize his claim to pretrial double jeopardy rulings that are immediately appealable	Government and court treated the claim as a defense to liability, not an immunity; Whyte had not previously been placed in jeopardy so double jeopardy protections did not apply	Collateral estoppel here is a defense to liability and thus not immediately reviewable; lacking prior jeopardy, the Abney rule does not apply

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1949) (framework for final and collateral-order appellate jurisdiction)
Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82 (4th Cir. 2014) (elements of appealable collateral orders)
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing immunity from defenses to liability for collateral-order purposes)
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (U.S. 1994) (defenses to liability are not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine)
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1977) (interlocutory appeals permitted for pretrial orders rejecting claims of former jeopardy)
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1975) (double jeopardy requires prior placement in jeopardy to bar subsequent prosecution)