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Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.
679 F.3d 205
4th Cir.
2012
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*1 Watch, Determination, Rights Human SHIMARI; Najim Bantekas, Cerone, Geoffrey Abdullah AL Suhail Ilias John Rashid; Arraq Corn, Glazier, Heller, Sa’ad Taha Yaseen David Kevin Jon Al-Zuba’e; Newton, Sassoli, Gary Salah Hamza Hantoosh Marco Michael Al-Ejaili, Plain Solis, Sullivan, Hasan Nusaif Jasim M. Dr. Anicee Scott tiffs-Appellees, Engeland, Supporting Ap Amici Van pellees, INTERNATIONAL, INCORPO CACI America, States of United Technology, RATED; Premier CACI Amicus Curiae. Defendants-Appellants. Incorporated, Al-Quraishi, Wissam Abdullateff Sa’eed Services, Kellogg Root Brown & Plaintiff-Appellee, Sup Incorporated, Amicus porting Appellants, Services, Incorporated, L-3 Defendant-Appellant, Fed of Civil Procedure and Professors and Chemerinsky, Courts, eral Erwin Distinguished Professor of Dean and Nakhla; International, In Adel CACI California, Law, University Irvine of corporated; Premier CACI Technolo Freedman, Law, Eric M. of School gy, Incorporated, Defendants. Deane, Distinguished A. Pro Maurice Law, Hofstra Professors of Civil Procedure and Fed- fessor of Constitutional Law, Courts, Chemerinsky, University Jennifer M. eral Erwin School of Director, Rights Distinguished Green, Liti Dean and Professor of Human Advocacy Law, University California, of gation International Irvine University Law, Freedman, Clinic, Law of Eric M. of Minnesota School Deane, Distinguished Hafetz, School, Associate Maurice A. Pro- Jonathan Law, Law, Hall fessor of Constitutional Hofstra of Seton Univer Professor Morrison, University Law, sity Law, M. Alan B. School of Jennifer of School Green, Director, Rights Family Dean for Human Liti- Lerner Associate Advocacy gation and International Public Interest and Public Service University Clinic, University Law, George Washington of Minnesota Law Hafetz, Vladeck, School, Law, Stephen Jonathan Associate I. School of Law, of Hall Univer- Law and Associate Dean Professor Seton Professor of University sity Law, Morrison, Alan B. Scholarship, American of for School Family College Law; Dean Washington Retired Lerner Associate Officers; Military Earthrights Public Interest and Public Service Inter University Law, George Washington national; Human International Law, Stephen Vladeck, Experts, I. Rights Organizations School Rights First, Professor of Law and Associate Dean Human The Center for University Scholarship, Torture, American The International Victims Law; Washington College Jurists, Working Retired Commission of Military Officers; Earthrights Inter- Group Established Commission national; Rights International Human of Mer on Human Use Experts, Rights Organizations Violating as a Means of Hu cenaries First, Rights Rights Impeding Human The Center for the Exer man Torture, Right Peoples The International Victims cise of the Self- *2 Jurists, Working Scholarship, University The Commission of American Group Washington College Law; Established the Commission Retired Military Rights Officers; Earthrights on Human on the of Mer- Use Inter- national; Violating cenaries as a Means of Hu- International Human Rights Organizations Rights Impeding Experts, man the Exer- Rights First, Right Peoples Human cise of the to Self- Center Torture, Determination, Rights Watch, Human Victims of The International Jurists, Bantekas, Cerone, Geoffrey Working Commission of Ilias John Corn, Group Glazier, Heller, Established David Kevin Jon Commission Newton, Rights Sassoli, Gary on Human Michael Marco on the Use of Mer- Solis, Sullivan, Violating cenaries as a M. Dr. Anicee Means of Hu- Scott Rights Engeland, Supporting Ap- Impeding man Van Amici the Exer- pellee, Right Peoples cise of the to Self- Determination, Rights Watch, Human America,

United States of Bantekas, Cerone, Geoffrey Ilias John Amicus Curiae. Corn, Glazier, Heller, David Kevin Jon Newton, Sassoli, Gary Michael Marco Al-Quraishi, Wissam Abdullateff Sa’eed Solis, Sullivan, Scott M. Dr. Anicee Plaintiff-Appellee, Engeland, Supporting Van Ap- Amici pellee, Nakhla, Adel Defendant-Appellant, America, United States of Amicus Curiae. Services, Incorporated; L-3 CACI Inter- 09-1335, 10-1891, Nos. 10-1921. national, Incorporated; CACI Premier Appeals, United States Court of Technology, Incorporated, Defen- Fourth Circuit. dants. Argued: Jan. 2012. Professors of Civil Procedure and Fed- May Decided: Courts, eral Chemerinsky, Erwin Distinguished Dean and Professor of

Law, University California, Irvine Law, Freedman,

School of Eric M. Deane, Distinguished

Maurice A. Pro- Law,

fessor of Constitutional Hofstra

University Law, School of Jennifer M.

Green, Director, Rights Human Liti-

gation Advocacy and International

Clinic, University of Minnesota Law

School, Hafetz, Jonathan Associate Law,

Professor of Hall Seton Univer-

sity Law, Morrison, School of Alan B. Family

Lerner Associate Dean for

Public Interest and Public Service

Law, George Washington University Law, Stephen Vladeck,

School of I.

Professor of Law and Associate Dean *3 Technology, Premier Incorporated;

CACI Devore, Agnieszka Frysz- M. Joshua S. man, McOwen, Maureen E. Mil- Cohen PLLC, Washington, stein Sellers & Toll D.C., for Professors of Civil Procedure Courts, Supporting and Federal Amici Condon, Appellees. Jennifer B. Seton Law, University Hall School Center Justice, Newark, Jersey; for Social New Gibbons, Lustberg, John J. Lawrence S. Manes, P.C., Jonathan M. Gibbons New- *4 ark, Jersey, Military New for Retired Officers, Amici Supporting Appellees. Rona, Milazzo, Gabor Melina Human Joseph Koegel, ARGUED: William First, York, York; Rights New New Jr., Johnson, LLP, Steptoe Washing- & LoBue, Robert P. Ella Campi, Richard D.C.; ton, Zymelman, Ari S. Williams & Kim, Shofner, Elizabeth Patterson Belk- LLP, D.C., Connolly, Washington, for LLP, York, nap Tyler Webb & New Appellants. Azmy, Baher for Center York, New for International Human York, Rights, Constitutional New New Rights Organizations Experts, and Amici York; Burke, PLLC, L. Susan Burke Simons, Supporting Appellees. Marco D.C., Washington, Appellees. for H. Herz, Vahlsing, Richard Marissa Jona- III, Byron, Thomas United States De- Kaufman, International, than Earthrights Justice, D.C., partment of Washington, D.C., Washington, Earthrights for Inter- for Amicus Curiae. ON BRIEF: John national, Amicus Supporting Appellees. O’Connor, Johnson, LLP, Steptoe F. & West, Tony General, Attorney Assistant D.C., Washington, Appellants for CACI Raab, Depart- Michael S. United States International, Incorporated and CACI Justice, Washington, D.C., ment of for Technology, Incorporated. Premier Eric Amicus Curiae. Delinsky, LLP, R. Spaeder Zuckerman D.C.; Washington, Peters, F. Whitten F. TRAXLER, Before Judge, Chief and Bowman, Greg Connolly, Williams & WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, MOTZ, LLP, D.C., Washington, Appellants KING, GREGORY, SHEDD, DUNCAN, Services, Incorporated L-3 and Adel AGEE, DAVIS, KEENAN, WYNN, PLLC, Sajadi, Nakhla. M. Susan Burke DIAZ, FLOYD, and Judges. Circuit D.C.; Washington, Gallagher, Katherine Dixon, J. Wells Center Appeals for Constitutional published opinion. dismissed York, York; Rights, New New Joseph Judge opinion, KING wrote the in which Rice, LLC, Pleasant, Motley F. Rice Judge Mt. Chief TRAXLER Judges Carolina; Akeel, MOTZ, GREGORY, South DUNCAN, AGEE, Shereef Hadi Valentine, PC, Troy, Michigan, DAVIS, KEENAN, WYNN, DIAZ, Akeel & for Appellees. Raymond Biagini, B. joined. Judge FLOYD DUNCAN wrote a Ebner, Lawrence Long S. McKenna & concurring opinion, Judge which AGEE LLP, D.C., Aldridge Washington, joined. Judge a concurring WYNN wrote Services, Kellogg Brown & Root opinion. Judge Incor- WILKINSON wrote porated, Supporting Appellants Amicus dissenting opinion, Judge in which International, CACI Incorporated, joined. and Judge NIEMEYER SHEDD bodies, dissenting subjected Judge NIEMEYER wrote them to sexual humiliation, abuse and Judge in which WILKINSON and opinion, traumatized them with joined. mock executions and other Judge SHEDD sa- operative

distic acts. Second OPINION Complaint Amended filed in the companion litigation, seventy-two plaintiffs, headed KING, Judge: Circuit AI-Quraishi, Wissam Abdullateff Sa’eed Following Iraq, the 2003 invasion of allegations against detailed similar L-3 United States took control of Abu Nakhla, employee and Adel an L-3 resid- prison Baghdad, using Ghraib near it to ing Maryland.1 criminals, provisional detain enemies of the persons thought and other government, I. regarding the possess information anti-Co- A. insurgency. alition The United States International, contracted with CACI Incor- September On CACI moved (with Technology, CACI Premier porated Complaint dismiss the Amended filed in Incorporated, together referred to herein the Eastern Virginia, District of maintain- *5 “CACI”), Corporation, as and Titan now that, (1) ing generally among other things: Services, (“L-3”), Incorporated L-3 dispute presented nonjusticiable po- employees civilian to assist provide (2) question; litical applica- inevitable communicating in with and inter- occupied Iraq tion the law of rendered rogating group this latter of detainees. CACI, part as of the occupying power, 30, 2008, Iraqis On June a number of immune from suit under Coleman v. Ten- nessee, (1878), who had been detained at Abu Ghraib and 97 U.S. 24 L.Ed. 1118 Johnson, elsewhere filed lawsuits CACI and and Dow v. (3) (1879);

L-3 in the District of plaintiffs’ Southern Ohio and L.Ed. 632 claims Maryland, the District of alleging preempted by the were the “combatant activi- employees contractors and certain of their exception ties” to the Federal Tort Claims (the “FTCA”), in § were liable common law tort and under Act 2680(j), see 28 U.S.C. (“ATS”), the Alien Tort Statute Corp., 28 U.S.C. discussed Ibrahim v. Titan (D.D.C.2007), § torturing abusing F.Supp.2d and them subsequent- during Following ly adopted appeal, incarceration. see Saleh Titan (D.C.Cir.2009) unopposed transfer of the Corp., Ohio action to 580 F.3d 1 (citing Virginia, Boyle the Eastern District of Corp., where v. United Tech. headquartered, Najim (1988)); CACI is Suhail Ab- 101 L.Ed.2d (4) dullah A1 co-plaintiffs Shimari and three the company was entitled to abso- Complaint submitted an Amended immunity assert- lute official in accordance with CACI, Services, Inc., ing through employees, its Mangold Analytic (4th agents, Cir.1996), coconspirators, F.3d 1442 because its em- necessities, deprived ployees them basic human performed delegated govern- had through beat them and ran electric current respect mental functions. With to the initially Virginia proceedings. CACI and L-3 were each named as in the See Fed.R.Civ.P. couple defendants in both lawsuits. Within a 41(a)(l)(A)(i). On March the district following of months commencement of the Maryland prejudice court in denied without however, litigation, voluntarily CACI was dis L-3’s motion to transfer venue of that case to Maryland missed from the action and the Virginia. Eastern District accomplished respect same was to L-3 claims, contractor, proffered, arms-length several addi- tus as an ATS CACI “because jurisdiction if foreign even the law of a arguments, none of them relevant tional govern any were of the Plaintiffs’ light here in of the claims’ eventual dis- claims, it not regulate would the conduct of at 210. missal. See infra States, a non-party the United to this suit motion to dismiss the Second L-3’s private parties.” between Id. at 725. Maryland ac- Complaint Amended dividing line between the bona fide tion, 26, 2008, and in filed on November support and its civilian personnel joined, predicated which Nakhla was es- uncertainty also fueled the district court’s CACI’s, sentially along the same lines as that the engaged latter could have war- though Mangold it characterized as involv- time activities pur- “combatant” for sovereign of derivative ing application poses adopting theory the D.C. Circuit’s immunity instead of absolute official immu- Shimari, preemption. of FTCA See Al done, nity. previously As had L-3 CACI F.Supp.2d at 720-21. The court con- doctrine, question cit- political invoked the that, event, plaintiffs’ cluded Supreme ed Court’s decisions Cole- allegations of torture at the hands of CACI (the defense”), man and Dow “law-of-war implicate uniquely failed to federal in- requested (through supplemental terests or irreconcilable conflict with state briefing) adopt that the court the combat- law that animated the Court’s ant exception ultimately applied activities in Boyle, decision on which Saleh relied. preemption”). Saleh L-3 simi- {“Saleh See id. 722-25. larly advocated for dismissal of the ATS Regarding CACI’s claim of derivative substantially claims on grounds the same Mangold, under the district identified CACI.2 court set forth its view that validity *6 depends such a claim pro- on whether its 1. ponent, committing complained the act 19, 2009, March On the district court in “ of, was ‘exercising discretion while acting Virginia entered a Memorandum Order ” within scope employment.’ of their CACI, dismissing the ATS claims Shimari, Al F.Supp.2d (empha- 657 at 715 but permitting the common-law tort claims omitted) (quoting sis Mangold, 77 F.3d at to proceed. See Al Shimari v. CACI Pre 1446). Citing very “a limited factual rec- Tech., Inc., F.Supp.2d mier 700 ord,” expressed the court its skepticism (E.D.Va.2009). In so ruling, the court ac that CACI had established at the dismissal knowledged its considerable reservations stage that plaintiffs its treatment of the implicated political ques the action a Abu Ghraib involved the exercise of discre- tion, CACI, private entity, was tion. Id. The court stated further that it States, not the United low-level “completely was by sug- bewildered” governmental personnel ap gestion accept repre- that it could CACI’s peared to have been involved in the alleged company sentations that per- had mistreatment. See id. at 708-14. The scope agreement formed within the of its court similarly was doubtful that the fore government with the “when the contract is application seeable Iraqi required law not before the Court on this motion.” Id. light 23, 2009, dismissal in apparent CACI’s sta- at 717. On March CACI noted Maryland 2. The argument grounds urged district court denied L-3’s to the identical dismissal motion support primary as to the ATS claims. See of its contention that appeal at 212. L-3 incorrectly maintains on court below declined to dismiss infra this error, ruling was in but it confines its the state-law tort claims. (No. 09-1335) which, appeal Maryland, its from the district court in its Opinion of ruling. that, court’s July concluded “relying on

the information in the [Second Amended] 2- Complaint, clearly early too to dismiss Al-Quraishi Nakhla, Defendants.” Mangold immunity The assertion of was (D.Md.2010).3 way by much the district F.Supp.2d viewed the same The dis- " Mangold, private (quoting Mangold, In we reversed the district court’s lawsuits.’ Id. 1446). immunity govern- Mangold denial to the defendant immunity F.3d While cer- employees tainly in a law- removing potential ment contractor its has the effect of brought by litigation, important suit an Air Force officer and his distraction of it is to note scope wife statements the contractor made to narrow of the immunization actual- case, investigating ly officials applied officer's al- authorized in that which we leged "only necessary misconduct. L-3 and CACI have each insofar as to shield state- information, heavily Mangold proposition relied for the ments and whether truthful or not, given by that our decision in case likewise entitles contractor and its immunity employees response queries them to for the tort claims asserted by govern- by plaintiffs Maryland investigators engaged here. The district ment in an official in- court, noting vestigation.” the defendants' additional reli- light at 1449. International, Inc., disposition appeals, infra, ance on Butters Vance our of these we (4th Cir.2000), express opinion 225 F.3d 462 characterized no as to the merits of immunity being immunity by claimed as in the nature gener- asserted the defendants in al, sovereign immunity, pertinence of derivative which the Mangold or as to the of our "protect[ing] agents precedent particular, court described as of the but instead leave sovereign liability carrying out the those matters for the district courts to consid- Al-Quraishi, sovereign's will." er in the first instance should arise on F.Supp.2d distinguished at 736. The court remand. Mangold, opining immunity that the discussed sovereign difference between derivative immunity therein "was based on a combination of de- and derivative absolute official im thereof) munity (including any rivative absolute official ap wit- offshoots immunity, pears ness doctrines that differ from de- may depend to be a fine one that on the Al-Quraishi, sovereign immunity.” degree rivative of discretion afforded the contractor which, F.Supp.2d government, at 736. stage at this litigation, question capable is not of final The distinction drawn the district court proceeding. resolution in either Were that support Mangold, finds in the text of as ex- case, crucial, not the the distinction could be pressed by our careful observation that the *7 fully developed rulings in that denying abso public policy justifying grant of absolute immunity immediately appeal- lute official immunity exercising job- to federal officials able, sovereign while denials based on immu "provide[d] only partial related discretion (or thereof) nity derivative claims not protecting” foundation be. for the defendant con- Cmty. Hosp. See Mangold, Hous. v. Blue Cross & Blue tractor in that case. 77 F.3d at Tex., Inc., Erwin, 265, 292, (5th Shield (citing 481 F.3d Westfall 300, Cir.2007) (denial 580, (1988)). sovereign 98 L.Ed.2d derivative im munity appealable); sup- The not remainder of that foundation was Alaska v. United States, 1352, (9th Cir.1995) (de plied by privilege testify "the common law 64 F.3d law, immunity sovereign immunity appealable); with absolute in nial of courts of be- Indus., grand juries, States, fore and before in- Pullman Const. Inc. v. United vestigators.” (7th 1994) (same). According Id. at 1449. to the 23 F.3d Cir. court, Maryland district derivative absolute But see In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site (invoked immunity by (2d Cir.2008) Litigation, official CACI and more directly by Virginia authorities). (disagreeing foregoing addressed district with Al Shimari) though degree Mangold court in Al "ensures that discretion- to which controls governmental ary specific decision makers are able to assertions of in these decided, will, efficiently yet simplic exercise their discretion in the best cases is we to be sake, po- ity’s interests Government without ‘the to refer continue to L-3 CACI tentially debilitating defending having "Mangold immunity.” distraction of asserted (4th Cir.2011).4 therewith, Consistently defi- perceived court no such record trict judgments reversing separate we entered concerning L-3’s and Nakhla’s al- ciencies however, dismissal, appeal remanding on the orders bases for ternative proceedings. both to instructions dismiss deeming pleaded the facts as sufficient argu- both defendants’ reject outright 8, 2011, upon timely November On denied the motion ments. The court thus petitions plaintiffs, R.App. of the see Fed. claims, in- to all respect to dismiss with 35(b)-(c), granting P. we entered an Order premised on the ATS. See cluding those of all three rehearing appeals, en banc 724-33, at 736-60. From the court’s id. thereby vacating prior judgments. our Order, appeal noted its accompanying L-3 appeals were thereafter consolidated 10-1891) (No. 4, 2010, August on followed purposes argument, of oral which was (No. days appeal later another 10- two conducted before the en banc Court on 1921) of Nakhla. noted on behalf January Having fully 2012.5 consid- arguments par- of the ered briefs B. ties, together with the written and oral Alr-Quraishi appeals were consol permitted amici curiae submissions argued idated and seriatim with the Al participate, leave to we conclude we appeal panel Shimari before a of this jurisdiction interlocutory lack over these Apart on October appeals, and we therefore dismiss them.6 merits, urging our affirmance on the alternatively

plaintiffs each matter II. appellate juris maintained that we lacked A. diction over the district courts’ non-final denying Except for in- respective categories orders the contractors’ the limited terlocutory September motions dismiss. On orders set forth 28 U.S.C. cases, § opinions appellate jurisdiction we issued in both federal is re- panel which a concluded served for “final decisions of the district Court, jurisdiction proper was courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § undisputed and that the district courts had erred in 1291. It is that the decisions permitting underlying putative appeals the claims the contrac are in- proceed. terlocutory, tors to Al procedural See Shimari v. CACI least (4th Int’l, Inc., Cir.2011); sense, judgment 658 F.3d 413 Al- in that no final order or Inc., Quraishi Servs., v. L-3 657 F.3d 201 has been entered either district court. panel opinions plaintiffs supple- 4. We both released of our moved to tender their own September following grant plaintiffs' mental briefs. We mo- Court’s denial of certiorari in Saleh on June accept supplemental replies tions *8 27, 11, previously, 2011. We had on March for consideration. 2011, placed appeals abeyance pend- these ing petition. resolution of the Saleh certiorari arguments 6.The and contentions before us in appeals, though identically present- invitation, Justice, Department 5. At our emphasized, ed or are nonetheless substan- States, on behalf of the United submitted tially enough similar that we are content to participated argu- amicus brief and in oral appeals’ pur- continue the consolidation for Therein, posi- ment. took Hereinafter, poses of decision. we shall refer jurisdiction tion that we were without to de- "L-3,” together to L-3 and Nakhla appeals. prior argument, cide these Just collectively them with both of CACI as the granted we leave defendants to submit "appellants.” supplemental response govern- briefs in to the submission, ment’s amicus after which the

213 taken, appeal properly contest that neither or- It is also without the Court de- appealable by been certified der has exception jurisdictional clared no to the issuing pursuant court to 28 U.S.C. 1291, § prerequisites 28 U.S.C. but in- 1292(b), § that none of that statute’s stead described what would subsequently apply juris- otherwise to confer provisions doctrine,” be coined the “collateral order diction on this Court. Guterma, 65, MacAlister v. 67 (2d Cir.1958), as a “practical, rather than a only way we

Consequently, be technical construction” of the statute. Co- appeal the orders on is if entitled review hen, 546, 337 U.S. at 69 among “that small S.Ct. [of class deci- Indus. Loan issue has pounding S.Ct. right separable to be denied review and too the cause itself to rights consideration be deferred until the whole sions] order must disputed question, case is emphasized completely separate asserted in the which adjudicated.” on the “[1] Corp., finally conclusively that an L.Ed. topic, from, [2] require 337 U.S. determine claims of resolve an action, Cohen Beneficial 1528 and collateral appealable from the merits Supreme independent determine the too (1949). 541, 546, important important appellate Cohen Court Ex- to, 69 penter, rein on the therefore bound to maintain “a healthy ment rule.” Mohawk respect for the virtues of the final-judg modest mentioned U.S. doctrine appeal consistent with Cohen. We are sistently 175 L.Ed.2d 458 The federal courts of — U.S. —, scope.”).7 been recently applying 126 S.Ct. 952 types charged (2009); without emphasizing its of orders suitable for the collateral order Indus., 130 S.Ct. appeals see also (“[W]e keeping tight Inc. v. Car have con Will, 599, have not 605, action, [3] effectively unre- Supreme Court’s concern, as ex- appeal judgment.” viewable on from a final pressed through repeated admonitions, its Hallock, 345, 349, Will amply justified. The appellate courts (2006) (altera- S.Ct. 163 L.Ed.2d 836 are, by design, jurisdiction; of limited (internal in original) quotation tions marks thus, accepting prejudgment appeals as a omitted). matter of course would effi- “undermine[ ] judicial cient administration and en-

Cohen involved a stockholder’s deriva- upon prerogatives croach[ ] district fraud, mismanagement action for tive judges, play court who a special role in Supreme in which the Court reviewed the Mohawk, managing ongoing litigation.” district court’s threshold declining decision (internal at 605 quotation marks requiring plaintiffs to enforce a state law omitted). addition, interlocutory routine post security ensuring in such cases attorney unacceptably subject review payment of fees the event the would merito- corporation prevailed. Deeming defendant rious lawsuits to “the harassment and cost scope” (1982) (denial apparent 7. This "modest from the 102 S.Ct 73 L.Ed.2d 396 approved by qualified immunity pursuant short list of orders from suit 1983); § Fitzgerald, for immediate review under Cohen. 42 U.S.C. Nixon v. 225, 238-39, 731, 742, Haley, See Osborn v. (denial (1982) (denial (2007) president 166 L.Ed.2d of absolute immu- Meanor, nity); of substitution of United States under Westfall Helstoski v. Act); (denial (1979) *9 Aqueduct P.R. & Sewer Auth. v. 99 S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 30 of Metcalf Inc., 139, 144-45, Eddy, Speech immunity); Abney & 506 U.S. 113 S.Ct. and Debate Clause 684, States, (1993) (denial 651, 660, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 to state v. United 431 U.S. 2034, (1977) (denial immunity); of claimed Eleventh Amendment 52 L.Ed.2d 651 of double 800, 817-18, bar). Fitzgerald, jeopardy Harlow v. 457 U.S. 214 appellate from sent an immediate review of the separate appeals a succession claim, immunity right of an not litigation a denial rulings various which irretrievably to stand trial “would be lost.” rise, entry initiation to from its

may give (internal omitted). quotation Id. marks Rubber Firestone Tire & Co. judgment.” 374, 101 669, contrast, if 368, By right at issue is one S.Ct. Risjord, 449 U.S. (1981) (internal subject binding to a judgment “not to be quotation 571 66 L.Ed.2d omitted). is, liability— the court”—that a defense to marks just right then the can be vindicated as Moreover, there is no need to con readily appeal judgment, from the final broadly given the existence of strue Cohen and the collateral order doctrine does not “safety alternative. The valve” a suitable 527, 108 apply. Id. at S.Ct. 1945. interlocutory discretionary review under In assessing right sought whether the 1292(b) frequently § is a “better 28 U.S.C. protected immunity be constitutes a true vindicating ... [certain] vehicle for serious defense, merely requires “§ not a 1291 blunt, categorical than the instru claims appeals claims of a [the court] view § appeal.” ment of 1291 collateral order [a] not to if ‘right skepticism, be tried’ with Direct, Equip. Corp. Desktop Digital jaundiced eye.” Digital Equip., not a Inc., 1992, 511 U.S. S.Ct. 873, S.Ct. 1992. As the Su (1994). Accordingly, L.Ed.2d 842 the col cautioned, preme Court has must be “[o]ne doctrine lateral order should “never be ... play games careful not to word general to swallow the rule that a allowed ” tried,’ concept ‘right of a not to be single appeal, to a party is entitled States, Asphalt Corp. Midland v. United judgment until final has been en deferred 489 U.S. (citation 868, 114 Id. at S.Ct. 1992 tered.” (1989), “virtually every L.Ed.2d 879 omitted). right appropriately that could be enforced by pretrial might loosely B. dismissal be de conferring right scribed as not to stand Although properly appealable col trial,” Digital Equip., 511 lateral order under Cohen must of course foregoing S.Ct. 1992. It is within the satisfy requirements, all of the its Will framework that we review de novo the encapsulation hallmark is the of a right appealability of the district courts’ denial abridgement “effectively whose unre Forsyth, orders. See Mitchell v. appellate viewable” should review await 511, 528-30, 105 S.Ct. final judgment. Henry See v. Lake (1985) (equating qualified denials of immu LLC, Am. Charles Press 566 F.3d nity to collateral denials of other asserted (5th Cir.2009) (describing unreviewability jeopardy immunities or of double invoca as “the fundamental characteristic of the tions, and deeming prop de novo standard (citation collateral order doctrine” omit er based on non-deferential review of lat ted)). “critical question” determin claims). ter ing right effectively whether the at issue is unreviewable in the normal course “is III. right whether the essence of the claimed is, right Corp., to stand trial” —that wheth In Doe v. Exxon Mobil (D.C.Cir.2007), er it constitutes suit. 345 the District of Colum- Biard, Cauwenberghe v. attempted appeal Van bia Circuit confronted an (1988) 524, 108 1945, 100 interlocutory L.Ed.2d 517 from the district court’s or- (internal omitted). quotation refusing brought marks Ab- der an action dismiss *10 in- by villagers alleging authority any pro- serious are without to make Indonesian by juries upon them members nouncement on that aspect appel- visited the in that the defendants’ nation’s lants’ defense. We therefore withhold for According defen- private employ. to the the moment substantive comment the dants, nonjustieia- dispute a presented the doctrine, political question at least until we question. ap- The court of political ble defense, evaluate whether the law-of-war peals to address the merits of the declined preemption, Mangold or Saleh issue, noting single the absence of “a case jurisdictional provides green light for in which federal court held that appeals a proceed. us to a political denial of motion to dismiss on question grounds immediately ap- an is A.

pealable collateral Id. at order.” 352.8 yet appears lacking,

That case to be appellants characterize their former do the con- appellants (L- not contend to Iraq presence “occupying as forces” L-3, however, 3) trary. that an (CACI) ventures “occupying personnel” or court appellate may determine whether an are “only country’s answerable to their political action a question is or otherwise laws,” 25, criminal Opening Br. of CACI jurisdic- nonjusticiable proper when it has subject and thus “not civil suits a pursuant tion over different issue to occupied,” Opening Br. L-3 at 22-23. 1292(b), § Cohen or if consideration of the that regard, the appellants equate their “necessary former meaningful to ensure situation with those of the Civil War sol- Cnty. review.” Swint v. Chambers Tennessee, diers in Coleman 97 U.S. Comm’n, (1878), 24 L.Ed. 1118 and Dow v. (1995). may 131 L.Ed.2d We also exer- Johnson, 25 L.Ed. 632 jurisdic- “pendent” appellate cise so-called (1879), sought who relief from judgments tion in question circumstances where against entered them for their wartime “inextricably intertwined” with another acts. The defendant Coleman had been Id.; immediately be may reviewed. convicted sentenced to death a Sudan, 461 Republic see Rux v. F.3d murdering Tennessee state court for a ci- (4th Cir.2006). vilian, though judgment the same and sen- argument necessarily previously imposed tence had supposes L-3’s been of an result of jurisdiction- Army existence otherwise valid States court-mar- United Dow, al its appeal. indepen- by contrast, basis for Absent an tial. chal- involved a dently po- lenge reviewable issue with which the judgment to civil entered in Louisi- litical question inexorably doctrine be ana a Union general after forces bound, one that plain- or cannot reviewed a under his command seized had meaningful addressing private property fashion without tiffs furtherance justiciability dispute, of the underlying we war effort. presented judgment.

8. The Circuit Doe D.C. was F.3d at 351. The court Doe argument appellants notion, here: same make squarely rejected that mistaken how- premised that the of a ever, denial dismissal motion explaining although separation powers on the doctrine is ‘honoring separa- Court has "identified] appealable collateral order under Cohen be- powers’ support tion of as a value that could necessary pro- cause immediate “is review trial, party’s avoiding [the interest judicial tect the executive branch from intru- discussing has] d[one] so while cases foreign policy sion sensitive into matters” involving immunity.” Id. appeal could not be remedied on from a final *11 appellants is that the Another distinction permitted to judgment was Neither to the law-of-war defense attempt invoke cases, Supreme Court In the stand. both al- exclusively that them on the assertion Confederacy states the considered the Iraqi wrongs will evaluated under leged be country,” enemy’s to have “the to been Mary- law, not of Virginia, the laws “[ojfficers the and soldiers tribunals whose land, true, may If that or another state. not sub- of the Union were of the armies enough bring to or be Coleman Coleman, 97 U.S. at 515. ject.” the over- play, Dow into inasmuch as that a its bewilderment expressed Court to appears riding concern those cases very “from the contrary could obtain result the application the have been less about war,” “the tribu- concluding nature of that law or of Louisiana criminal of Tennessee juris- enemy must without nals of the be (there that being suggestion law no tort judgment upon diction sit analo- significantly from the either differed the officers and soldiers conduct of states applied by law the defendants’ gous army. It is difficult to reason invading citizenry), jurisdic- and more about the manifest; its cor- a so upon proposition Coleman, “foreign” tion of the courts. See upon announce- rectness is evident its bare (musing at 516 “there would 97 U.S. Dow, at ment.” incongruous and something absurd in- or permitting an officer soldier of disputes between the Some differences army by enemy”); vading tried to be his underlying at bar and those Coleman “[tjhe Dow, (identifying at 163 U.S. readily are evident. salient Dow Most as important question” resolution employees that the civilian of CACI and be held whether nation’s could Abu not sol- assigned L-3 Ghraib were tribunals”). Here, “in local liable employees diers. The idea those course, being are sued on appellants nonetheless be treated like full- should turf, home in courts are indis- fledged military pervades members putably domestic. reso- litigation, though concept assuming Even that the facts before us nates with more force some of the as to permit can be viewed such fashion to defenses, particularly other Sa- appellants’ apply, there is no Coleman and Dow immunity. preemption Mangold leh opinions indication in those cases from 594, 601-02, Surget, 97 But Ford v. cf. Supreme to con- Court intended (1878) Mississippi (relieving 24 L.Ed. 1018 defense an immuni- strue law-of-war as liability burning civilian landown- from suit, than an insula- ty merely rather er’s ordered cotton where destruction- Dow, liability. tion from See army in ad- Confederate face of Union concerning (characterizing dispute vance and those “commands would have jurisdiction); personal Lauro Lines s.r.l. undoubtedly been enforced the same Chasser, if means of coercion as he had been an (1989) (“[W]e de- have soldier”). potential liability enlisted clined to the collateral order doctrine hold was front and contractors has de- applicable where district court and if Mangold, center in both Saleh and against a claim ... that the suit nied (or both) legal principles either case the ... properly is not before defendant bar, apposite dispute deemed jurisdiction.”). it lacks court because there is question appellants, judg- little that the subsequent opinion, with its Ford themselves, may having avail them- the de- as contractors ment entered been verdict, in no jury selves of fendant them. trial Immunity, indicated that should not have way suit. according *12 Court, had. explicit been derives from “an statutory guarantee or constitutional that trial will Indeed, it seems a bit to curious Asphalt not occur.” Midland Corp. v. imagine century the nineteenth re Court States, United 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. in garding its the Civil cases decisions War (1989) 103 (emphasis L.Ed.2d 879 effect; having durable the precedential as added).9 There is no contention that the an unusual appeals opportunity afforded Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Tech- for substantive domestic review of what nologies Corp., 487 U.S. 108 S.Ct. were, effect, foreign pronouncements of (1988), from which judgment. But to extent that Cole derived, preemption Saleh is relied on any possess man and Dow continued relevance explicit guarantee such embodied in stat- context, beyond their immediate it none is ute or in the Boyle Constitution. preemp- theless clear that the issues presented (and, thus, is, tion preemption) Saleh ipso effectively cases those were reviewed and facto, immunity. not and, such, of disposed appeal, as Supreme manner which the chose We are not the first court to arrive at compel to resolve them fails the conclu this ineluctable conclusion. Martin v. immunity that must be all sion accorded Halliburton, (5th Cir. prospective defendants who are insist 2010), Fifth similarly Circuit reckoned similarly situated. The law-of-war defense that “the combatant exception activities is provides for an interlocutory thus no basis not subject to a sui generis exemption appeal this case. ordinary jurisdictional from the require ments for denials of preemption claims.”10

B. Indeed, Boyle Court itself repeatedly fashion, In a like Saleh preemption preemption framed the recognized squarely falls on the side of being creating See, a de a mere liability. defense to liability (“The fense to not an immunity e.g., at 487 U.S. properly 9. The proponent implicit Court has right dismissed asserts is an to be 875-76, the mistaken that Asphalt's notion Midland free from suit. Id. at 114 S.Ct. 1992. "explicit guarantee” requirement ... is in appealability tension Rodriguez with the immediate of 10. See also Lockheed Martin denying qualified (9th Cir.2010), order immunity, Corp., an an in- 627 F.3d 1259 in which herently equivocal appears jurisdiction term to con- the court addressed its over an only guarantee implicit against interlocutory appeal premised note on the discre- Any tionary burdens of trial. tension can be exception functions to the FTCA. Ac- chimerical, however, court, light cording characterized as Rodriguez because the qualified immunity’s "good pedigree right recognized by Boyle merely was a "de- law,” not, public up judgment” which more than qualified makes fense to like —and implicitness. Digital Equip., “right its immunity, required go not to be argument nothing irretrievably 1992. that an lost the lack trial” — of an explicit need not be appeal in order for pre- immediate from an adverse jurisdiction ruling. Rodriguez, to lie under the collateral order trial F.3d at "only proponent juris- [the doctrine emphasized Boyle leaves The Ninth Circuit did explaining diction] with the species immunity, unenviable task of a new devise but " why rights might fairly recognized other merely be said ‘whether the facts 'right (implicit) include an [government not to stand trial' establish conditions for aspect protection question less in need imme- contractor] defense is a for the ” review, readily diate jury.’ (quoting Boyle, or more vindicated on Id. at 1265 right 2510). appeal judgment, from final than” the S.Ct. liability in such imposition con- cause liability on Government imposition uniquely situations is irreconcilable military procurement con- [in tractors right conferred federal of Gov- interests. directly affect terms will text] in other contracts.”); 511-12, through preemption, federal id. at ernment words, by a not to be bound (“The judg- right financial burden of law judgment stemming from state duties. ulti- the contractors would ments ... through to the Unit- mately passed contrast, immunity has In stark consis- *13 itself.”); 512, at 108 S.Ct. id. ed States protection as a tently been administered (“[S]tate law which holds Government 2510 litigation altogether. the burden design in mil- defects liable contractors Forsyth, 525- See Mitchell does in circum- equipment some itary (1985). 411 105 86 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. ‘significant a conflict’ with present stances Further, appeals explained as the court displaced.”). and must be policy federal Martin Rodriguez Corp., v. Lockheed (9th Cir.2010), 1265 suppose, we to blur tempting, It is “Al- con- though of lia- the source of an eventual frustration line between [recognized Boyle is to tractor defense right ] the more immediate bility and sovereign immunity,” the United altogether. might per- One be States’ avoid suit not itself spe- defense is a “preemption” preemption the words suaded to consider contrary, are cies thereof. To the entitlement “immunity” as mere labels that other, only corollary a “is financial synonymous preemption less with each more or government’s flowing that the can effec- benefit from the sov- presume or to former immunity.” Id. merely ereign Accordingly, But tively operate as latter. Boyle’s contractor “government the sake of defense repackaging for convenience sovereign immunity from does not defense derived confer preemption such, contractors,” the denial immunity,” and as Boyle as “combatant activities immediately appealable. defense Id. colleague Judge Niemeyer is not good as our omitted). (internal dissenters, at marks post quotation for the speaking does 259, patently incorrect. is requires that Importantly, the law we potentially of a

Though Boyle preemption, like sover- assess the appealability qualifying order in a immunity, categorical be invoked to bar collateral eign sense, claims, encapsulated rights case-by-case not on a basis.11 state law here purposes. Conducting claims that assessment leads to serve distinct State law of a Boyle simply preemp- under be- the conclusion that the denial preempted 11. Although presence recognize an of a “sub- order as collater S.Ct. 1992. Whether jurisdictional interest,” in al is not "an individualized particular public stantial or "some quiry," is based the entire but rather "on order,” necessary high prereq- value of a a is belongs.” category to which a claim Mo Will, appeal, uisite a collateral order hawk, Consequently, "we 130 S.Ct. at 605. 352-53, at identifica- engage in do not now in each individual case public tion of interest is not the end of such a balancing appeala to decide ad hoc issues of inquiry. explained As the Jones, bility.” Johnson Mohawk, question crucial ... is not "[t]he (1995). 132 L.Ed.2d It important whether the ab- an interest appealability "the issue of under follows that stract; deferring review it is whether until § determined 1291 is to be ... without re judgment imperils the final so interest as litigation gard to the chance that at hand justify allowing appeal immediate the cost of particular justice might speeded, or a averted, relevant orders.” entire class of appellate prompt deci a court Digital Equip., 511 606. sion.” U.S. at Martin, stemming interlocutory tion claim from the combatant sort to review. exception necessarily not F.3d at For example, activities would district court scrutiny of mili- significant develop entail sensitive “should take care to and resolve tary Fundamentally, early is little stage issues. there such defenses while inquiry avoiding, because the court’s focus- to the extent possible, any intrusion inter- complied es on whether the contractor ference with prerogatives.” Id. government’s specifications Additionally, with the trial court should consider instructions, “limiting discovery initially the wisdom or cor- to such defens- Boyle “certifying thereof. The and Saleh es” and denying rectness orders [the] well but, decisions themselves illustrate the defense[ ] where law unsettled lack of intrusion that would result from after refinement on appeal, might warrant entry review until after of a final deferring dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.” Id.13 judgment. Boyle, example, involved an conducted, When properly suits against appeal jury plaintiff, verdict for the *14 private pose contractors minimal risk that while “the two appeals Saleh reached military personnel will be improperly haled using the D.C. Circuit the normal machin- taken, into court or their depositions be- 1292(b).” Martin, ery §§of 1291 and discovery cause hamper would “[w]here F.3d at 488.12 mission, military’s can district courts Moreover, Saleh, delay the district court in had Saleh and must it.” F.3d (Garland, discovery “regarding J., conducted extensive dissenting) (citing, alia, inter SEC, military’s supervision contract Watts 482 F.3d 508-09 (D.C.Cir.2007)). employees degree as well as the to which procedural Other and integrated rules, such into employees were substantive such as Rule 45 of the command,” military chain of F.3d at Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Circuit, doctrine, with no ill effects. The Fifth while state secrets adequately also acknowledging Boyle preemption safeguard military interests. See id. at 29 underpinned by respect (Garland, J., “a for the inter- n. 18 dissenting). According- in military ests of the Government mat- ly, recognize we decline to denials of Saleh ters,” has nonetheless reasoned that those as a preemption new class of collateral can safeguarded interests be without re- order.14 it Insofar as would be on founded plaintiffs 12.It no that the government’s is of moment have 13. amicus submission contractors, alleged conspiracy among agrees, observing postpon- that concerns over employees, military person- their and certain ing by review "can and be should addressed allegation conspiracy nel. The does not supervision careful any limitation and close challenge transform civil action into a to courts, necessary discovery by the district and interests, government’s policy or or into existing the use of mechanisms inter- attempt to hold liable its contractors review, locutory appellate including certifica- acting governmental in accord with decisions. 1292(b).” § tion under 28 U.S.C. Br. for the Saleh, plaintiffs Just as in some where of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4. alleged conspiracy, a similar no "there is alle- evidence, gation, and no that” the "low-level And, indeed, to be seen remains whether alleged acting conspiracy soldiers” to be adopt concept we will the substantive "bat- control, personnel any with contractor "had preemption” espoused tlefield the Saleh facto, jure de per- de the” or over contractor majority. purposes For the of our decision J„ (Garland, sonnel. at 20 dissent- however, today, we assume but do not decide such, ing). proceedings As Sa- —like that such a defense available to the challenges only leh—constitute direct to "the appellants. private and unlawful unauthorized actions contractors,” id., pleadings based on the record date. to claim, immunity. And including one of appeals that immediate premise the false immunity assertion of party even a whose pro- cases necessary preemption ultimately worthy must submit proves legitimate the government’s tect until a court be- litigation burdens of interests, reflect an the would recognition such sufficiently rule. informed to appellate comes indulgent view of impermissibly jurisdiction. Manifestly, to the respect with attempts Mangold to invoke appellants’ C. actions, respective suf jurisdiction can be invoked Before lacking. The Ma ficient information was doctrine, order a dis under the collateral courts each Virginia district ryland and “fully consummat trict court must issue validity perceived of such invo complete, “a that constitutes ed decision” significant part depended cations formal, ... final” resolution was act the contractor involved whether States, 431 Abney v. issue. United agreement of its ing scope within States. One could hard United (1977). words, ruling In other court’s question ly begin answer that without subject on the “the final word must be all contracts between resort Digital Equip., 511 addressed.” government perti appellants ruling If a lacks S.Ct. 1992. claims, defenses, and related nent *15 finality, requirement for col the threshold See, Al-Quraishi e.g., v. matters below. question in lateral order review—that 702, Nakhla, 741 11 F.Supp.2d 728 n. definitively like resolved—is dispute (D.Md.2010) (reasoning that contract Hallock, wanting. left See Will v. 546 wise “ show, example, for that ‘federal could 345, 349, 952, 126 163 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. was not behind policy-making’ wartime (2006) non-final (confining review of 836 actions,” in alleged which Defendants’ conclusively to disputed questions orders law plaintiffs’ [would] case “state claims determined, important which raise non- field”). upon preempted not intrude effectively that merits issues are unreview testimony other evidence and could While immediately appealed). if not able appel also be relevant to ascertain relationship gov dispute A cannot be lants’ business with question general, parties’ if a and the conclusively been resolved ernment said have Iraq agreed responsibilities clear that its duties and district court deci “ma[kes] one, particular, at ... and that Abu Ghraib [is] sion a tentative necessarily change analysis begin mind” after further must with might well its or Wiley, 14 contract contracts. Harris Jamison v. F.3d written proceedings. Cf. Cir.1994). Servs., Inc., (4th 222, Kellogg Brown Root Disputed ques 230 v. & Cir.2010) (3d 398, (rejecting 402 respect that arise with to claims of 618 F.3d tions failure of immunity appellate jurisdiction to that for Will’s exception “conclusively requirement, determined” Fundamentally, ironclad rule. court record, had discovery it a limited been proper entitled to have before where activities and sufficiently through discovery conducted on combatant developed defenses).15 accurately any political question assess proceedings, out, Virginia pointed appellants] were bound to honor as [the As the court 15. district addition, light In contractors. consid- the contracts "will shed much dealing responsibilities, expectations eration of course [their] limitations and

221 dissent, Judge Niemeyer materiality In contends of factual issues.” Bazan Pelletier, 299, v. 516 116 Hidalgo that Behrens ex Bazan v. Cnty., rel. 246 F.3d (5th (1996), Cir.2001). 834, 481, 773 By contrast, S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d 490 we Iqbal, jurisdiction v. lack if an appeal such “chal- Ashcroft (2009), each a quali- lenges 173 L.Ed.2d 868 the district genuineness court’s rul- immunity provide col- proceeding, ing genuine fied concerning issues exist —that jurisdiction of course, lateral order the district facts.” Of material Id. al- “[w]e immunity, denying Mangold ways jurisdiction courts’ orders have wheth- determine qualified as of our jurisdiction illustrated other er the facts relevant to our (cit- Reno, cases. See at post 255 exist.” Wireko v. 211 F.3d (4th (4th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). v. ing McVey Stacy, 157 F.3d 271 Cir.1998); Medford, v. Jenkins Iqbal, Supreme Court framed the (4th Cir.1997) (en banc); Winfield genuineness-materiality distinction one (en Bass, (4th Cir.1997) F.3d 525 or between “fact-based” “abstract” issues banc)). According Judge Niemeyer, law, with only the latter supplying Iqbal Behrens counsel Rule proper appeal. foundation for immediate immunity invariably denials of constitute at 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting appealable § final decisions under Jones, Johnson “clearly and those authorities establish (1995)). S.Ct. appeals comfortably fit with the Iqbal par- Court concluded whether a Cohen collateral order doctrine.” Post right ticular clearly constitutional was es- 249. qualified immunity purposes tablished presents an per- abstract issue of law that say

It is more accurate to that orders motions, appeal mits an stage. the' dismissal See denying dismissal insofar as those 674-75, Here, id. at as in motions are based on immunities that are there is context, Iqbal, pretrial no “vast record” to not absolute but conditioned on *16 our decisionmaking, encumber at § such id. qualified as a 1983 but the issues us action before are or the derivative immunities at issue here, factually are, more entrenched and far less in accordance with Behrens and to meaningful analysis by amenable resort Iqbal, immediately appealable. sometimes Thus, merely plaintiffs’ to the pleadings. point: makes the Winfield Iqbal, appeals encompass unlike these fact- jurisdiction possess no over a claim [W]e law, issues of based with the need for plaintiff enough that a has not presented development additional being record prove plaintiffs to evidence that the ver- among those a “matters more within dis- actually occurred, sion of the events but trict ken.” court’s Id. claim jurisdiction we have a over no of clearly there was violation estab- Hence, an interlocutory insofar ap- as accepting lished law the facts as the denial peal immunity requires of a of reso- district court viewed them. (such a purely question lution of legal as 106 at 530. an generally, alleged F.3d More we whether constitutional violation jurisdiction appeal clearly law), would have like an over was of established or os- attempted “if it challenged] tensibly ones here be may fact-bound issue that re- (E.D.Va.2009). government may whether F.Supp.2d reveal deviations 717 Of and, so, course, from the contract occurred if can this evi- wheth- district court receive seal, otherwise, they er were tolerated or ratified.” Al under circum- Shi- dence or if the Tech., Inc., mari v. CACI Premier so warrant. stances zone, (1) (such when are in a war virtue law as whether matter of solved as a (2) government. with the in a of a contract or undisputed viewed facts that are Saleh, ring- which receives a immu- But not even material are particular light dissents, went in both calculus), ing rule endorsement may consider and nity we Behrens, that far. at upon it. See jurisdiction to (deeming appellate S.Ct. 834 adopted following court Saleh denial of

have asserted over properly rule; been wartime, private where “During a § where 1983 action summary judgment integrated into com- service contractor defen- premised was on ruling adverse over which the batant activities having violated conduct alleged dant’s authority, a claim retains tort command law); McVey, clearly established arising engagement the contractor’s out of jurisdiction over similar at (approving preempted.” in such shall be activities stage, appeal legal at dismissal where issue F.3d 9. The D.C. Circuit therefore concerning questions factual did not “raise presence on the of a conditions preemption involvement, which would the defendants’ public/private integration, certain level appealable”).16 be classi- the conduct of activities combat, military’s Behrens, then, jurisdiction fied as and the retained confers concerning decisionmaking prerogative if the record appeals process. Though the Saleh court had pres- can be stage dismissal construed luxury complete developed record of a might ent issue of law. We discern pure it in through discovery pondering to assist opinion, such if we were of the an issue are, issues, discovery no evidently those there has been persons dissenters bar, and the appellants pleadings in- the cases at similarly situated to the definitive an- invariably provide nothing approaching from suit evitably and immune occurring all swers.17 premised conduct on Jenkins, simply note there is no 119 F.3d at 1159-60 12. But reason

16. See also integration separate appellate jurisdiction believe entities (noting existence of qualified immunity whole denial of on motion into more or less unified is necessari- over dismiss, part ly equivalent as- legal based in defendant’s collaboration or alleged impli- violation did not conspiracy sertion that between those entities. right); clearly cate established constitutional that, respect It is clear also far from (recognizing juris- Winfield, F.3d at 530 alleged by plain- the torture and abuses appeal qualified denial over im- diction tiffs, "acting appellants were *17 under munity as district court ruled on sum- insofar military authority,” post presumed at as right mary judgment legal that asserted was by Judge If one felt Wilkinson. constrained established). clearly to on the form a conclusion authorization record, Wilkinson, question the available then Judge on behalf of our dissent- based on friends, ing to as fact contrac- one would be better served reference assumes that the that, pertinent allegations plaintiffs “integrated of the into wartime combatant tors were example, military,” that the States control of the "CACI knew United activities under 226, notwithstanding government post is no has denounced use of torture at that there inhuman, cruel, degrading support assumption, and other or treat- to record evidence ment,” “integration” Complaint Amended at or the con- Al Shimari even what means in 95; ¶ ig- Judge permitted translators to appears [its] text war. to "L-3 Wilkinson military’s equate integration plaintiffs' repeatedly—the instructions with the asser- nore— to abide Conventions,” (citing conspiracy. post by the Geneva Al- of a See at 227 tion Quraishi Complaint Complaint at conspiracy allegations of Second Amended Amended 430; affirmatively hid support V "L-3 the miscon- in Al "that the Shimari notion acting employees duct States here were of its from United contractors in collaboration ¶ supra military,” personnel”); id. at 433. with U.S. see also

223 Indeed, require questions that will The appellants requesting immunity ain context that been has heretofore unex- gauge ap- order to proper answers plored. These are not disputes which immunity yet to have pellants’ entitlement might facts that be to material the ulti- fully Mangold v. to be ascertained. mate have conclusively issue been identi- Services, Inc., supra Analytic note Moreover, may fied. those facts that have summary on appeal relevant issues tentatively designated been as outcome- judgment included whether yet subject genuine determinative are to conducting an in- personnel were “official is, dispute, a reasonable fact-finder vestigation,” and whether the contractors’ could conclude favor of the plain- either giving potential liability rise to statements tiffs dr the defendants. See Metric/Kvaer- responsive investigators’ quer- to the were Co., Fayetteville ner v. Fed. Ins. ies, opposed being extraneous there- (4th Cir.2005). Because the Services, Analytic to. See v. Mangold immunity rulings courts’ below turn on Inc., 77 1449-50. Subsequently, jurisdiction F.3d at genuineness, we lack to consid- Inc., er them an International, interlocutory appeal. v. See Butters Vance su- Winfield, 530; Bazan, F.3d summary pra judgment ap- note also F.3d at 490.18 we peal, were constrained to decide wheth- Thus, although Mangold job immunity withholding promotion er con- from the upon fers those within its aegis right plaintiff activity,” was a “commercial trial, not to appellants stand yet have employment whether decision was establish entitlement to it. See foreign gov- made the defendant or the Martin, (concluding 618 F.3d at 483 ernment with which had contracted. See claims of immunity “substantial,” must be International, Inc., Butters Vance colorable”). “merely and not Because As Mangold F.3d 465-67. these appeals were taken before the dis- Butters, requires this case too careful anal- reasonably trict courts could render a deci- issues, ysis intrinsically fact-bound applicability and, sion on the Mangold any which resemble or all of the Saleh Butters, perhaps, there is no collateral or- considerations, certainly and will almost fulfilling requirements der the Will an exploration entail of the appellants’ Cohen, appealability pursuant under their gov- duties contracts with the jurisdiction therefore no in this Court to ernment and whether exceeded the aspect review related proceed- legitimate scope ings thereof. below.19 ment, 1660-61, 18. ascertaining Court's recent decision in see id. at that the - Delia, -, Filarsky i.e., strictly controversy legal, issues in were (2012), all L.Ed.2d is not at qualified immunity whether could extend- contrary. Filarsky, appeal The issue in private parties, ed alleged and whether the private lawyer quali- from the denial of clearly constitutional was violation one es- case, §a fied was "whether tablished law. *18 government an to individual hired the do jurisdiction 19. The same lack of obtains with prohibited seeking its work is from im- such respect attempted appeal to L-3’s of the Ma- munity.” Supreme Id. at 1660. The Court ryland district court's denial of its motion to and, negative, concluded in the consistent claims, therewith, appeal dismiss the ATS insofar as that opportu- we have not the curtailed grounded any in of the derivative immuni- nity appellants immunity of the to herein seek claims; supra ties we have discussed. See note plaintiffs' the from such winnowing yet (observing may noting argu- It of ATS be had. is also worth that L-3’s appeal Filarsky only presented the was taken after the ments from those to the district court). summary judg- questions pertain- district court ruled had on Similar unsettled (2012), Judge discussed in D. L.Ed.2d 662 as Niemeyer’s are far dissent —which from independent basis being There no lacking in force. jurisdiction the law- premised on appellate me Judge Agee authorized to indi- has defense, or preemption, Man- of-war Saleh joins in cate that he this concurrence. pendent immunity, we are without gold appel- jurisdiction to further consider WYNN, Judge, concurring: Circuit plaintiffs’ lants’ contentions that the claims fully in thoughtful I concur and well- nonjusticiable political questions. present majority opinion in these cases. reasoned rejection prof- of Our each of the three I separately only write underscore the precludes fered also the exercise bases restraint, majority’s which prudence of the regardless ap- jurisdiction of whether judicial promotes both “efficient adminis political inex- pellants’ question defense is prerogatives tration” and “the of district them, tricably intertwined with or judges, play special court role in who similarly whether those bases are interde- ongoing managing litigation.” Mohawk with one another. pendent — Indus., —, v. Carpenter, Inc. (2009). 175 L.Ed.2d 458 IV. consideration, latter respect With to the foregoing, Pursuant to the these consoli- compelled majority’s I feel reiterate appeals be dated must dismissed. holding limited appellate that our role APPEALS DISMISSED jurisdiction leaves us without at this stage litigation to consider the underlying DUNCAN, Judge, concurring: Circuit Likewise, appeals. merits as not- majority opinion, ed in “facts I respect majority’s well-reasoned might be to the ultimate material issue fully opinion this case and therefore yet] conclusively [not have been identified” juris concur in lack its conclusion we cases, appeal in these which on appeal. sepa diction to hear this I write motions to dismiss. Ante at 223. my rately express hope that the ap today’s courts in these Accordingly, opinion district consolidated no offers peals give guidance will consideration to the due to the district court on the under- appellant’s immunity preemption ar lying merits of these To do matters. oth- would, guments especially light my of the Su opinion, potentially erwise — preme Filarsky usurp Court’s recent role or opinion district court risk —Delia, U.S. —, v. our own. overstepping See United States Al-Quraishi Nakhla, ing potentially relevant considerations such diction. See (D.Md.2010). agency, scope F.Supp.2d as contracts, of L-3’s duties under the 751-53 Our degree integration may regard and the conclusion is buttressed Alvarez-Machain, bear on the asserted immunities are whether Sosa & properly plaintiffs' "derived” defeat the n. Further, (2004), agree carefully claims. we with the court in which the although Maryland plaintiffs open question liability

below that left of whether ATS ATS, litigation may private imposed have sued under the strat- actors. Obvious- egy judicial ly, plaintiffs' should not be construed as if the ATS claims be main- private admission that the actions of L-3 those tained L-3 as a but were actor States, thereby crystallizing agent acting of the United ac- within sovereign immunity scope agency, to a cess defense and of its L-3's status is one *19 providing, through appropriate the denial such immu- that be for of more issue juris- following nity, independent appellate discovery. basis district court to resolve Fruehauf, ened those photographs and the de- (1961) (“Such [advisory] L.Ed.2d 476 conduct praved reprehensi- that would be whenever, wherever, legal such opinions, expressions advance of ble and upon issues remain unfo judgment applied. which was But whomever acknowl- pressed edging are not before fact only question cused because that answers pro with that clear the Court concreteness of whether this is a hard It case. does not emerges when question precisely question vided answer the whether it is bad law necessary lasting consequences framed and for decision from whose abiding and adversary argument exploring damage long clash of ev distressing will outlive the ery of a multifaceted situation em that aspect photographs prompted have the suits bracing conflicting demanding and inter herein. ests, consistently we have refused to The styled actions here are as tradition- Further, my extent give.”). al wrapped ones and in the venerable colleagues, separate opinions, offer their clothing of the common on law. Even on underlying

views merits of these terms, however, they common law are de- nature[,] cases, opinions, “by those incorrect, monstrably and the impact express views that are not the law.” Arar will which tort doctrine on have (2d Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 581 n. operations mag- and international relations banc). Cir.2009) (en nifies immeasurably. the difficulties I say dare none of us have litiga- seen WILKINSON, Judge, Circuit quite tion like this and we default if we dissenting: accept uncritically indefinitely or entertain majority in this tries to present case of this novel violation basic most sort of jurisdic- its view as some innocuous customary of precepts both common and disposition. jurisdictional tional But the law. constitutional any- decision is ruling wrong, Sadly, majority’s opinion pre- does It inflicts thing significant but innocuous. decision, cisely reading this. After its one separation powers, on of damage allow- forgiven thinking could be ing civil tort suits invade theatres simple jurisdictional issue before us is a province conflict heretofore the armed question arising ordinary out of tort suits. those branches of constitution- But these are not routine appeals can ally charged safeguarding the nation’s quickly through be dismissed some rote most vital interests. application of the collateral order doctrine. fully join Judge Niemeyer’s I fine dis- requires This case instead us decide My good colleague ably sent. has ad- whether the contractors who assist our many failings today’s dressed military on the battlefield will held ac- decision, I no to repeat and see need those contract, through countable tort or here. be- points separately I write seemingly question common sleepy cause difficulties with these actions are goes law to the heart of remedies our legion single hope so that no dissent could separation powers. constitutional Tort them all. cover oversight military place opera- suits much, disagree judiciary, I on tions an unelected contract disagreement but there law in a politically is no about accountable executive. photographs appar- contrary Abu that have And in the absence of some Ghraib ex- See ante ently inspired litigation. part of the Article I pression legis- branch, good 209. Americans of will were sick- lative the basic of Arti- principles *20 of contractual, tort, why majority’s application the explains not II require ele goes beyond the order doctrine collateral apply. remedies on inflicting damage being incorrect this emphatically decides majority overseas. American interests not to de- question pretending weighty cide, appeals gives of these its dismissal as I. green light the courts individual district operations to the most subject military regimes well-known trade- Tort involve litigation. But of tort serious drawbacks inter- They may public the promote offs. in a to the Third Branch arrogating power victims, innocent de- by compensating est authority the military is contest over conduct, wrongful encouraging and terring Constitution, and wrong under our call However, accountability. tort safety and benign for this decision so garb there nois may law also lead to excessive risk-averse- what ma- import of as to obscure part potential on the of defendants. ness jority has done. in a may be And caution well-advised neatly to civilian context not translate territory peril. this at our

We tread military the calculus is setting, where contrary to of This decades decision different, high. con- and stakes run Risks fed- warning admonitions unacceptable in life are civilian sidered off with interna- eral courts interference necessary a battlefield. sometimes on military Of course con- tional relations. or high-value intelligence to secure order accountable, be and it tractors should held security, military and its maintain that a important framework be set agents quickly must often act and on But accomplish this task. instead place to imperfect knowledge. Requiring of framework, basis majori- establishing that of the costs and conse- consideration ty doing to mere drift and succumbs so quences protracted litigation tort intro- damaging in the most and places courts military wholly novel element into duces legal landscape possible. least defensible decisionmaking, one that has never before exactly all None of us have idea where country’s so history deployed our been in- damage this is headed or whether in a pervasively theatre of armed combat. will operations flicted on minimum, marginal truly At a or severe. judicial majority con- acquiesces however, today’s breaches a line decision judg- trol over these sensitive respected by predecessors our was It opens plaintiffs ments. the door I would cross high courts and low. discovery broad on boil- conduct based boundary even if the collateral order laundry erplate complaints alleging list all my steps. doctrine could cloak With claims, including law “assault state respect my colleagues, fíne I would “in- battery,” battery,” “sexual assault and these to the district court remand actions distress,” infliction of emotional tentional that they with direction be dismissed. “negligent hiring supervision.” By my dissenting opinion allowing go such claims to forward Part I of discuss- integrated war- unsuitability es the utter of tort actions contractors into such the context of an interna- time combatant activities under control military, thor- tional Part II raises theatre war. addresses why ny apply, of whose law should compatible questions contract law is responsibili- military’s ability to utilize separation powers compromises and the future, nudges for- ties the executive branch under contractors allocated eign away and war policy powers II of our Constitution. Part III Article *21 political govern- branches of the federal See Ironically, Part II. the com- infra ment and into the hands of federal courts. plaint speaks itself specifically in terms of Simply put, state claims no tort have a “abide[ failure to ] the contract passport foreign that allows their travel in terms,” Al-Quraishi Complaint Amended ¶ battlefields, no authority and we have to though plaintiffs even the were in no issue one. party sense a any to same. But breach of begin contract does not to confer clear, complaint

The makes and the con- a part cause action in tort on the dispute, tractors do not that the contrac- detainees a theatre of armed conflict. acting tors here in collaboration were Congress There is no indication that or See, personnel. military e.g., U.S. Al Shi- law-making other authority, ¶¶ federal or mari Complaint Amended state, wanted foreign nationals deten- majority 135. The nonetheless draws litigate tion relationship to tort the be- the odd distinction that contractors and military tween contractors U.S. military may “conspiracy” in a with- military when the itself as out being somehow “integrated.” See ante party to the contract has posited no at 222 n. need 17. addition the foremen- to do so. complaint paragraphs, tioned in fact

provides ample allegations integration. Al-Quraishi example, For plaintiffs A. claim that all employed “L-3 the civilian point, problems From this with this military Iraq,” translators used litigation only First, multiply. largely due ¶ Al-Quraishi Complaint 78, Amended nature, to their inventive pres- these suits place during “Defendants’ acts took ent the difficult question of whose law conflict, period of armed in connection with govern should majority them. The clears hostilities” in which the military was way court, sitting one federal ¶280. Indeed, engaged, they allege id. Maryland, to apply Iraqi tort law to the integration complete so that civilian inter- alleged conduct—in an Iraqi war zone—of rogators giving military were orders to a Virginia-headquartered contractor inte- ¶ personnel. Id. contrary 221. For its grated into wartime combatant activities of view, majority from departs the well- military, and for another federal established rule that take we the asser- court, sitting in Virginia, apply Virginia complaint tions of the on a motion to dis- similarly tort law a situated contractor miss as true. While whole gravamen alleged occurring conduct also in an complaint military-contractor co- Iraqi is, war zone. This put mildly, operation collaboration, majority no to run way a railroad. would have believe they us were more akin strangers in the night. also suggests the con- tractors departed have Al-Quraishi court below Nakhla, instructions. See (D.Md.2010)— ante at n. 17. If the 728 F.Supp.2d 702 depart military’s contractors did from the applying the principle lex loci delicti— instructions, that govern- would allow the decided that law “Iraqi applies to all of ment to pursue breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs’ state law claims.” Id. 763.* * The Al-Quraishi district also recognized court declined to constitute violations of the law of nations, plaintiffs’ dismiss Alien Tort Statute appropriately claims against assertable De- because, judgment, F.Supp.2d in its "Plaintiffs’ claims fendants.” at 715. Such They tribunals for their acts. were to its highly troublesome. conclusion

This own subject only government, Ira- to their fundamentally, application Most laws, by its au- only by its administered agents of the U.S. qi law *22 to thority, they called account.” complete of sover- could be surrender constitutes (“The added)); ques- Iraqi id. at 170 majority (emphases The allows citizens eignty. is, governs in an active the law which theatre tion here What is imprisoned who were invading enemy’s country? the occu- It bring against army to tort suits an of war of authority Iraqi causes based the civil the invaded coun- pying is not law of novel, Coleman, only added)); to are not try....” (emphasis action. Such suits least, (“Officers in conflict with but also say the of the U.S. at 515 and soldiers See, e.g., Dow Supreme precedent. subject of not dur- armies the Union were Johnson, 100 U.S. enemy, v. the ing the war to the laws or of (1879) occupy- (explaining L.Ed. 632 com- to his tribunals for offences amenable the of subject to laws are not ing forces They mitted them. were answerable v. Ten- occupied territory); the Coleman only only by their own and government, to 509, 515, 517, nessee, 24 L.Ed. 1118 97 U.S. laws, armies, its as enforced its could (1878) (same). added)); punished.” (emphases id. military (Following occupation, at 517 “the to point single not majority

The does municipal occupied territory] laws of [the foreign were case in which citizens allowed ... remain in full force so as the authority in own occupying the its to sue far country inhabitants are con- of action. foreign under causes courts affect, .... cerned This doctrine does not Likewise, support for its asser- offers no character of respect, exclusive apply and do not tion that Dow Coleman military jurisdiction of the tribunals contractors, only citing Ford v. army over the officers and soldiers (1878), 594, 24 Surget, 97 U.S. L.Ed. 1018 for, ...; already of the United States as law-of-war implying a case said, they subject were not to the laws nor limited to uniformed soldiers. See Ford, (holding amenable to tribunals the hostile a civilian 606-08 added)). country.” (emphases for cotton burning immune from civil suit military). support of the Confederate application Iraqi tort law to Moreover, prob- majority simply wrong military practical contractors creates American courts are ill- suggesting that the Dow and Coleman lems well. questions of Ira- protect- Courts were concerned suited decide unsettled Al-Quraiski, foreign qi district court in ing occupying authority law. The See, tribunals, instance, foreign Aiding considered ‘Whether contrast laws. Dow, (“When, Conspiracy and Abetting Recog- at 165 there- and e.g., fore, Iraqi marched into ... the ene- nized Torts Under Law and Whether our armies Law Allows my’s country, Iraqi Damages.” their officers and soldiers Punitive laws, argued F.Supp.2d at 764. The defendants subject were not to its nor amenable "[wjhether (2011) (Mem), Royal precluded by L.Ed.2d 292 claims could be Kiobel (No. 10-1491), what the Alien Tort Petroleum Co. in which and under circumstances Dutch recognize expected decide Statute ... allows courts to cause Court is provide[s] ... action violations of the law of nations whether "the Alien Tort Statute occurring territory jurisdiction sovereign of a subject over within the matter claims — States,” —, corporations,” Royal than the United Kiobel Dutch Petro other Co., (2012) (2d Cir.2010), leum (Mem). granted, — U.S. —, cert. Al-Quraishi abetting conspiracy reasoning aiding district court, stand, causes of action under which the cognizable are not allows to law, punitive damages paused the contractors have Iraqi tort and that should to con- potential liability Id. sider their remedy. are not allowed as a under tort disagreed, Iraq agree- substantive law of plaintiffs parties “sub- before ing supply Iraqi experts in needed person- mitted affidavits from law nel under the contract. support respective positions.” of their Id. surprisingly, considering difficulty Not course, corporations Of generally must law, ascertaining district foreign weigh potential liabilities before *23 court decided to “defer decision with re- agreeing specific projects. to possibil- of spect Iraqi to the content law.” Id. ity defending of a every lawsuit time a foreign citizen claims a violation foreign of Given the district court had trouble tort law might substantially prof- alter the deciding rudimentary questions such as itability government of Thus, contracts. aiding whether abetting conspira- and and agreeing before to perform the criti- most cy Iraqi are even causes of action under in intelligence cal functions of support the law, punitive and whether law Iraqi allows military, U.S. contractors would be forced damages, expect how can we court to investigate to and analyze the substantive challenging decide the far more nec- issues tort law every country of in which its instance, essary to a full-scale trial? For employees might work. This unenviable decipher how will it of standard care task would be even more burdensome action, for each cause of and determine when the substantive tort law varies from whether there was a can rely breach? It jurisdiction jurisdiction within a coun- course, expert on testimony, Iraqi of but try, as it does the United States. experts appear disagree law as to of whether these causes action are even words, In other a court that understand cognizable. See Accordingly, id. the ma- ably difficulty deciding had such elementa jority go allows federal court to forward ry questions as Aiding “Whether and with litigation Iraqi which sue citizens a Abetting and Conspiracy Recognized are U.S. contractor working hand-in-hand with Torts Under Iraqi Iraqi Law Whether military U.S. zone Iraqi war under Al-Qurais Law Allows Damages,” Punitive hi, causes of action that not even exist. F.Supp.2d is implying that contractors, playing before a critical role in decision, majority’s military Under the military the U.S. in Iraq, effort should face the prospect contractors of drawn out analyzed have the nuances permuta lawsuits under the law substantive tort of every tions of Iraqi might tort law that every country operate. they which conceivably affect By forcing them. con a regime Such is unworkable in an era highly tractors to undertake a complex and where military has no choice but to analysis deeply legal uncertain before aid private corporations. contract ing military operations, particularly our cases, present example, “a severe quickly those executed and in countries shortage” military intelligence personnel systems legal whose are unstable and un “prompt[ed] U.S. to con- familiar, majority jeopardizes mili tract with private corporations provide tary’s ability employ contractors interrogators civilian and interpreters.” future. 408. This use private J.A. contractors courts, military was deemed essential to the achievement Like the contractors military objectives. Yet, rely legal of U.S. under the experts analyze must on for- law Virginia tort application clear: the Iraqi that most suspects eign law. One conduct contrac- Iraq, law in to overseas battlefield practice legal experts authority indeed, AEQuraishi plaintiffs acting relied under tors em- Iraqi attorney of Ira- problematic application as the the declaration firm. Iraqi law Should at an ployed qi law. counsel from these sought have defendants First, is no indication whatsoever there the U.S. attorneys helping before Iraqi has Virginia the Commonwealth interrogation detention

military with applied its tort law having interest contractors, be- Should other functions? types in these of cases. Absent abroad in the to aid agreeing fore intent, contrary legislative we assume Iraqi reached out to Iraq, invasion have law to legislatures do want tort legal ramifica- lawyers for advice on instance, in extraterritorially. For apply Iraqi tort an attack under tions of such (“Ar- EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. now, questions seemed law? Until amco”), far-fetched, newly valid con- but (1991), L.Ed.2d subjects *24 regime under a that siderations Act Rights that Title VII of the Civil held corporations American to lawsuit-averse extraterritorially to 1964 not apply of does My point of Iraq. the substantive tort law practices of U.S. regulate employment disrespect Iraqi law or is not at all who citizens employers employ U.S. feasibility of lawyers, query but 246-47, 111 1227. abroad. Id. at S.Ct. legal inquiries into extensive and uncertain conclusion, the relied reaching this Court any eve or in the execu- foreign law the “ leg- “longstanding principle” on the that military operations. tion of contrary in- Congress, islation unless a of apply only within appears, tent is meant to 2. jurisdiction of the territorial the United Al-Quraishi in the district court Unlike ” (cita- Id. at 111 S.Ct. 1227 States.’ (D.Md. Nakhla, F.Supp.2d 728 702 omitted). legis- “Congress tion Given that 2010), the district court Al Shimari v. against the backdrop presump- lates Inc., Technology, Premier 657 CACI against extraterritoriality,” tion the Court (E.D.Va.2009) F.Supp.2d 700 deferred stated, is ‘the affirmative “unless there ruling on the choice of law issues. See id. Congress clearly intention ex- King 725 As Judge n. 7. noted his it pressed,’ presume primarily we must ‘is opin panel dissent from now-vacated ” Id. concerned with domestic conditions.’ ion, plaintiffs argue the Al Shimari omitted). (citations Ultimately, the Court Virginia CACI is “liable to them under petitioners concluded that the had failed battery, law for the torts of assault and Congress provide sufficient evidence assault, negligent sexual intentional and Title Id. at apply intended VII to abroad. distress, negli infliction of emotional 259, 111 1227. S.Ct. gent hiring supervision.” Al Shimari Aramco, (4th re Citing Court Int'l, Inc., 413, 427 v. CACI Cir.2011) cently principles in Morri reiterated (King, J., (emphasis dissenting) —Ltd., added). son v. National Australia Bank all, plaintiffs, after U.S. —, action, L.Ed.2d pressing Virginia causes 10(b) (2010), § it of the forward, where held go thus if the suit is allowed to Exchange of 1934 does not question Virginia tort Securities Act whether law 2877-78, extraterritorially. Id. at applies extraterritorially seriously apply must be re- question asked. The to this 2883. The Court reasoned that “[t]he answer against judicial-speculation-made-law application suits extraterritorial is even —di- Congress stronger in vining what would have wanted the context of tort state law. it thought if had situation before the that, It defies belief notwithstanding pre- court—demonstrate wisdom the the constitutional of foreign entrustment sumption extraterritoriality.” Id. government, affairs to the national Virgi- guess than anew in at 2881. “Rather each silently nia and impliedly wished ex- case,” continued, apply the Court “we tend the application of its tort law to cases, presumption preserving all sta- further, events overseas. Or background against Congress ble which disregard would do so active of Su- legislate predictable can effects.” Id. preme pronouncements. Court For the repeatedly Court has stated that the fed-

Similarly, Gregory Ashcroft, power eral has exclusive over L.Ed.2d S.Ct. affairs, foreign and that states have very (1991), judges the Court concluded that authority little in this area. In Chae apply must a “plain statement rule” before States, Ping Chan v. United upsetting the standard constitutional bal- (1889), 32 L.Ed. 1068 for in- ance of federal powers. and state Id. at “ stance, noted, the Court ‘[T]he United 460-61, 111 Congress “[I]f only government, States is not but it is intends to alter usual constitutional government, a national and the gov- balance,” explained, “it must country ernment in this that has the char- make its unmistakably intention do so nationality. acter of It is invested with language clear of the statute.” Id. *25 power foreign over all the relations of the (internal 460, 111 quotation at 2395 S.Ct. war, country, peace and negotiations and omitted). “In traditionally marks sensitive nations; intercourse with other all of areas,” continued, the require- Court “the which are to govern- forbidden the state ment of clear statement assures the ” (citation 605, ments.’ Id. at 9 S.Ct. 623 faced, fact legislature has in and intended omitted). The Court reiterated these issue, bring to into the critical matters principles Belmont, in United States v. judicial involved the decision.” Id. at 324, 758, 57 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. 1134 (internal 461, 111 quotation S.Ct. 2395 (1937), emphasizing that “[governmental omitted). marks power over external affairs is not distrib- Aramco, Morrison, and all Gregory in- uted, but is vested exclusively the na- volved the “longstanding principle” that 330, government.” tional Id. at 57 S.Ct. “ ‘legislation Congress, a contrary unless 758. The Belmont Court further noted appears, apply intent is meant power “complete over international jurisdiction the territorial within of the affairs is in the national and ” Aramco, 248, United States.’ 499 U.S. at subject not cannot be cur- added) (citation (emphasis 111 1227 S.Ct. part tailment or interference on the of the omitted). However, given that the Consti- 331, Id. at several states.” S.Ct. 57 758. foreign tution entrusts the affairs to feder- Likewise, Davidowitz, in Hines v. 312 Const, branches, I, al political see U.S. art. 52, 399, (1941), L.Ed. 8, 1, 11-15; 2, II, 1-2, § § els. art. els. system the Court stressed that “[o]ur affairs, power limits state over foreign see government is such ... the interest I, 10, § nation, id. art. and establishes the su- people of the of the whole impera- premacy tively federal enactments over state requires that federal power the law, VI, see id. cl. presumption foreign art. the field be left affecting relations en- (Stewart, J., con- Id. at 88 S.Ct. Id. local interference.”

tirely free curring). 399. 61 S.Ct. we precisely what interference is Such 3. fifty the ascribing states invite here, hardly required are too we So gov tort that their law unexpressed wish state- Department’s Justice defer military operations ern the conduct go cases should forward. ments that these such inter principle against abroad. The us to Department urges the executive even ference holds where tort law claims hold state law not that the state does branch insists if generally preempted contractors foreign power. relations interfere with against the Unit- brought similar claims Miller, instance, Zschernig For come within the FTCA’s ed States would if exception and combatant activities (1968), an struck down Court alleged of the contractor its actions intrusion law as “an Oregon probate scope within the personnel occurred foreign field of affairs which into the State relationship contractual to the entrusts President Constitution if the conduct government, particularly Congress.” Id. personnel contractor occurred while ... States Although “[t]he several integrated with its were traditionally regulated have descent activities. combat-related estates,” the con distribution at 2-3. cluded, Br. of United States give way must if regulations “those of the they impair the effective exercise far, good. so And would think So one foreign policy.” Id. at Nation’s However, would the end of it. that this curiae, the In its amicus S.Ct. 664. brief exception out Department carves stated, gov Department of Justice “The committed where “a contractor has torture ... contend that ernment does 2340,” § in 18 the feder defined U.S.C. application Oregon escheat statute gov al Id. anti-torture statute. at 3. unduly in the of this case circumstances *26 on ernment then elaborates further its conduct interferes with United States’ exception by implying that state- proposed Id. at S.Ct. foreign of relations.” 88 need not available law tort remedies disregarded 664. The Court this state going light forward “in of measures subse ment, reasoning that the state action Congress quently instituted and the might or embarrass “disruption cause Branch, developments and other Executive Department ment” that the Justice failed in Abu Ghraib.” Id. at the aftermath of 434-35, 441, appreciate. to Id. at S.Ct. 88 Department’s brief in 23. Like Justice concurrence, 664. In Stewart was Justice Zschemig, explained this and in vaguely toward statements even less deferential exception explicably derived is entitled from the executive branch: court. the Su As deference reiterated, only recently preme here with allocation of

We deal the basic not de separation powers Na- does power between the States “[T]he encroached-upon pend ... ‘the tion. Resolution of so fundamental on whether ” approves encroachment.’ vary cannot from branch constitutional issue Ac shifting Enteiyrise Fund v. Pub. Co. day day with the winds at Free —Bd., U.S. —, told, Today, counting Oversight we 130 Department. State (2010) 3138, 3155, 177 706 Oregon’s not conflict with L.Ed.2d statute does States, may. New v. United 505 (quoting the national interest. Tomorrow it York

233 Co., (4th L.Ed.2d Potomac Tel. Cir.1989). (1992)). requested This court government’s point to a does not here, submission of an amicus brief and I single expression congressional intent appreciative am of that submission. How- tort support permitting state law claims ever, government’s position amicus on apply solely overseas based the na- at odds with own If its conduct. the gov- Instead, it allegations. ture of the asserts ernment that believes there have been con- “in the limited where circumstances tractual or criminal part violations allegations state law claim is based on contractors, its own then it pro- should torture, that the contractor committed ceed to its unquestioned exercise contrac- § defined should U.S.C. courts prosecutorial tual and authority go after strong take into account the federal inter- culpable party. See Part II.B. infra ests in that federal law.” Br. embodied If it does not believe such violations have United at 22. States these circum- occurred, say given should so. But stances, the government suggests, “the to- significance case, of this the exclusive com- tality of the federal is different interests petence of the federal government in the require and does not that state-law tort affairs, field of foreign principles and the suits preempted.” contractors be Aramco, Morrison, articulated Id. at 3. Gregory, neither federal executive nor It is difficult to see how U.S.C. judiciary the federal is entitled to assume § 2340—which exhibits an in pun- interest that states applied want their tort law ishing through torture criminal extraterritorially absent a plain statement federal any prosecution congres- to the contrary. —demonstrates sional interest in permitting torture-based Here there is no indication tort state claims. federal anti-torture of Virginia Commonwealth ap- intended to statute, § seq., U.S.C. et does not assault, ply its battery, laws of sexual as- private even contain right action. sault, intentional and negligent infliction of event, And in courts have no license to distress, emotional negligent hiring exceptions create based on helter-skelter supervision to the battlefield conduct application statutes, of federal criminal ex- integrated of contractors into the wartime ceptions permit preempted otherwise military. activities abroad A go state tort claims forward. state’s in employing regime interest a tort largely activity confined to tortious with- It is elemental a federal court can- *27 in its own against borders or own citi- its simply not on engraft its a federal own anything zens. It Virginia is but clear that criminal law standard onto state tort any has providing interest whatsoever in claims. The federal is judiciary per- causes of that foreign action allow citizens reconfigure mitted to the elements of a that have set never foot the Common- state law cause action. For as the to its drag corporations wealth own into “[Supreme] recognized [Lingle Court costly, protracted lawsuits under who- Inc., Norge Magic Chef, Division legal authority. knows-what 399, 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988),] the responsibility defining Notwithstanding the the presumption scope elements a state cause of application extraterritorial of state action rests with the state legislature and law and the absence of indication that Chesapeake state courts.” Childers v. & the ap- Commonwealth wants its tort law very capacity of the conduct, “compromise[d] the the Al Shimari to battlefield plied with apply speak court President to for the Nation one ask district plaintiffs law conduct Virginia dealing governments.” tort to war-zone other voice with 6,000 away. It miles place 381, 120 over took Id. at S.Ct. 2288. limiting principle to find difficult Similarly, in Insurance Ass’n American analysis. approach, Under plaintiffs’ Garamendi, 396, 123 S.Ct. regimes tort tort law—and the

Virginia 2374, (2003), the Court to conduct fifty applied states —can all Holocaust down California’s Victim struck earth. occurring every By corner of the Act, required any Relief which Insurance go of action to allowing plaintiffs’ causes doing in the state dis- insurer business forward, imprimatur lends its in- close information about Holocaust-era application of state to the extraterritorial 401, at policies. surance Id. S.Ct. opinion, I Reading majority’s tort law. by noting, began 2374. The Court launch my if next state wonder friends will into outer is ... that at some space. question tort law There no power of state point exercise yield must foreign touches relations policy, had Even if the Commonwealth some- National Government’s applica- uniformity given how intended extraterritorial ‘concern for not, law, tort it has country’s dealings foreign tion of its which with nations’ Supreme Court has made clear state that animated the Constitution’s alloca- influencing foreign laws aimed at relations power tion of the relations foreign cannot stand when conflict with feder- place. in the first National Government objectives. Crosby al v. National For- (citation at omit- Id. S.Ct. 2374 Council, eign Trade 120 ted). In the Holocaust-era in- context of (2000), 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 claims, Court, explained surance “Cali- example, the Court invalidated Massa- seeks to an iron fist where the fornia use agencies chusetts law that state restricted consistently has chosen kid President purchasing goods from or services from gloves.” Id. 123 S.Ct. 2374. Ac- companies doing with Burma. business cordingly, the held that state Court Id. S.Ct. 2288. preempted statute was because “inter- that the reasoned state law was “an obsta- feres with National Government’s con- accomplishment Congress’s cle to the foreign duct of relations.” Id. at objectives” full a federal law that under S.Ct. 2374. develop a com- directed President Crosby Under states prehensive, strategy multilateral toward Garamendi obstructing the prohibited for- Id. at Burma. 120 S.Ct. 2288. objectives federal eign policy gov- different, By “imposing system state question There no ernment. can be pressure against economic the Burmese here, where the there obstruction feder- political regime,” explained, the Court “the law, voice, poten- can speaking al one penalizes private state statute some action *28 (as tially supplanted by fifty different that the federal Act administered President) varying regimes, tort each allow, voices state pulls levers potentially working cross-purposes at of influence that Act does one the federal Thus, 376, Virginia if at with federal even reach.” Id. 2288. Conse- aims. S.Ct. to wanted to tort law overseas quently, explained, Massa- extend its contractors, military chusetts law not stand because it conduct of could battlefield wise, it cannot create an to “obstacle the accom traditionally courts have been reluc- plishment Congress’s objectives” full tant to upon intrude authority Crosby, under federal law. 530 U.S. at in military Executive and national security 373, affairs,” 2288. Because Congress S.Ct. Dep’t Navy Egan, 484 U.S. emphatically 518, 530, has forbid tort gov law from 818, 108 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed.2d 918 conduct, erning any (1988), battlefield attempt to and this hesitance to transgress different, “imposte] a system” state on the constitutional applies boundaries fully to battlefield, 376, 120 2288, id. would interpretation our of statutes. See Feres impermissibly States, “interfere[] the Na v. 135, 146, United 340 U.S. tional foreign 153, (1950) Government’s conduct of re S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 152 (declining to lations,” 401, 539 U.S. at 123 read the FTCA’s broad waiver of sover- Garamendi S.Ct. 2374. eign immunity to military personnel allow sue the for service-related

B. injuries even though no provision explicitly prevents so); them from doing see also In contrast to the Commonwealth of Vir- Johnson, United States v. 681, 481 U.S. ginia, Congress has a constitutionally pro- 690, (1987) 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d 648 foreign tected role in affairs. See U.S. (reaffirming the holding in Feres because Const, I, § art. els. Congress 11-15. “suits brought by service against members undoubtedly power has the private allow injuries Government for incurred inci- parties to pursue against tort remedies dent to service ... ‘type[s] are the operating war-zone contractors mili- under that, claims if generally permitted, would tary authority. “[T]he Constitution con- involve the judiciary military sensitive templated Legislative Branch affairs the expense military discipline plenary have control ... regulations, over ” and effectiveness.’ (emphasis original) procedures and remedies related to mili- ” (citation omitted)). tary discipline.... Wallace, Chappell v. To adopt plaintiffs’ reading of the FTCA (1983). L.Ed.2d 586 Congress could thus require would us to abandon this tradition do what has asserted its own of restraint. This broadly phrased statute do, right namely foreign authorize does not contain anything close to a con- private attorneys nationals as general to gressional authorization private parties police contractor conduct in theatres of to hale war-zone contractors into However, armed combat. contrary to the most, civilian courts. At provides assertions, plaintiffs’ there is no indication “the term ‘Federal agency’ ... does not that Congress pursued has any such include contractor with the United course. § States.” 28 U.S.C. 2671. But

Plaintiffs contend that the Federal Tort broad provision definitional does not mean (“FTCA”) Claims Act permits private par- that “contractors ... expressly exclud- bring ties to state law tort suits ed from the FTCA’s reach” in the area of military contractors for Shimari, wartime conduct. battlefield torts. Al 658 F.3d at claim, analyzing J., we must (King, adhere to dissenting). “general For a longstanding presumption that statutory Con- rule usually govern does not un- gress permit private does not parties to rule,” less there is no specific more Green interfere with operations Co., Laundry absent v. Bock Mach.

explicit statutory authorization. “[U]nless

Congress specifically provided (1989), has other- but provision here there is another

236 recognized widely a broad and specifically out of’ speaks that more the FTCA

of im- term. prohibitory contractors are whether to tort actions. mune from these term “com exception’s use is combatant activi- That provision narrow not denote a batant activities” does govern- preserves which exception, ties legisla a military operations but subset “[a]ny immunity against sovereign ment’s entering to tort from prevent tive intention activi- of the combatant arising claim out encompasses This term the battlefield. forces, military or naval or ties of the violence, activities only physical but “not Guard, 28 during time war.” Coast necessary and in direct connection both to clues in 2680(j). Multiple § textual U.S.C. hostilities,” v. United with actual Johnson Congress that want- exception this indicate (9th Cir.1948), 767, States, 170 770 F.2d the battlefield tort law out of keep ed sweep. therefore has a considerable status as a regardless of a defendant’s noted, this As the Court has a contractor. soldier or “paint[s] with a far broader provision with, claims exception To bars start exceptions than FTCA brush” other activities, id., “arising out of’ combatant harms bar out of subset of arising suits among is the broadest phrase and this particular with a area. See Do associated compensation the law. workmen’s “[I]n Serv., 481, 489- lan v. U.S. Postal instance, statutes,” arising-out-of “[t]he (2006) L.Ed.2d ... familiar used to denote test one (contrasting combatant activities ex the term of any causal connection between 2680(b), § 2680(j) §in with which ception employment injury.” and the Saleh v. Ti- “just preserves immunity types three (D.C.Cir.2009) 1, 6 Corp., tan 580 F.3d delivery). of harm” associated with mail omitted). (footnote original) (emphasis in language the broad of the combatant Given Indeed, in other phrase the use this exception, it is difficult believe activities a wide exceptions precluded FTCA has Congress wanted the sensibilities of instance, range of actions. For realities of govern tort to war. “sweeping language” U.S.C. Indeed, as the District of Cir- Columbia 2680(h) § preserves govern- —which recognized, policy cuit “the embodied sovereign immunity against ment’s claims activities is sim- exception the combatant “arising battery” out of assault [or] —bars of tort the battle- ply the elimination from actions, only battery negligence but Saleh, Congress field.” 580 F.3d battery” claims that “stem from a as well. the theatre of war from tort law insulated Shearer, United States v. “recognize[d] during war- because (1985) (plu- 87 L.Ed.2d duty of care time encounters no reasonable rality see Kosak v. United opinion); also whom force is owed those States, directed as result of authorized (1984) “arising in (equating States, action.” Koohi v. United 2680(c) § respect in 28 of’ U.S.C. (9th Cir.1992). In order “arising observing of’ out “[a]ny arising the com- shield claim out of ... seems “encompassing phrase former military” batant activities of the tort all exception injuries within the sweep liability, Congress used some of the broad- any way with the ‘detention’ associated possible drafting when language est goods”). Congress wanted to forbid It our role exception. is not to dismember stemming tort suits from combatant activi- ties, in order “[a]ny arising it chose in claim this exclusion’s text to determine *30 2680(a); § can and what extent arise ernment.” torts U.S.C. Boyle, when 511-12, Here, all. combatant activities after 487 U.S. at 108 S.Ct. 2510. from contrast, by Congress provided has an ex- enough, textual evidence were not If this ception singles out claims “arising out Supreme Court has to read the refused ... combatant activities.” 28 U.S.C. against to authorize tort de- FTCA suits § 2680(j). If the Court was will- contractors, slightly albeit in dif- fense ing general to read the former provision to Boyle context. Techs. ferent See v. United contractors, cover military it not would 500, 511-12, Corp., 108 S.Ct. hesitate to do same with the latter (1988). 101 L.Ed.2d The contractor targeted exception. more provided Boyle helicopter for the mili- war-zone, tary rather than aid in a id. at In enacting addition to the combatant logic 108 S.Ct. is the exception, Congress but the activities has indicat- discretionary Because the same. FTCA’s ed its to keep desire tort law off the exception precluded against by subjecting function suits battlefield military certain design for in mili- defects other discipline contractors to forms of equipment, Boyle tary instance, held that barred war-zone For conduct. the Uni- against (“UCMJ”) actions Military those defense contractors form Code of Justice 511-12, Id. at 2510. applies as well. As not to members of our mili- observed, tary, “persons the Court makes little sense but serving “[i]t with or ac- finan- to insulate Government armed companying an force in the field” liability ... pro- cial when the Government “time of declared war or a contingency itself, equipment 802(a)(10). not when it operation” § duces but well. 10 U.S.C. production.” for the Military contracts Id. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction subjects Act likewise these contractors to domestic criminal sanctions punishing recognize I that the exists to temptation who, anyone employed by “while or accom- exalt the brave men and who de- women abroad, Armed panying the Forces” “en- war, then, nation in time of fend our gages in conduct outside the United States breath, the next contractors disparage punisha- would constitute an offense sort of evil responsible as some twin ble imprisonment for more than 1 year inevitable missteps wars’ and excesses. if the had been engaged conduct in within permit But the FTCA does not such a special juris- maritime and territorial dichotomy. It than makes even less sense diction of United States.” 18 U.S.C. Boyle military litiga- shield the 8261(a)(1). § Unlike the application tion for battlefield of soldiers activities law, these procedures state tort for hold- not contractors. Boyle, but Su- ing approved contractors accountable were Court did not even a mili- preme require by Congress. exception tary-specific insulating before design-defect contractors from lia- Ignoring the risks legal Instead, bility. prohibit the Court on the relied constraints extraterritorial discretionary law, exception, application function which is state tort specific military operations but in- by allowing inserts tort into battlefield broadly precludes go stead claims “based these suits to forward. But before upon performance the exercise or or the tort law applying state to the combat activ- perform to exercise or working failure a discretion- ities of contractors under the U.S. ary duty military, function or of a make part we should certain that the agency employee legislative federal or an has Gov- branch authorized us to do *31 that, in for the Not but methods same. Supreme explained the so. As 669, procurement of intelli- Stanley, interrogation 107 of and States United (1987), gence single will at the sufferance of a 3054, “[T]he 97 L.Ed.2d officer, judicial safely ensconced in a se- ... with which the Constitution insistence courtroom, judgment cure on bat- Army, Navy, passing over the authority confers away. ... tlefield of political conduct thousands miles upon militia the branches and as a matter of Litigants plead in of dam- will course our creation counsels hesitation may field.” to the breach of whatever seem the ages in this Id. remedies care, setting thus in prevailing Because I find no evi- standard of private logistical problems motion inherent Congress has recruited dence that foreign tort suits of such novel less nationals —to transcontinental parties —much frontline, my stripe. I col- police join the cannot the contrary. decision to

leagues’ rising tide of litigation results of the unpredictable will be both and contradicto-

C. ry, particular juries as and judges debate deferring to and methods Congress’s disagree of valid over which of deten- Instead constitutionally granted interrogation permissible. tion and exercise of its enemy powers, majority places ac- And as detention of the becomes a contractor countability litigious enterprise, in the hands of the unaccount- more the incentives to efforts, lethal un- majority’s capture Thanks to the shortcut with more and able. previously subject that were to manned measures rise. Whether or contractors judi- approves transplanting of the executive have new not one of the deli- the control cacy judicial But judges etiquette cial masters. when unelected and branch decisions into of war is not the question. render contestable about theatre policy applying presage in the course of tort law to These lawsuits a massive transfer contractors, will public authority political be unable to reserved to posts. them I and remove them from This flies branches under Articles II of our hands, judicial the face of our constitutional tradition of Constitution into to a and single ensuring popular judge jury control over the trial and to boot. This is some prosecution subject As expect of a war. one would Congress “[Mjatters detail, explained, great Court has of war- address in and meticulous has, making belong example, Military of those who it in the hands Com- 111-84, politically are ... most accountable for missions Act of Pub.L. Rumsfeld, 2190, 2574-614, Military Hamdi v. making them.” Stat. Commis- 109-366, L.Ed.2d sions Act Pub.L. (2004) opinion). (plurality Stat. and the Detainee Treatment 109-148, Act of Pub.L. 119 Stat. law, No one will contend that how- tort I take issue respectfully defined, ever derived and is a field excel- manner in which gravity matter-of-fact vagueness in- ling precision. acknowledged taken is not even step determinacy these cut-and-paste causes by the majority, much less addressed. judicial permit action will discretion variability govern By to the jury opening this most sensi- the door extraterrito- application must rial state tive of areas. Courts henceforth set of different tort re- gimes, of care of war- allows unlimited the standards matters detentions, variation in of care that captures, interroga- time the standard damages applied combatant tions as well as measure of to critical activities. widely agreed upon stan- the field while There is not a sions we sit here in Maryland Virginia for overseas detentions and or or dard care whatever other interrogations, doing “ironing.” and different states will al- venue is go low causes of action to for- different By dismissing appeals, majori- apply ward different standards to and will ty only dawdles, drifts and sparing itself *32 if agreed them. there were an Amd even grips issues, the need to come to with par- is upon standard —which there not— kicking and the can far down road. juries apply ticular and that judges would The to that recognize fails this is a inconsistently. standard Such standard urgency. a matter of some for start- Just would bottom some ver- probably out on ers, in the commanders field need action- sion But in the context of reasonableness. intelligence able in order battlefield for what exact- interrogation, of detention and to have soldiers survive. Few wars been ly That ques- does reasonableness mean? prosecuted successfully or will be without answers, provoke tion could innumerable intelligence permits plan to that units ac- vagueness formula- very and the of tort forces, against curate enemy strikes and tions as to the standard of care means that every importantly, bit as to know when will jurors setting civilian be the standards lethal force plotted Americans military of interrogation detention and themselves. intelligence Actionable has al- of knowledge detainees without conditions ways had both offensive and defensive val- halfway that obtain in zone of combat words, ue. In other intelligence I globe. imply disrespect across the no of us prevailing; assists it saves American jurors of give good who their time and lives. system justice, sense to our of but this legitimate While there is debate about system provide guidance will no and no obtained, how is best intelligence a tort predictability whatsoever it will because probably very suit is forum in worst leave of military the conduct functions to which that issue can or should be resolved. litigious hindsight. the fortuities of juries judges The who review those can forgiven Contractors be for not fairly expected pos matters cannot be wanting employees to entrust background utility sess a in the of different vagaries caprice of individual verdicts military intelligence, forms of and to ask prospect and trials. Add to that delicate, sensitive, them to decide such punitive damages and uncertain other word, is, complicated questions in a unreal recovery, will measures of and one intro- istic. v. Kellogg, See Carmichael Brown & interrogation duce into the detention and Inc., Servs., Root 572 F.3d 1286-87 process a of risk degree aversion that (11th Cir.2009) (explaining military that gathering could well in the result as traditionally intelligence-gathering is insu intelligence possible. little vital While review); judicial lated from States United may interrogations some regard reduced Hung, Truong Dink 913- satisfaction, with those whose lives and (4th Cir.1980) (noting “the that courts upon acquisition depend fortunes in diplomacy unschooled likely join any vital are not intelligence affairs, mastery of which would be essen approval. chorus of upon” passing tial matters intelli course, response undoubtedly say, this is to majority’s gence). None of questions “ir- all these remain contractors are without fault such go oned out.” But words are small com- or abuses should ever unremedied. simply point fort to must critical deci- It is to make the some- those who make Cir.2008). (5th Department placement of as the thing as mischievous 170,000 mili- around “employs of Defense should be military calculations law in tort basis, having yearly tary contractors on appreci- body capable of by some approved contracting than doubled its use and more of its action consequences ating the Groth, Lauren since 2001.” the task. services constitutionally entrusted Proposal A Accountability: Transforming Rights Human Ob- Reconsidering how II. Military to Private ligations Applied Are A. Firms, Comp. Int’l Hastings & Security (2012). 29, 38 L.Rev. upon focus present suits While mili- necessary, and conditions of interrogation being Apart methods of *33 detention, larger private enterprise even than tary’s partnership the issue is with a assuming salutary tort suits are as well. For one aspects that. In has military the contrac- policing thing, permits method of our all-volunteer preferred military operations, in a cost-effi- troop shortages assist tors who to handle Army that there exists According the fact to the majority obscures cient manner. “[rjecent remedy Manual, in this area. In the in mili- a reductions proper more Field contrary expression by structure, coupled high of some with mission tary absence precepts of unlikely prospect the most basic of Congress, requirements mobilization, that the al- a powers require mean that to reach separation full military support, contractors must leged required abuses of minimum of levels of through the medium of con- often have to military be addressed forces will deployed short, tract, through tort. without contractor significantly augmented not be congres- I Army, a manifestation of Article Field support.” Dep’t clear intent, 3-100.21, II that con- sional Article mandates on the Bat- Manual Contractors tractual, remedies, (2003). utilized. not tort Because of these tlefield Preface military, in our “the future battle- changes government, including It a truism require increasing ever numbers field will Few, any, if military, must contract. contractor em- critically important of often today are undertaken governmental tasks ployees.” Id. public-private part without form of some the mili- partnerships These also allow nership. government The federal routine tary pool and its contractors to their re- public functions ly carries out sensitive entities, bring the best of running spective expertise through private checks, private industry to bear public States v. service and background see United (4th Cir.1998), mission at hand. This reliance F.3d on the Virginia, 139 will become expertise contractor rehabilitating prisoners, see Corr. Servs. Malesko, necessary as warfare becomes more 63 n. 122 more Corp. v. Army 515, 151 (2001), technologically demanding. As the to inves L.Ed.2d 456 notes, increasingly hi- Manual “the activity, criminal see States Field tigating United (6th Warshak, ... equipment [has] tech nature of our 631 F.3d Cir. 2010). proper- the need to operations significantly increased Assisting with combat into all ly integrate support contractor “ample There is evidence no different. military Id. War is not operations.” finds the use of civilian that the military will enterprise, and our roles to be an es static support contractors every edge technologi- war-time need bit component sential successful Halliburton, to face the expertise cal affords order mission.” Lane v. Only instance, hostilities of the future. the clueless ment. For could promi- believe future battlefields will direct contractors to “adhere to nently private feature contractors. the standards of by conduct established operational or unit commander.” See

B. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., F.Supp.2d (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation mark and realities, illusory Given these it is omitted). citation Focusing govern- on the pretend that these simply suits are ordi- ment’s contract rather than theories of tort nary private party tort actions one would also ensure that important federal Instead, against another. because con- interests were not “left to vagaries regularly type tractors assist in “the States,” laws the several but instead governmental action that was intended “governed by uniform rules” the con- political Constitution to be left to the tracts Green, themselves. Carlson v. directly branches ... responsible to the 14, 23, electoral process,” Gilligan Morgan, see (1980). majority, however, appears to 37 L.Ed.2d prefer judicial supervision through mallea- (1973), respect separa- decent for the multiple ble and tort standards to execu- powers compels tion of tous consider what control through tive clearer and more con- *34 remedy sort of would best ensure the au- sistent contractual provisions. thority of the executive over those with partners whom it in carrying out what are Contract law gives also the executive branch, core executive functions. The answer is party contract, as to the the op- tort, obvious. Unlike contract gives law portunity pursue a variety of remedies. the executive branch a mechanism of con- In being addition to able to sue a contrac- trol regularly over those who breach, assist the tor in the event of a the executive military in performing its mission. can create more tailored sanctions in the terms of the contract govern- itself. The thing, For one contract law is a more ment, for example, could contractually re- textually law, precise field than tort allow- right serve the to demand that its contrac- ing the executive branch to set the stan- tor ... any “remove employee for reasons in dard of care the terms of the contract. misconduct,” Ibrahim, see In contrast to tort suits in judges which (omission F.Supp.2d at 7 in original), would have to decide what constitutes a thereby allowing jettison it to bad apples “reasonable bombing,” McMahon v. Presi- without jeopardizing an military entire op- Inc., Airways, dential 502 F.3d eration. (11th Cir.2007), “prudent intercept,” Tif- States, fany v. United These contractual tools are not the (4th Cir.1991), legitimate or a interroga- ones available to the executive branch. method, tion contract cases turn They would augmented by regula- web of more language definite in the contract it- tions to which subject contractors them- language that policy reflected the by selves partnering military. with the self— of a democratically choices Army accountable Regulations, example, permit branch. rely judicial Rather than on the “apprehend commanders to and detain application of some indeterminate stan- contractors for violations of the law” as care, dard of reasonable the executive well as “restrict or revoke ... access to branch require could contractors to abide Army facilities or installations for disci- military well-established rules and man- plinary Army Reg. infractions.” 715-9 4-2(e). uals the terms of agree- more, § its contractual What sum, silly to think that without it is against con- military sanctions pursue

can suits, simply will under tort contractors misconduct tractors for battlefield 8Q2(a)(10), unsuper § zones UCMJ, wandering around war see 10 U.S.C. punishments criminal chain of command does as domestic vised. What the well officers, crimes committed contractors for contract law does for 3261(a)(1). abroad, § Just Army see 18 U.S.C. Field military contractors. As circuit, States v. United notes, within com military chain of Manual “The (4th Cir.2009), Passaro, F.3d 207 control management exercises mand contractor” was convicted “paramilitary Dep’t of the the contract.” U.S. through out charges arising federal assault Manual, § 1-25. Army, supra, Field in Af- a detainee interrogation lethal contractors military oversight “[Pjroper gov- at 210-12. ghanistan. See id. integrating private imperative” employed prosecutorial has its ernment 1-23, § military operations, id. actors into rogue interrogators powers punish goal ways and contract law achieves this why it past, and I see little reason con though cannot. Even tort law sanctions would forswear the use of such formally oper “part tractors are not Saleh, F.3d at in the future. See command,” they are “man ational chain of of the events at (noting that the wake with the terms and aged accordance Ghraib, executive branch obtained Abu through of their contract” conditions in- convictions of a number of soldiers Representative, who Contracting Officer investiga- pursued volved and “extensive operational commander’s “serves as allegations into of abuse contrac- tions” Army Reg. 715-9 primary oversight.” tors). 1(c)—(d).Thus, § law contract ensures 4 — tools, combined with contractual When “subject mili that these contractors are *35 provide laws the executive branch direction, subject if to nor tary even not from ranging with an of remedies arsenal Saleh, 580 F.3d military discipline.” mal specific removal of a contractor to criminal words, “the Government’s 7. other requires The executive “a punishment. managing opera ... its authority broad area of nation- degree of discretion” turn “contract tions does not on” whether v. security, al see United States Curtiss- in employees” or “civil servants” are 304, 320, 57 Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. — Nelson, U.S. —, volved. NASA (1936), 216, L.Ed. 255 and this S.Ct. 758-59, 178 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. gives appropri- of sanctions it an selection (2011) (citation omitted). mil- flexibility. ate amount of Because the law, however, Tort conflicts with rather bound, itary tightly and its contractors are complements than these contractual mech- subjects litigation in federal court often by “interfering] of control with the anisms judicial process. Unlike tort suits both authority punish government’s federal instigated private parties, at the behest of by its own contrac- and deter misconduct per- contractual and criminal enforcement Saleh, at 8. The tors.” See 580 F.3d protect military the executive to com- mits majority’s of common law reme- allocation being “un- manders and contractors from just a matter of paradoxically dies is necessarily dangerously distracted concerning It common law. is decision litigation away” pre- half a world and to will control which branch of military operations” “discovery vent into that assist our soldiers on the contractors “intruding] from on the sensitive secrets Hamdi, Whereas contract 542 U.S. the battlefield. of national defense.” See accountabili- (plurality opinion). places criminal law contractor S.Ct. 2633 II ty places where Article it—in the hands private contractors, have on supra see I, places of the executive—tort law it in the Part I but fear that majority’s ef forts judiciary. discourage hands of the But the will the government executive partnering private with judicial industry not the responsi- branch —and as well. —is Congress might well think overseeing ble for a war effort the defense under the budget large enough without courts add Constitution. Whereas President ing prospect of uncertain tort liabili required as Commander Chief “to take By ties. increasing through prospective responsible continuing supe- action to tort suits the costs of employing contrac military,” Loving rintend the v. United battlefield, tors inter States, feres with the executive capacity branch’s (1996), we judges are carry out its constitutional duties. To given running “not the task of Army.” Department Defense in an era of cost Willoughby, Orloff consciousness, the threat of tort liability (1953). S.Ct. 97 L.Ed. 842 can chill government’s both the ability and It disquieting say the least that the willingness to contract raising price majority now it can displace, believes or to of partnering private with industry, and euphemism, use a “supplement” executive that is particularly true Boyle here. not control of contractors judicial with ed, fact, that burdens of “tort suits” oversight. The of that costs decision will against military contractors “would ulti thing, be severe. For one togeth- bleeds mately passed through ... to the Unit er two areas of law—tort and contract— itself, ed States since defense contractors conceptually distinct. No one dis- predictably will raise their prices to cover putes those contractors actually who ... contingent liability.” 487 U.S. at 511- engage provisions torture breach those 12, 108 long So as the execu of their require contracts that them to act tive branch could control contractual per in accordance with federal law. But a through law, formance contract it had lit “[bjreach tort,” of contract is not a XCO tle reason to eschew valuable partnerships Co., Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Scientific private enterprise. But now that (7th Cir.2004), it only mud- parties third can pull contractors and their dies the law permit private litigants to military supervisors into protracted legal *36 bring tort just suits contractors battles, we can expect a distortion of con because the allegedly latter violated an military tractor and decisionmaking to ac agreement with the executive. “[T]he count for that contingency. As the Saleh main currents of tort law run in different explained, court “Allowance of such suits contract,” directions from those E. Riv- surely hamper will military flexibility and Corp. Delaval, er S.S. v. Transamerica cost-effectiveness, as contractors may Inc., 858, 8, 476 U.S. 873 n. 106 S.Ct. prove reluctant expose employees (1986), and it does little to litigation-prone combat situations.” 580 good to attempt to channel them together. at F.3d 8. It will no longer enough be that military contractors meet their con

C. T, tractual commitments to a for there bottom, majority’s At facilitation of exists no assurance that the standard of tort remedies willingness chills the of both care in subsequent embraced tort suits contractors and the incorporate by will reference or otherwise contract. I previously have discussed meeting the criterion of one’s contractual chilling today’s effect obligations. decision will premised order doctrine is The collateral re doctrine separation-of-powers

“[T]he eminently conclusion reasonable impair another a branch not quires that recog- immunities constitutional from suit should its performance later, 757, 116 than because the 517 U.S. rather Loving, nized sooner duties.” precisely every that. Today’s decision does can often be bit “rigors of trial” capacity practical judgment. Digi- Government’s as an adverse damaging “[T]he Inc., sover Direct, “the essence of contracts” is Desktop make Corp. v. Equip. tal Winstar, States eignty itself.” United 114 S.Ct. 511 U.S. (1994). Indeed, the “crucial L.Ed.2d 842 (1996) (internal quotation L.Ed.2d 964 tried right a not to be between distinction omitted). By making mark and citation remedy requires ... whose right and a govern the essence the contract immunity in is whether dismissal” we diminish partnership, ment-contractor very be eviscerated question would to erode adversaries of our capacity v. Hol- litigation. United States process sover of our national aspect this critical Co., Motor Car lywood Conversely, by through litigation. eignty (1982). 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 a mechanism of weaken elevating tort as Here, immunity can take on the asserted give partnership, we ing this essential immunity,” different labels—“law-of-war a means of not wish us well those who do inherently polit- “Boyle preemption,” or I can under ill will to use. putting their underlying premise question ical use would seek to stand that our enemies —but damages the same: suits us, I weapon against but our own laws as a arising out of defendants against private sanction why we should cannot understand in a theatre performed contracts suits, effect of which is the unintended by the federal cognizable of war are not equip them. point under state tort law. courts III. all determine after is not to in a frank engage Rather than discus- litigation who should the vicissitudes that will ensue consequences sion of the Rather, it is win and who should lose. cubby ruling, from its seeks military matters recognition that sensitive This hole in the collateral order doctrine. the outset from should be insulated many mark-—-for argument misses the ef- judicial scrutiny, and the cases to this tort law does not the same reasons legion. fect are battlefield, belong on the this case does majority’s contrary holding is ani- court. We belong back before the district single mated mistaken belief: word engaged in a lot of semantic claim stem- preemption denial of a “the here, losing completely the forest games excep- activities *37 ming from the combatant for the trees. The collateral order doc- significant ... scruti- tion would not entail banter, legalistic is not a matter of trine military issues.” Ante at ny of sensitive an court confront in letting appellate but of this confi- majority expresses 218-19. timely presenting grave, manner issues that “the despite dence its observation Before us is a far-reaching consequences. answers questions require proper that will litigation instance of deeply unfortunate Id. yet fully ... have to be ascertained.” postpone ap- creep where doctrines minimum, it seems clear that at 223. At a transposed in a domestic context are peals luxury of “the majority’s pursuit setting recogni- without to an international developed through discov- complete record gravity gears. of such a shift of tion of the 222, ery,” analysis id. at “careful of intrin- expects “inquiry focusefd] on issues,” at sically fact-bound id. and whether the contractor complied with the “exploration appellants’ government’s under specifications duties and instruc- tions,” ante at government,” their contracts with the id. to be resolved without hauling before contemplates full-fledged litigation at the district court the mili- tary inevitably gave instructions, that will officers who require the substantial those exposing our national scrutiny military security apparatus affairs. direct contravention of the Supreme just day But this is not another at the Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. ranch. an extraordinary pre This is case Because military contractors work at senting issues that touch on the most sen such quarters close military, judi- aspects sitive operations and “inquiry cial into the civilian activities intelligence. majority’s in proposed [will] have the same effect on military quiry, “foeuse[d] whether the contractor discipline as a direct inquiry into military complied government’s with the specifica Johnson, judgments.” 481 U.S. at 691 n. instructions,” tions and id. at must 11, 107 S.Ct. 2063. This is hardly a fanci- perforce entail bringing military per ful concern. Al-Quraishi, instance, will gave sonnel who those instructions before likely seek discovery to validate the allega- halfway a court around the world. The tion in complaint his that “L-3 employ- Supreme long Court has cautioned employees ] CACI conspired with ees! “compelled depositions ... by military offi certain military personnel to pris- torture concerning cers the details of their mili oners.” And the defendants are no better. commands,” tary which will “disrupt acknowledged CACI argument oral military regime.” Stanley, 483 that, in produce order to sensitive military 682-83, 107 S.Ct. 3054. documents that itself, would vindicate push would the discovery process against

Domestically, this sort of ranging “broad “as broadly as possibly [it] discovery and the deposing of numerous could.” ... persons peculiarly can be disruptive of government.”

effective Fitzger- Harlow v. quite This plainly is the stuff of immuni- ald, 800, 817, 73 ty, just some affirmative defense. De- (1982). L.Ed.2d 396 It carries the risks of spite explicit Court’s admoni- govern- “distraction of officials from their tion contrary, to the parties both frankly duties, mental inhibition of discretionary seek “require members of the Armed action, and deterrence people of able from Services” and their testify contractors “to public service.” Id. at 102 S.Ct. 2727. in court as to each other’s decisions and battlefield, In the context of the the conse- actions” in an attempt to sort out “the quences geometrically dire, more since degree fault,” thereby undermining the plaintiffs seek information about the private-public cooperation and discipline interrogation intelligence methods and necessary for the execution military op- gathering techniques critical to our na- erations. See Eng’g Corp. Stencel Aero tion’s success in States, combat. “Even a small United 97 (1977). chance that some court will order disclo- 52 L.Ed.2d parties Both identity sure of a source’s could well im- propose go this suit rummaging *38 pair intelligence gathering....” v. through CIA the most sensitive files Sims, 159, 175, 1881, documents, U.S. 105 S.Ct. seeking prove 85 and or dis- (1985). L.Ed.2d 173 I wonder prove how the a broad-reaching conspiracy to con- 511, 524- Forsyth, I interrogations. Mitchell illegal alleged duct (1985). 30, 2806, L.Ed.2d 411 -will 105 S.Ct. proceedings that these no doubt have that the touchstone finger- That case makes clear into an exercise quickly “devolve contractor the collateral order doctrine is whether the defendant between pointing judi- “conse- military, requiring delayed impose extensive review would and the liability wartime government’s ... not limited to probing quences cial Saleh, 526, F.3d at 8. money damages.” Id. at 105 S.Ct. policies.” majority refuses to even 2806. Yet the mili- soldiers and By pitting uniformed presents this case acknowledge another, we against one tary contractors worse—that dangers same distinct bring effort and —and “hamper the war will appeal Forsyth, pre- merited immediate enemy,” will to the which and comfort aid act if ferring instead to this were drag American opportunity relish injury case. typical personal civil courts” and into our “own soldiers attention “efforts and thereby divert their conclusion, majority justify To this abroad to from the offensive semantics, Supreme ignoring relies on Ei- at home.” Johnson v. legal defensive or- instruction that the collateral Court’s 70 S.Ct. sentrager, 339 U.S. “practical given der doctrine is to be “[Tjhese (1950). cases 94 L.Ed. 1255 rather than a technical construction.” Co- actions of really challenges indirect to the Corp., 337 hen v. Indus. Loan Beneficial Saleh, military,” F.3d at the U.S. 541, 546, 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 be difficult to devise more “would (1949). a field commander fettering effective First, a literal relies on majority en- than to allow” the suits the reading ap- of the dictum that collateral today. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. courages See statutory peals “explicit are reserved for 70 S.Ct. 936. guaranteed or constitutional that trial will court to address Rather than allow this Asphalt Corp. not occur.” Midland immunity question and the merits of the States, United and for all whether the de- decide once (1989). majori- security preclude this mands of national ty lonely sweeping cites this line for the suit, liti- majority prefers sending staggering conclusion that the inter- judge with no gation back to lone district protected by Boyle ests and Saleh are say than to that he should guidance more “ipso facto, immunity.” Ante at 217. keep finger his in the dike and avoid dis- recognized Supreme But the Court has security. covery imperils national statutory or constitutional “explicit Supreme ringing klaxons guarantee^” do not describe the whole of in this area do not Court has sounded the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v. permit approach. By this casual the time Forsyth example stands as an of how “ex- gets this case back to this court for consid- jurisdic- plicitness may not be needed for immunity questions eration the selfsame appeal. Digital tion” to hear a collateral right perfectly that we could well address Equip., 511 U.S. now, litigation process may well have qualified immuni- What differentiates both damage. done its ty immunity from the mass and law-of-war of con- of claims that do not merit immediate re- precisely These were sort pedigree public “good cerns that animated the Court’s view is their law.” words, immunities are of the collateral order doctrine Id. other extension although because the interests appeals pertaining qualified distinct *39 they protect specifically are not significant enshrined matter how might issues be. text, legislative they Today’s opinion gives nonetheless the district courts a green light protection good, plunge vital to the of the common without a scintilla of direction into the and serve more than the mere interest intractable difficulties significant pitfalls litigation. of this single judgment. individual a favorable danger is precisely that which the Second, majority Boyle examines collateral order doctrine is meant to fore- microscopic eye, honing with a in on the stall, namely the expenditure years fact that the uses the “liability” case word litigation involving a succession of national “immunity.” rather than See ante at 217- security concerns in plainly cases that First, this observation is not even should be very dismissed at the outset. correct —both the and the dissent Will, 353, 952; See at 126 S.Ct. Boyle also describe the result as “immu Perkowski, Gough 1140, See, nity.” e.g., Boyle, 510, 108 487 U.S. at (9th Cir.1982). If the collateral order doc- (“contractor immunity”); S.Ct. 2510 at id. trine has no in saving role resources and (“contractor (Brennan, J., dissenting) sparing wasted efforts in a context such as Second, immunity”). important, more this, I then fear it largely has been evis- however, Court has instruct cerated those situations where it would appeals ed that the courts of should not be of most use. “play games concept word with the aof I recognize ” that people on both sides of not to ‘right Asphalt, be tried.’ Midland questions these have the noblest intentions 801, 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 1494. The ma mind, but we should not be oblivious to jority recognizes principle this when con profound changes that are occurring. venient, see 214 (quoting ante at Midland It was once the judges case that of all 801, Asphalt, 1494), 489 U.S. at persuasions went great lengths to re- but ignore chooses to it when parsing strain themselves from entering theatres Boyle exegetic precision, with see ante at of armed conflict with prescriptions of 217-18. All that inquiry is relevant to the own, and this was true whether the before us is that Boyle the rationale for conflict regional was or worldwide in its was the same desire to avoid the “inhibi See, dimensions. e.g., Holtzman v. Schles- discretionary tion of action” that made im 1304, inger, 1309-10, 1315, 414 U.S. appeals necessary mediate in Mitchell v. (1973) (Marshall, S.Ct. Forsyth. Compare Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511- Justice) Circuit (refusing to op- review air Forsyth, 472 U.S. because, erations over Cambodia in part, 525-26, 105 S.Ct. 2806. “Justices of this Court have little or no Given fact that these cases simply information or expertise” with regard to novel, unprecedented bristle with ques- sensitive decisions and “are on tions, their likely duration is to be meas- ground treacherous [they] indeed when at- in years. ured It inwill all likelihood be a tempt judgments as to [the] wisdom or long time again indeed before ever necessity” action); executive appeals, reach the court of especially in Eisentrager, 70 S.Ct. 936 view of (World the fact that the vote here will II); Quirin, parte War Ex operate as a disincentive for future (1942) (World 87 L.Ed. 3 appeals certified II); under 28 U.S.C. Cases, (2 War The Prize 1292(b). § Black) given (1863) (The District courts have been 17 L.Ed. 459 Civil War). signal court that we do not But that era ending. Perhaps end, want to be appeals bothered no shall but how it ends is all important *40 require not to apparent be so as through law should pass it to see and I hate iteration, and so it is here. As a matter judicial ukase. through but go suits for- these prefer one policy, have Niemeyer Judge Shedd Judge law, they should ward, a matter but as join opinion. this that indicated forthwith dismissed. NIEMEYER, Judge, dissenting: Circuit pertinent view of majority’s the Under majority today disregards control- im- qualified an officer denied precedent, and belit- precedents ling Supreme arrest would be wrongful a munity for presented gravity the of the issues tles that appeal of an immediate entitled to cases, to find comfort purporting questions of war decision, weighty but or- application of the collateral its narrow here must take policy at issue and wartime regrettably Its effort der doctrine. of the line. turn at the back What threadbare. “irretrievably lost in the ab- stands to be appeal,” Richard- an immediate sence of work in Military performing contractors Roller, 472 Inc. v. son-Merrell zone under the command Iraqi war (1985), L.Ed.2d 340 States and control of United how America decisions as to is whether im- jurisdiction, claiming our have invoked through herself can be scrutinized protects brought by foreign munity from tort suits causes of extraterritorial applications novel of the war ef- part nationals detained as any body unauthorized of action convenience, ma- As a matter of fort. protection of charged by our charter with on this jority making ducks decision country’s security concerns. this most vital public to the greatest importance issue of proceed, allowing these suits to discovery that interest because feels respon- itself the majority has asserted for proceedings would further district court system: sibility all others our But making assist it in a decision. Congress private to authorize tort right of reason, majority fails giving activity challenging actions combatant Supreme to follow the Court’s command overseas; right of the executive to Pelletier, 299, 116 Behrens v. operations through its control wartime (1996), and S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d 773 prerogatives; law contractual and criminal 662, 129 Iqbal, Ashcroft to assent to the right of the states not (2009), hear we law; of their application extraterritorial now, simply on such claims of right (though and the not of constitutional complaint. the basis of the dimension) courts litigants and district claim, easy to as does simply It is too where this brave new to some notion of majority, that unresolved facts bar Perhaps litigation lead. world will im- now of the defendants’ consideration tiny simply steps one of those small and munity always claims. There are unre- only by America increments weaken any explanation, the solved facts. Without only and erode our constitutional structure that the majority recognize fails to undis- But I think this understates by degree. plaintiffs’ claims alone puted facts of the collat- the matter. The touchstone of the defendants’ allow a court to rule on a trial eral order doctrine is whether law. immunity claims as a matter of public inter- imperil “would substantial appear It would high value of a particular est” or “some wayward fix our course. Court can now Will, order.” questions To some the answers Iraqi reject in these cases are I would each plaintiffs given of the reasons citizens, deciding for not the immu Iraq who were seized and de *41 nity stage issues at this of the case and in by military the U.S. Abu Ghraib tained undoubtedly conclude that we appel have military prisons Iraq. prison and other jurisdiction late now to consider them un They commenced these actions under state principles der the well-established Co tort law and the Alien Tort Statute hen v. Corp., Industrial Loan Beneficial (“ATS”), 1350, § alleged in 28 U.S.C. 541, 1221, 337 69 U.S. S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 1528 juries their sustained from mistreatment (1949), Pelletier, Behrens v. defendants, prison the hands the (1996), contractors, who were U.S. and of progeny. Cohen authorizes the im military personnel the themselves. As appeal § mediate under 28 U.S.C. by contractors hired the U.S. important and collateral interlocutory or during under its control the course of the ders that “have a irreparable final and effort, war defendants these two rights effect on the parties.” cases have various asserted immunities U.S. at 69 S.Ct. 1221. And Behrens liability They and suit. claim that and Iqbal clearly establish that these ap (1) plaintiffs’ claims are barred peals comfortably fit with the Cohen collat sovereign immunity derivative or deriva eral order doctrine because the denial of immunity, tive absolute as forth in set immunity “at the stage motion-to-dismiss Services, Inc., Mangold Analytic proceeding of a is a ‘final decision’ within (4th (2) Cir.1996); F.3d 1442 immunity § meaning of 1291.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at zone, liability recog from tort a war as Behrens, (citing S.Ct. 1937 nized under v. Titan Corp., Saleh 307, 116 834). — (D.C.Cir.2009), denied, cert. majority’s Each of the deny- reasons for —, 180 L.Ed.2d 886 ing review now is demonstrably flawed. (3) (2011); and immunity, law-of-war as rejecting right In appeal the district recognized by Supreme Court in Dow courts’ denials of the derivative absolute Johnson, 25 L.Ed. 632 immunity in Mangold, described the ma- (1880). rejection On the district courts’ jority ignores precedent well-established these claims of or their refusal that a district court’s denial of an immuni- grant immunity on motions filed under ty from suit based on the facts as alleged 12(b)(1) 12(b)(6), final, Rules complaint the defendants is a conclusive order that is immediately appealable interlocutory appeals. filed these collat- eral order. And in rejecting right majority refuses to address whether appeal rulings on Saleh and law-of-war enjoy any defendants immuni- immunities, majority heavily rests on a asserted, holding ties the district distinction an immunity pro- between 12(b)(1) courts’ decisions made on Rule “an liability” vides insulation from and “an 12(b)(6) and Rule motions are not final suit,” immunity from concluding appealable orders and that we do not have immunities this case protect defen- jurisdiction. decision, appellate With dants from civil liability. analysis This subjects majority the defendants to point, misses the however. The litigation procedures, discovery, denying immunity Court has found orders trial, perhaps contrary even to deep- to the appealable in its common law to be sense policies rooted inherent in these immuni- by examining performed by the function ties. parties claiming immunity, the interfer- Congress by the Constitution for of immuni- reserved that function a denial

ence with occasion, interest. to resolve. public and the and the Commander-in-Chief ty would conclusion, its reaching In analysis recog- or to undertake

fails I interest nize the substantial immunities, an interest underlying force, led a multi-national in the common law. deep roots Britain, in- the United States and Great war, Iraq. During the course of the vaded collateral important, ever were If there *42 Iraqi military seized and detained under the U.S. qualify that would Cohen decisions decisions, suspected being enemy final the district combat- reviewable citizens immunity in these cases denials of thought possessing courts’ ants or to have value The defendants are such decisions. intelligence regarding insurgen- useful mili- engaged by the U.S. these cases were cy other terrorist activities. These de- or tary conducting interrogations to assist imprisoned were in Abu Ghraib tainees under the command and control Iraq. prison prisons throughout and other and the decisions about personnel, by Although prisons operated were interroga- nature of these scope and zone, Army in an active war “a the U.S. part military’s integral tions were an military intelligence shortage” severe Moreover, military desper- interests. “prompt[ed] govern- the U.S. personnel ately needed to receive contractor assis- corporations private ment to contract with interrogations in its because of a tance inter- provide interrogators civilian and Thus, shortage personnel. substantial These contractors in- preters.” J.A. 408. major compo- were a interrogations Inc., Technology, Premier cluded CACI effort, designed gather nent of the war (col- International, subsidiary of CACI Inc. strong military intelligence. public These “CACI”) herein, Corpo- Titan lectively and interests merit our consideration of the (“L-3”). ration, Services, now L-3 Inc. by common law immunities claimed federal required comply CACI and L-3 were protection civil the defendants as Department interrogation of Defense any potential liability and from civil suit conducting policies procedures and when under state tort law. interrogations, de- “[ijntelligence detainee jurisdiction appellate Because we have briefings, questioning” per- and tactical all of the of immu- to address one or forms military. custody sons of the U.S. defendants, would, nity by claimed we Secretary J.A. 270-71. of Defense Donald outset, required at the to decide our Congress Rumsfeld testified before jurisdiction. subject matter See Steel Co. linguists interrogators provided and Env’t, v. a Better 523 Citizens “responsi- contractors at Abu were Ghraib (1998). 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 military intelligence] personnel ble to [the jurisdiction, considering When our responsibility who them and hire[d] ha[d] we, as well as the district apparent Hearing of the supervising them.” courts, authority lack under Article III to U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services they present entertain the actions because 2004). Secretary of the (May Acting nonjusticiable political question. also that ci- Army Les Brownlee testified interrogators linguists “work[ed] vilian ap- I would Accordingly, dismiss these of officers or non- supervision under the peals and remand them with orders to charge of whatev- nonjusticiable commissioned officers dismiss the cases as at- they or unit are on.” Id. tempts engage judiciary questions er team (E.D.Ya.2009); Al-Quraishi Nakhla, in these two actions are plaintiffs (D.Md.2010). F.Supp.2d who were seized and detained individuals prison at Abu Ghraib by the The defendants filed motions to dismiss military-controlled prisons “during a other pursuant all of the claims to Federal Rules and “in connec- period of armed conflict” 12(b)(1) 12(b)(6), of Civil Procedure tion with hostilities.” Second Amended (1) alleging that the nonjustici claims were ¶ (Al-Quraishi); Compl. (“Complaint”) 497 they able presented political because Compl. (“Complaint”) Second Amended question, relying Tiffany v. United ¶ (Al Shimari). complaints, their States, (4th (2) Cir.1991); 931 F.2d 271 assault, allege various acts of sexual sovereign barred derivative or absolute humiliation, assault, and inhumane treat- immunity, official as set forth in Mangold defendants, ment at the hands of the Services, Inc., Analytic F.3d employees, co-conspirators and their in the (4th (3) Cir.1996); preempted and dis military. They allege during the placed by the federal govern common law providing interrogation course of defense, ment contractor as set forth in *43 military, translation services for the U.S. (D.C.Cir.2009), Corp., Saleh v. Titan 580 F.3d 1 employees corporations of the defendant — denied, —, rt. U.S. 131 ce with each and with conspired other mem- 3055, (4) (2011); S.Ct. 180 L.Ed.2d 886 and torture, bers of the to commit by barred the law-of-war recog assault, battery, and war crimes and Supreme nized the Dow v. their conduct violated terms Johnson, 158, 100 U.S. 25 L.Ed. 632 contracts CACI and L-3 had with the (1880). respect With to the state law tort military, provisions U.S. of the U.S. claims, both rejected district courts below manual, Army field as well as United all of these defenses and denied the mo law, law, States state and the Geneva Con- respect tions to dismiss. And with to the ¶¶ 418, 430, 450, 454, Complaint vention. claims, ATS the Al Shimari court dis ¶¶ 463, (Al-Quraishi); 67, Complaint 470 missed, concluding jurisdic that it lacked (Al Shimari). 88, 94, 98, 107, 108 tion, 725-728, F.Supp.2d 657 at while the addition, they allege that the defendants Al-Quraishi court denied the motion to conspired with each other and mem- dismiss, 728 at F.Supp.2d 741-60. cover-up bers of the U.S. misconduct and hide it from the authori- A panel of this court reversed the dis- ties. trict courts’ orders in opinions two re- day, leased on the same concluding that complaints

The purport state causes the district courts should have dismissed of action under various state-defined torts the claims on the basis of the Statute, naming and under the Alien Tort contractor recognized defense in Saleh. CACI, L-3, as defendants Nakh Adel Al-Quraishi Servs., Inc., v. L-3 la, L-3, employee individual (4th Cir.2011); 201 Al Shimari CACI compensatory damages demand (4th Cir.2011). Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 economic, On physical, injuries; and mental motions, plaintiffs’ granted we a re- damages punitive punish defendants for hearing ap- en banc and consolidated the engaging rights in human abuses and to invitation, peals. future; At our deter similar behavior in the United States ¶¶ 2, 468-559, curiae, attorney’s participated filing also as an amicus Complaint fees. (Al-Quraishi)-, ¶¶2, a Complaint participating argument 560 brief and oral 113- 204, 205; 27, January see also Al Shimari v. CACI now Tech., Inc., F.Supp.2d appeals Premier 657 700 dismisses the for a lack of final 252 867, 511 U.S. at (quoting Digital Equip., § 1291 under 28

appealable orders U.S.C. (internal omitted). 1992) citation 114 S.Ct. litigation proceed allows the and thus Thus, final, order, appealable be a courts. district satisfy require- collateral order must three (1) “conclusively II ments: it must determine (2) disputed it “re- question”; must 28, authorizing “ap Title 1291 of Section important completely sepa- solve an issue all final decisions of the district peals from action”; rate from the merits of States,” codifies courts of the United (3) “effectively unreviewable on must be rule,” representing “Con judgment “final judgment.” a final Johnson v. appeal from Judiciary since the gress’ determination Jones, 304, 310, 2151, 115 515 U.S. S.Ct. general ‘appel Act that as rule of 1789 (internal (1995) quotation ... until postponed late review should omitted). marks judgment after has been rendered final ” court.’ Kerr U.S. Dist. Ct. trial has noted that the Supreme Court Cal., the N. Dist. is of “collateral doctrine” “modest order (1976) (quoting L.Ed.2d 725 S.Ct. Hallock, scope,” States, Will v. United applied and should not be “to swallow (1967)). Thus, L.Ed.2d 305 S.Ct. general party rule that a is entitled to “the emphasized Court has Indus., single appeal,” Mohawk general party that a is entitled to a rule Digital Equip., at 605 (quoting single to be deferred until final appeal, 1992). But, equally impor *44 In judgment has been entered.” Mohawk tant, the has noted that the doctrine — U.S. —, Carpenter, dus. v. 130 S.Ct. necessary appropriate in cases (2009) 599, 605, (quoting 175 L.Ed.2d 458 volving high value of order” “particular Direct, Digital Equip. Corp. Desktop v. including “honoring separation pow the of Inc., 863, 868, 1992, 114 511 S.Ct. 128 U.S. ers, efficiency preserving govern the of (1994)). 842 L.Ed.2d officials, ment and the initiative of its [or] category appealable respecting dignitary of a State’s interests.” Falling within Hallock, 352-53, § 126 final under 1291 are certain 546 U.S. at S.Ct. 952. decisions vein, that are “other than final this Court and our collateral orders final judgments” irrepara- applied but “have a court have the collateral order doc interlocutory of rights parties.” deny ble on the trine review orders effect ing Corp., Cohen v. Indus. Loan defendants’ motions dismiss on Beneficial 541, 545, 1221, 337 69 L.Ed. basis of numerous immunities. U.S. S.Ct. 93 asserted (1949). See, States, e.g., Abney 1528 con- v. United 431 “practical Under U.S. 651, (1977) 2034, statutory to the 97 52 L.Ed.2d given language struction” S.Ct. 651 (double claim); decisions,” authority jeopardy v. Mea “final Helstoski “[t]he nor, 500, 2445, review 442 Appeals all final deci- U.S. 99 S.Ct. 61 Courts (1979) (Speech the district courts” is construed to L.Ed.2d and Debate sions of 30 “ jurisdiction immunity); nar- v. appellate Fitzgerald, confer over ‘a Clause Nixon 731, 2690, 457 U.S. 73 row class of decisions do not termi- 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1982) (absolute litigation’ sufficiently immunity); nate the but are im- 349 official 511, 105 portant Forsyth, 472 and collateral to the merits Mitchell v. U.S. S.Ct. (1985) 2806, (qualified fi- 86 411 im should ‘nonetheless treated as L.Ed.2d ” Hallock, 345, 347, munity); Aqueduct nal.’ v. 546 Puerto Rico & Sewer Will (2006) Inc., 952, Eddy, Auth. v. 126 163 L.Ed.2d 836 & 506 U.S. S.Ct. Metcalf

253 (1993) 684, 139, by 121 605 tained the U.S. to perform L.Ed.2d (Eleventh immunity); Osborn interrogation Amendment and translation services 881, 127 166 Haley, 549 U.S. S.Ct. interrogation of military detainees in (2007) (Westfall L.Ed.2d 819 Act military prisons throughout Iraqi war certification); Republic Iraq Beaty, (Al- ¶¶8, Complaint zone. ¶¶ 173 L.Ed.2d (Al Quraishi); Complaint Shi- (2009) (foreign sovereign immunity); ). Indeed, mari complaints assert that India to the Permanent Mission United the functioning defendants were on behalf York, v. City Nations New in conspiracy (2007) military personnel “during period Mullins, (same); Roberson v. 29 F.3d 132 conflict, armed in connection with hostili- (4th Cir.1994) (absolute legislative immuni- ¶ (AUQuraishi); ties.” Complaint (derivative ty); Mangold, 77 F.3d ¶ (Al Shimari). Complaint contractor). immunity for a Regardless of whether these facts are Some or all of the defendants’ claims of ultimately proved, they alleged by were immunity in these cases are thus entitled plaintiffs complaints their and ad our review under the collateral order mitted in asserting defendants im doctrine, I them and address seriatim. munity. facts, And on the basis of these conclusively both district courts below de Immunity A. Derivative Absolute termined that the defendants were not en Immunity generally protects govern- titled to the immunity recog derivative liability ment officials from based their decision, in Mangold. nized In one office, function, public and the inter- court “rejected] district stated that it both litigation And when is commenced to est. arguments” made the defendant that it them, liability against enforce the officials was immune under the “doctrine of deriva are, public sufficiently if the interest immunity” tive absolute official because it strong, protected defending also scope could not “determine the of Defen itself, suit even when official is accused *45 contract, dants’ amount the Nixon, of misconduct. 457 at See discretion it in afforded Defendants deal 752, (noting immunity 102 2690 S.Ct. detainees, ing with or the costs and bene is afforded when it is in the interest public immunity recognizing fits this case ability provide official “the maximum examining complete without record after fearlessly impartially to deal and with discovery place.” has taken Al Shimari v. (internal quotation duties of his office” Tech., Inc., F.Supp.2d CA CI Premier 657 omitted)). course, particu- marks each Of (E.D.Va.2009) 700, added). (emphasis 714 immunity by lar is defined the official it, function, claiming by his and the below, In the other decision the district particular public sought pro- interest to be court concluded that “relying on the infor- tected. Complaint, clearly mation in the it is too early to case, dismiss Defendants on the basis of claim,

In this the defendants sovereign immunity,” immunities, explaining derivative among other abso- derivative that “the contract [the between immunity carry- contractor] lute based on their role in military’s before the Court ing out the U.S. mission time,” making impossible this to “deter- Iraq war zone under the ultimate direction scope of military. alleged control of As both the the contract and mine] complaints, scope re- whether that was exceeded.” Al- the defendants were 254 702, Nakhla, the con- significant part on whether

Quraishi F.Supp.2d v. 728 (D.Md.2010). acting within the tractor involved was scope agreement of its with the United Thus, opinions take the both of these hardly to an- begin States. One could plaintiffs in their alleged facts as question without resort to swer and conclude that the complaints as true appellants and all contracts between the to derivative defendants were not entitled government pertinent and the immunity. claims, defenses, and related matters be- Supreme precedents Court’s As both low. establish, clearly when precedents and our Ante, Thus, majority at 220. con grant an immu- a district court refuses cludes that because the district courts def of the facts nity from suit on basis ruling immunity erred until derivative complaint, in a the refusals are alleged developed, the record was more their deci immediately appealable. Whether lack finality require sions and fail the decided, we have rightly wrongly are or Hallock, 349-50, ments of 546 U.S. at jurisdiction rulings pro- to review such 952, S.Ct. that collateral orders be conclu tect the defendants from the costs and sively determined. litigation, distraction of which undermine gov- public protecting however, interest majority recognize, fails to interroga- ernmental function of war zone contrary that its conclusions are to well- The district courts’ refusals to rec- tions. established and Fourth ognize immunity undoubtedly can precedents Circuit the district immediately appealed under the collateral in refusing grant courts’ decisions im- Iqbal, order doctrine. See 556 munity on motions to dismiss based on Ashcroft 1937, 12(b)(1) 12(b)(6) S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d 868 Rules appealable (2009); Pelletier, Behrens v. final determinations under the collateral (1996); order doctrine. Medford, Jenkins v. Behrens, (4th Cir.1997) (en banc); McVey Stacy, 834, the court district had entered an or- (4th Cir.1998). F.3d denying, prejudice, der without a motion to does not take issue qualified dismiss based on a defense of claim of defendants’ under immunity, giving as its reason the fact that the doctrine of derivative absolute immu- premature it was because the lack nity, princi- nor does it take issue with the discovery. Both the Ninth Circuit ple immunity protects that this defendants and, first appeal eventually taken the Su- *46 Ante, (“Mangold from suit. at 223 immu- Court, preme recognized that the district nity upon aegis confers those within its deferring pend- court’s order consideration trial”). Rather, right the not to stand ing discovery was a final determination of any ruling defers on the immuni- defense, immunity subject to immedi- ty because the “record suffi- [was not] appeal ate under the collateral order doc- ciently discovery developed through pro- trine. See Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan claim, ceedings accurately assess Francisco, 865, Bank San 871 of including immunity.” one of the ma- (9th As Cir.1992); Behrens, 516 U.S. at jority explains: (“Whether not a S.Ct. 834 or later Maryland Virginia summary judgment district [on motion the basis of perceived validity

courts each that immunity] granted, of is denial a motion ” immunity] depended such invocations right [of to dismiss is conclusive as to this them,” added)). though viewed even factual court As the Behrens Court (emphasis remained). stage of a issues noted, at the motion-to-dismiss conduct the defendant’s “it is proceeding, McVey, 157 F.3d at we Again, scruti- complaint that is in the alleged concluded that we applied Behrens and Behrens, at nized.” qualified jurisdiction had over denial added); see also (emphasis immunity though “recognized even we that 511, 529 n. Forsyth, 472 U.S. Mitchell v. essentially court’s order defer- the district (1985) 86 L.Ed.2d ruling qualified immunity a would ring (“[W]e that point at this emphasize blush, to amount to a rou- appear, at first purely legal is a one: issue appealable generally that not procedural tine order is a alleged support ... whether the facts As we reasoned: appealable.” clearly established of violation claim “at rejecting immunity defense [I]n added)). (emphasis law” early stage,” the district court nec- subjected the commissioners to essarily recently, Iqbal, More procedures further trial princi- the burden of Behrens its reaffirmed discovery, unnecessarily. rejecting perhaps “a court’s order ple that district implicitly district order immunity [The court’s] at the motion-to-dis- qualified ... is a ‘final de- ruled the commissioners on proceeding of a stage miss § meaning legal questions.... questions 1291.” These do cision’ within questions concerning 129 S.Ct. 1937 not raise factual Iqbal, added). involvement, defendants’ which (emphasis appealable.... would not be On the con- majority, by the we Until this decision trary, they are answered with the facts reasoning of Mitchell and applied have complaint assumed to be true as a consistently, hold- faithfully and Behrens They matter law. are therefore motion to dismiss ing that the denial of a very questions that were Mitchell held immunity properly that on an based appealable. suit, immunity characterized as added) (internal cita- (emphasis Id. at 276 discovery that more if on the basis even omitted). tions order over which necessary, is a collateral majority acknowledges Although under 28 jurisdiction we have U.S.C. precedents, attempts distinguish Medford, § 119 F.3d these Jenkins Cir.1997) (en (4th banc), by noting ju- that “confers we them Behrens appeals only of these if the rec- jurisdiction had to review risdiction declared we stage to ord at the dismissal can be construed a district court’s denial of motion Ante, pure of law.” qualified immunity present even to issue dismiss based on It that in cases “those court had refused to 222. finds though the district tentatively desig- stage at that because an facts that have been rule on yet yet been filed. Without nated as outcome-determinative answer had is, subject genuine dispute, a dis- rea- qualification, “[w]hen we stated in favor sonable factfinder could conclude trict court denies a motion dismiss *47 defendants,” plaintiffs the or the qualified immunity ... the of either is based on jurisdiction lack because the by this and thus we action is a final order renewable Bass, Id.; immunity rulings turn[ed] “courts’ below also court.” see Winfield (4th Cir.1997) (en banc) Ante, at The ma- genuineness.” on 223. F.3d to the jority’s “genuineness” new addition jurisdiction immunity to review an (finding however, doctrine, no finds the collateral order “accepting claim the facts as district summary if support Supreme judgment the Court’s discussion denial of even immunity appeals. already unsuccessfully have appealed of collateral order To majority simply stating the extent the district court’s denial their motion to 305-08, 116 the well-established rule that a collateral dismiss. 516 U.S. at S.Ct. 834. immunity appeal present Surprisingly, majority a admits that we order must jurisdiction can have to review whether purely legal question, there be no de “facts appeals undisputed particu bate that the in the cases before that are or viewed in a Mitchell, present just question. light immunity us such a lar are material to the cal ante, Behrens, culus,” Iqbal ques mysteriously establish without at but then appeals present purely tion that these concludes that we cannot determine legal question because we are asked to whether these same facts establish immu Thus, nity. majority’s decide whether the defendants are entitled under the novel doctrine, immunity approach to derivative on the basis to the collateral order alleged by plaintiffs jurisdiction we have to review whether facts complaints. possibility The that a factfin undisputed ques facts are “material” to a might immunity, der construe these tion jurisdic facts favor of but we have no not, at a later immunity time does tion to review the determination defendants device, some legal absolutely heretofore unknown itself. Such a rule finds no create a factual dispute deprives legal support. us of jurisdiction at stage. the motion-to-dismiss difficulty Whether it is to avoid pre- logical necessity, As matter of there can political sented question doctrine or genuine be no issue of material fact when questions evade the other difficult reviewing only we are alleged facts as merits of important present, these cases by the plaintiff complaint. in the The majority existing chooses decimate majority simply ignores Mitchell’s state jurisprudence collateral order by finding a ment that “the appealable purely issue is a “genuine” dispute of material fact in a case ” legal one: alleged sup whether facts in which we are asked to review district port a claim immunity. 472 U.S. at 528 court denying decisions immuni- derivative S.Ct, 9, 105 n. ty only facts, based undisputed those alleged complaint. in the McVey, See majority’s claim that it could (“These questions F.3d do not raise “pure discern a issue of law” if it “were of factual questions concerning the defen- opinion, evidently as the dissenters dants’ involvement.... contrary, On the are, persons similarly situated to the they are answered with the facts of the appellants inevitably invariably complaint assumed to be true aas matter suit,” ante, immune from demon- They of law. very ques- are therefore the strates the fundamental ap- error of its tions that Mitchell held appealable”). were proach. majority If the believes that the majority’s approach manifestly con- defendants cannot establish their claims to trary Supreme to the Court’s collateral immunity suit, accepting as true the order immunity jurisprudence. complaint, facts in the deny then it should immunity the derivative on the following Rather than binding defense merits and allow the precedents district courts to our proceed develop court, a fuller factual rec- rely chooses to on a Indeed, ord. very Behrens distinguishable considers this Fifth Circuit decision that possibility, allowing the pur- defendants to immunity refused to consider a claim of sue second appeal after the because it was neither “substantial” nor

257 Halliburton, government of investigation procurement See Martin v. “colorable.” (5th Cir.2010). at practices. 484 77 F.3d F.3d 1447-48. however, court, not decide the did Martin recently, the Supreme And Court has case, today. regu- In that issue us before the need to protect reaffirmed those who explicitly the governing contractor lations perform government junctions immu “[ejontractors used will not be stated that nity regardless they public are whether inherently governmental func- to perform officers, such as or employees, preclude[d] Defen- “expressly tions” and private individuals the perform retained to from engaging dant discre- [contractors] —Delia, function. See Filarsky same v. conduct,” which tionary prerequisite was a —, at finding immunity. derivative See id. (2012) (“[T]he law L.Ed.2d common Thus, language regulations 484. public not draw a did distinction between made the defendants’ conten- themselves private engaged servants and individuals per- had engaged tions that public according service protection governmental functions frivo- formance of carrying government responsibil those out unsubstantial. lous and ities”). Mangold decision in and its Under our this, majority disputes But the never nor argument can be no progeny, there serious why allegations even discusses that, the defen complaint, based on present only and un- complaint a frivolous present in these cases failed to a dants immunity. substantial claim to derivative immunity. basis for the See substantial Instead, it frames the dispositive question (holding 77 F.3d Mangold, finality. majori- doing, as one of so government junctions performed by pri ty ignores fundamental and well-estab- immuni protected by vate contractors principle that a court’s deni- lished district ty con both for the and the al a motion to on an dismiss based tractor); Murray Northrop see also immunity final, immediately is from suit Tech., Inc., Grumman F.3d Info. collateral dis- appealable order. Whether (2d Cir.2006) (government contractor covery help could make the issue more liability immune from absolutely tort or whether the courts wanted clear district performing governmental eontracted-for ruling fuller record before on the merits function, citing Mangold); Pani v. Em immunity is irrelevant. The defendants Shield, pire Blue Cross Blue to be protected claim entitlement (2d Cir.1998) from (same); Psy 71-73 Midland litigation process, the court’s refusal Assocs., States, Inc. chiatric United immunity grant denied them (8th Cir.1998) (common 1000, 1005 F.3d protection appealable and was therefore an immunity tort suit law official barred Behrens, Mitchell, Iqbal, decision under insurer). immunity Medicare This Jenkins, Winfield, and It most McVey. protects contractors suit where such readily regrettable majority so immunity a dis necessary protect an tramples precedents, on these which clear- cretionary government function and the ly appellate jurisdiction us with provide immunity costs. outweigh benefits of its stage proceedings to consider Mangold, example, in we held that For claims assert- the substantial jus in efficient government” “the interest immu ed the defendants on the basis of granting private contractor tified alleged in the nity during complaint.1 for statements made official facts relating inexplicably arguments Stat- also dismisses L- to the Alien Tort 3's *49 Immunity- B. Combatant Again, response Activities to allegations the under Saleh plaintiffs’ complaints, the defendants immunity claimed that is based on The defendants also asserted an immu interests, the United States’ as embodied nity from suit based on the combatant exception the combatant activities and exception activities to the Federal Tort applied as immunity, Saleh. Under this Claims Act and the applica D.C. Circuit’s when claims arise out of federal combatant immunity tion of that in Saleh v. Titan activities, the federal preempt interests Corp., (D.C.Cir.2009), 580 F.3d cert. de —nied, application of —, state tort law to its contrac- (2011). replace tors and then state tort immunity, L.Ed.2d 886 This law with ap law, plied contractors, to federal recognizes common which based on immunity United States’ for sovereign immunity against claims contractors arising claims out of arising combatant out of activities combatant activities. The military during time of war. See 28 United States’ interest in its contractors’ § 2680(j). U.S.C. performance in the course of combatant footnote, claiming they must, ute in a Sanchez-Espinoza, that deserve plaintiffs to main analysis no different claims, than do the state law tain allege their ATS that the actions Ante, claims. at 223-24 n. 19. But in so of the defendants were actions of United concluding, recognize fails to jurisdictional necessity. States as a See Kad plaintiffs' claims, that Alien Tort Statute Karadzic, (2d ic v. 70 F.3d Cir. jurisdictional necessity, allegations include 1995) ("[T]orture summary execution allegedly that the defendants' abusive conduct proscribed by ... are only international law was the conduct the United States and by when committed state officials or under therefore claim immunity of derivative law”). jurisdiction color of To establish would have to be substantial as a matter of crimes,” alleging their ATS claims "war law. plaintiffs very allege must least that Although the district court in Al Shimari "parties” the defendants in this case were plaintiffs’ dismissed the claims under id., Iraq, hostilities in have to ATS, Al-Quraishi the district court in failed demonstrate state action as well if the court dismiss the ATS claims L-3 and considered war crimes to violate internation employee. its L-3 appeal contends on that al norms to the extent were com the denial of its motion to dismiss the ATS actors, by mitted combatants or state see claims on account immunity, of derivative Alvarez-Machain, Sosa v. 731- defenses, among other was an error. L-3’s (2004); claim derivative absolute in the Libyan Republic, Tel-Oren v. Arab 726 F.2d ATS context undeniably is thus "substantial.” (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J„ 791-95 Sanchez-Espinoza Reagan, concurring). (D.C.Cir.1985), plaintiffs alleged that de- Thus, the defendants' claims to derivative fendants had violated the law by of nations Al-Quraishi immunity as to the ATS claims in execution, murder, engaging "summary obviously plaintiffs substantial because abduction, torture, rape, wounding, and the allege jurisdictional must necessity as a either private property destruction of public fa- state action or cilities,” "par- defendants were part as conspiracy arising of a out ties” Iraq. armed conflict in Both alle- government's of the U.S. actions in Nicara- gations weight add further to the gua. contention Id. opinion at 205. In a unanimous that the performing defendants were a state then-Judge joined authored Scalia and function and then-Judge thus entitled to the Ginsburg, same immu- the D.C. Circuit found public nities performing afforded officials mockery "[i]t would make a of the doc- sovereign Filarsky, trine of function. immunity” permit See 1663. I proceed ATS claims to therefore fail based on to understand how "actions these defens- are, concededly jurisdictional es can be dismissed as so insubstantial and necessity, official actions of jurisdiction United frivolous that we lack even to States.” Id. at 207. allegations Like the entertain them. *50 the issue is observation that im- uniquely out of federal cords grows activities statutory “derives from an munity explicit of operation in the unencumbered interest guarantee or constructive trial will and in the “elimination military personnel (internal quotation occur” marks omit- not to battlefield, both tort from ted), Boyle, and that “from which Saleh fed- foreign regulation or preempt state derived, rely] not on preemption [did military conduct to free eral wartime and Ante, explicit guarantee.” any such at from the and uncer- commanders doubts majority’s opinion, however, 217. The nei- potential subjection tainty inherent actually considers what held in ther Saleh Saleh, (emphasis 580 at 7 civil suit.” F.3d assertion, prove analyzes its order nor added). policies the combatant “[T]he excep- the text of the combatant activities implicated exception equally activities unique and the interests it tion federal alleged tortfeasor is a soldier whether Moreover, assumes, embodies. it without ac- engaging in combatant or a contractor analysis, Boyle and are identi- Saleh the behest of the and tivities at purposes of cal for its collateral order military’s poli- Id. The under the control.” analysis. can protect interests cy jurisdiction Surely our to consider the preserved and if the defense furthered depend courts’ district orders cannot potential lawsuits protects such as wholly “preemption” on labels law, not brought under civilian tort Nonetheless, “immunity.” if a vote on la- liability. ultimate simply against critical, majority would bels were have courts the claimed The district denied support, as virtually every little court Al-Quraishi The court in re immunities. government has considered contractor recognize unique federal inter fused to set forth it Boyle defense takes as in the activities ests embodied combatant two-step immunity. leading defense Al-Quraishi, at F.Supp.2d exception. step, preempts Under the first the court the court in sim 738-39. And Al Shimari law, second, it state tort under the rejected the defense to these defen ply as recognizes pro- the federal common law conclusory Al dants manner. Shi immunity to such viding contractors. See mari, F.Supp.2d at Both courts 725. Breaches, Canal In re Katrina F.3d thus held that defendants were entitled Cir.2010) (5th (characterizing displacement of state tort to neither recognized Boyle “govern- defense common application law nor the of federal In re immunity”); ment contractor World immunizing them suit. law from Disaster 521 F.3d Litig., Trade Ctr. Site majority now also to review refuses (2d Cir.2008) (“In Boyle, orders, denying court thus these district requirements type Court refined the for a activities the defendants combatant immunity government derivative immunity. mainly by relying It does so added)); (emphasis contractors” It unexplored labeling problem. on an Bank, Ltd., United States v. Swiss Am. (1st eonelusorily, preemption Cir.1999) (“[T]he “Boyle states 30, 44 n. 6 191 F.3d is, (and, thus, preemption) ipso Saleh [Boyle] terminology Court used the fac- Ante, to, And immunity.” at 217. ‘preemp- of state ‘displacement law’ and reliance, its again, repeating labeling determining tion’ in whether federal law declares, squarely preemption provide government “Saleh falls contractors should liability being immunity the side defense certain state-law Ante, immunity product liability (emphasis not an from suit.” actions” add- ed)); ac- only analysis Winters Diamond Shamrock Co., (5th Boyle, these cases. In Cir.

Chem. 1998) (“The Supreme “displacement” Court set out the referred to the of state law law, under the with federal common test added), Boyle” (emphasis (emphasis defense 108 S.Ct. 2510 contractor added)); areas, Truck Corp., specifically held that “a Oliver Oshkosh few *51 (7th Cir.1996) (“The interests,’ gov involving ‘uniquely 997 federal F.3d 96 is so contractor defense derived committed and laws Constitution ernment of the government’s immunity from United States to federal control from replaced, of a state law performance pre-empted discretion is when suit at a (emphasis necessary, by issue” add where federal con- ary function law of (“Extend (absent ed)); prescribed statutory 77 at tent Mangold, explicit F.3d 1448 directive) immunity private contractors to the courts—so ‘federal ing called ” government protect important interest common law.’ Id. at 2510 108 S.Ct. See, added) (internal Boyle[ e.g., (emphasis (emphasis not novel. ]” citation omit- ted). added)); Boeing Thus, Helicopters, Tate v. federal 55 it is content of this (6th Cir.1995) (“The Boyle F.3d 1153 common rights law that defines the that, under certain government held circum defenses of contractor de- stances, fendant, government contractors are im preemption leading ap- not the liability” from (emphasis plication mune state tort of the federal common law. added)); Coach, Carley v. Wheeled 991 In Boyle, the father of a heli- deceased Cir.1993) (3d (noting F.2d copter pilot sued the manufac- helicopter’s the rationale that “underlies the modern turer, contractor, private government contractor defense” government is that law, under Virginia tort alleging that should, ... private contractor in “[a] some helicopter’s escape hatch had defec- been circumstances, sovereign share the immu tively designed opened because it out rath- nity of the (emphasis United States” add 502-03, er than in. Id. ed)); Dynamics Harduvel v. Gen. Corp., pilot While the impact survived the (11th Cir.1989) (“In F.2d helicopter’s off Virginia, crash the coast of context, military [government he was escape unable to water because the immunity serves contractor] the further pressure prevented escape hatch important purpose shielding sensitive opening. The Court concluded that “state scrutiny by ju decisions from law which holds Government contractors diciary, the branch of least liable design for defects in military equip- competent (emphasis to review them” ment in does some present circumstances added)). ‘significant policy conflict’ with federal votes, counting than labeling displaced.” Rather and must be Id. at however, must, added). determining we ap- our S.Ct. 2510 (emphasis jurisdiction pellate over the defendants’ Boyle Court reached its conclusion immunity, inquire claim of Saleh whether through two-step First, process. it rec- immunity the assertion of Saleh falls with- ognized subject that the matter of the suit in the category of collateral orders that the interests,” implicated “uniquely federal be- appealable Court has held under “performance cause it involved fed- collateral order doctrine. contracts,” eral procurement “bor- which begin by We looking the methodology upon der[ed] two areas that [the Court] Boyle, employed by which was Saleh to found to involve such feder- ‘uniquely ha[d] (1) identify the federal al unique rights interests interests’ obli- immunity recognized the FTCA. under its con law States gations of United (2) (retaining § 28 U.S.C. sover- tracts, liability of federal See the “civil 2680© “arising claims out eign actions taken the course officials 504-06, activities of the or 108 S.Ct. 2510. the combatant duty.” Id. forces, recognizing during after naval or the Coast Guard step, In the second war”); interests, “sig Filarsky, whether a see also the Court asked time of (“[W]e between an iden ‘proceed[ assump- nificant conflict at 1665 on the exist[ed] ] and the policy or interest of ... im- principles tifiable federal tion that common-law law,” “the judicial and whether operation munity incorporated of state were into our frustrate of state law would application they should not be abro- system and that objectives legislation.” of federal specific legislative intent to do gated absent clear ” (internal (first quota original) (quoting Id. at so’ alteration *52 omitted). The Allen, 522, 529, citation tion marks and Pulliam (1984))). that conflict with explained “[t]he Court 80 L.Ed.2d 565 The S.Ct. sharp need be as policy federal defendants in this case asked the district when a suit involves justify preemption” apply methodology Boyle, courts concern,” Saleh, but none “unique area of federal in as the court did in order to must be.” Id. at “conflict there theless the federal common law defense recognize 507-08, then 2510. The Court excep- based on the combatant activities discretionary tion, conflict in the found this which is animated different inter- Tort exception to the Federal function in Boyle. ests than were at issue See (“FTCA”), (“The it noting Saleh, Act that “dem Claims point 580 F.3d at 6 crucial for, suggests potential onstrates the [Boyle that the court looked to the FTCA ] of, conflict’ be ‘significant sovereign the outlines im- exceptions the waiver interests and state law tween federal munity in order to determine that the con- procurement.” the context of Government significant and to measure the flict was 511, 108 at 2510. Id. (emphasis boundaries of the conflict” add- ed)).2 displace- Boyle The case thus works law, through preemption, ment of state Boyle meth- apply Saleh indeed did de- common law and then

with federal odology to circumstances identical to those common scribes the content of the federal concluded us. Thus the Saleh court before defense, look- government law contractor the combatant ac- Congress that intended discretionary purpose to the ing for ... exception to tort “eliminat[e] tivities exception function the FTCA. battlefield, preempt state from the both case, however, regulation of federal wartime foreign not involve the or This does and to free commanders recognized contractor defense conduct government uncertainty from the doubts and inherent rather a defense based on the Boyle, but potential subjection to civil suit.” Sa- exception, activities a common combatant Boyle, repackaging applied we are "re- we are also not majority’s assertion that Rather, packaging analyz- for the sake of convenience anything Boyle. we are from Boyle preemption derived from as defense ing the content of the federal common law ” ante, immunity,’ 'combatant activities Boyle methodology instructs us Saleh, Boyle ignores the fact that analyzed apply. Saleh the content of this law apply preemption, pro- though both then well, majority simply ignores that and the apply principles of federal ceed to different singular in its focus there is such content Thus, not common law to the issue at hand. "preemption” on the label. applying the common law are we not added). barren,” leh, ly long recognized at 7 courts have (emphasis explained: exception exempt Circuit Saleh that the serves to activi D.C. that “by very ties nature should be In the context of the combatant activi- of a possible free the hindrance dam question the relevant exception, ties States, age suit.” Johnson v. United much whether the substance of not so (9th Cir.1948) (emphasis F.2d duty with a the federal is inconsistent added). recognizing the interests that duty by the hypothetical imposed State Rather, qualified immunity protection made foreign sovereign. or is the trial, imposition per foreign against standing se of the state or similarly emphasized public tort law conflicts with the FTCA’s has “the policy eliminating concepts tort from interest be better served action very purposes independence the battlefield. The taken ‘with and without fear ” Mitchell, pursuit law are in with the consequences.’ tort conflict Thus, pres- of warfare. the instant case (quoting 105 S.Ct. 2806 Harlow v. general Fitzgerald, ents us with a more conflict term, (1982)). preemption, to coin a “battle-field These “con preemption”: the federal sequences” liability were “not limited to occupies the field when it comes to money war- damages” but also included *53 “ fare, its in always general and interest combat is ‘the subjecting costs of officials “precisely contrary” to imposition to the risks of trial-distraction of officials duty. duties, non-federal tort governmental from their inhibition action, discretionary and deterrence Saleh, displacing 580 F.3d at 7. After ” people able public from service.’ Id. at state tort unique law favor of the federal Harlow, (quoting 105 S.Ct. 2806 stake, interests at court Saleh dis- 816, 102 2727). U.S. at complaints sovereign missed the on based immunity. Moreover, in Filarsky,

Thus, public Court relied on the same reject claim interest the defendants’ holding immunity pro- common law sovereign immunity under Saleh amounts only government employees tects not subjecting government but contractors en- private also gaged performing in the war contractors when military effort of the suits, government’s work: thereby interfering very with the combatant pro- activities intended to be public ensuring perform- interest in by tected from statutory suit federal and government ance of duties free from the government’s common law. The unique distractions that accompany can even only interest can protected pre- implicated routine lawsuits is also when served if the potential Saleh defense to a permanent gov- individuals other than preserved by suit is our review at the employees ernment discharge litigation. outset of This is because the duties. only Not will such individuals’ immunity Saleh serves the interests of performance any ongoing government freeing engaged officers combatant ac- responsibilities suffer from the distrac- tivities from uncertainty “the doubts and lawsuits, tion of but such distractions in potential subjection inherent to civil will any public employ- also often affect Saleh, suit.” (emphasis 580 F.3d add- ees whom they by embroiling work ed). employees those in litigation. (citation

Although the legislative history Filarsky, of the 132 S.Ct. at 1666 omit- ted). combatant exception “singular- activities government” of the because “often when recognized concerns Mitch-

The same Filarsky particular specialized animate the combatant there is a need for ell here, ensuring that en- ... exception knowledge expertise govern- or activities arising out of engaged actions permanent tities ment must look outside its not suffer “distrac- activities do combatant private work force to secure the services of “inhibition,” tion,” by are not slowed individuals.” Id. at 1665-66. country. serve our As Saleh willing are just presents example. This case such an

noted, government occupies “the federal military specialized had need for warfare, and its the field when comes language interrogation skills and hired con- always ‘precisely in combat is interest private individuals to work with the mili- of a non-federal trary’ imposition to the tary its Be- performing public function. 7; duty.” 580 F.3d at see also Koohi tort potential liability cause suit and would re- (9th States, v. United timidity” part in “unwarranted sult (“[0]ne Cir.1992) purpose combatant contractors, of these exception recognize is to activities immunity must share the common law en- duty of during wartime encounters no rea- joyed by and retained is owed to those sonable care exception. FTCA combatant activities a result of au- force is directed as whom underlying immunity These interests action”). thorized if protected immunity is not short, unique federal interest em- only liability, but also an excep- bodied in the combatant activities immunity from suit. freeing is an interest in tion to the FTCA Thus, the denial of combatant activi- distraction, inhibi- military actors from effectively ties defense will be unreview- tion, imposition and fear that the of state judgment able at final because the defen- potential means of a civil suit tort law *54 longer dants will no be able to vindicate It no difference entails. makes whether right to avoid the burdens and dis- soldiers, are actors low-level Military tractions of trial. contractors will commanders, military or contractors. The “arising have to undertake future actions Supreme has made clear that immu- Court un- out of combatant activities” with the nity being per- attaches to the function derstanding they presumptively that formed, private and actors who are hired subject by to civil tort law and must abide func- perform public law of care in of a state duties the middle tions are entitled to the same immunities foreign war zone. The will be ex- result public performing to which officials those actly Supreme what the Court cautioned Filarsky, would be entitled. See duties Filarsky: working along- “those at The 1661-66. unanimous Su- [government side left employees] could be Filarsky emphasized that preme Court holding bag facing liability full liability on imposing private individuals — conjunction govern- actions taken in performing public functions will result in employees enjoy immunity for ment who timidity” part of “unwarranted activity.” business,” the same engaged public’s “those in the governmental The interests uninhibited calling important this concern “the most military action and in the attraction of special government immunity-producing (internal candidates, public pri- talented both and quotation concern.” Id. omitted). vate, activities ex- animate the combatant recognized marks It the need to are far broad- immunity only public ception, em- these interests “afford[ ] acting recognized others on behalf er than the limited interests ployees but also to in the deci- majority, recognized Supreme focuses on “sensi- Court’s which Ante, Johnson, at 219. Such tive issues.” sion in Dow v. the federal (1879),

a narrow mischaracterization of part L.Ed. 632 because were language of the ignores interest the broad occupying force the middle of “arising actions out exception (protecting ongoing war.3 activities”) sup- no combatant and finds plaintiffs agree the district law. port in federal common conclusively courts decided defen- bottom, readily apparent At it is that the to law-of-war im- dants were not entitled im- denying district courts’ orders Saleh munity that the issue is collateral munity comfortably collater- fall within the contend, however, They the merits. al order doctrine. As the immunity immunity is not an from suit summarizing has said in its collateral order jurisdiction, depriving but doctrine of precedents: jurisdic- occupied territory courts in an case, particular In each some value of occupying tion over the forces. high support order was marshaled in avoiding honoring the interest trial: brief, In its amicus the United States separation powers, preserving the noted, explanation, without “Dow efficiency government and the initia- policies reflects well inform the officials, respecting tive its a State’s claims,” ultimate disposition of these but interest, dignitary mitigating prepared the United States was “not ... government’s advantage over the indi- to conclude that the contractor defendants is, vidual. That it is not mere avoidance right have demonstrated a to immediate trial, of a but avoidance of a trial that review of their contentions based on Dow imperil public would a substantial inter- alone.” est, asking that counts when whether an again resorts to labels to “effectively” order is unreviewable if re- issue, resolve this noting that view is to be left until later. Dow does not use the “immunity.” word Hallock, 345, 352-53, Will v. The fact that specific Dow does not use the (2006) (empha- however, “immunity,” term has little rele- added). sis So it is these cases. question ruling vance to the of whether a Immunity C. Law-of-War *55 denying application holding of its is imme- Finally, diately appealable. protec- CACI and L-3 claimed Dow characterized the tion application from suit and from the of defense at “exemption issue as an from Iraqi law immunity, under law-of-war ... civil proceedings,”4 100 U.S. at 165 Al-Quraishi, Co., 3. Raytheon the district court Inc. v. deter- Aircraft (4th Cir.2007) curiam). (per Judge 275 Iraqi apply mined that As law would to the ac- notes, however, plaintiffs Wilkinson in Al Maryland's tion under adherence to the lex Virginia ap- Shimari contend that law should analyzing loci delicti rule in choice of law in ply- F.Supp.2d tort actions. 728 at 761-62. In Al Shimari, the district court noted that it would Compare language Supreme with the "present parties opportunity with the Court’s more recent characterization address the choice of law issue at a later qualified immunity “shields date,” and did not determine what law would agents liability damages,” for civil Beh- apply. F.Supp.2d Virginia 657 at 725 n. 7. rens, (internal 516 U.S. at 116 S.Ct. 834 law, however, applies also the lex loci delicti (em- omitted) quotation marks and alterations and, thus, Iraqi appear rule added), law would phasis "protec- or that it as a serves Air, apply Colgan in that action as well. See tion to shield from undue [defendants] inter- in added), which, customary fense identified Saleh based on the com- as was (emphasis time, “juris- led to a lack of exception. at the batant activities Dow and other to find defendant, the court over diction” of cases of its era were decided as a matter of v. Exchange In The at 170. Schooner id. and international common law at a federal Cranch) (7 McFaddon, 11 U.S. Supreme recognized time when the Court (1812), which was relied L.Ed. 287 validity of such common law. See Dow, lan- similarly used the the Court 594, 613, 24 Surget, v. L.Ed. Ford phrase and this “jurisdiction,” of guage (1878) (finding Mississippi civilian interpreted by was later civil an- destroying immune from suit for call, today’s we Court to stand for what support cotton in other citizen’s immunity. See parlance, foreign sovereign occupying army Confederate based on the Nigeria, B.V. v. Cent. Bank Verlinden of “common laws of maxims war—those 1962, 76 103 S.Ct. U.S. moderation, justice” humanity, and the (1983). Further, subsequent L.Ed.2d 81 nations”). “law of decisions, cases, including Supreme Court protection type that the Dow is a recognize Although the invocation of federal com- Hernandez, immunity. v. See Underhill severely mon law was restricted with the 250, 252-53, 83, 42 18 S.Ct. L.Ed. Supreme Court’s decision Erie Railroad (1897); Moyer Peabody, Tompkins, Co. (1909); 85-86, 235, 53 L.Ed. 410 (1938), 82 L.Ed. 1188 the Court’s decision Immunity, 57 Yale L.J. “Act State” Boyle explicitly nonetheless instructs (1947). 108,112 displace courts to state tort law with feder- imposition al common law when the label, however, Rather than fuss with a uniquely state tort law would conflict with determine the nature of the de- we must immunity recog- federal interests. The as to be able to recognized fense Doio so body rejection nized Dow falls within the same whether is immedi- determine its displaces federal common law that state ately appealable. methodology employed by law under the imagine finds it “curious to Boyle. principles And “common-law century [Supreme] the nineteenth immunity incorporated ... were into our in the regarding its decisions Civil War judicial system and ... should not be ab- having precedential cases as durable ef- rogated legislative absent clear intent fect,” citing authority no to reach that (inter- Filarsky, do so.” 132 S.Ct. at 1665 conclusion, implies they may “pos- omitted). nal marks For this quotation im- beyond sess continued relevance reason, immunity claimed the de- Ante, By context.” at 217. con- mediate fendants under Dow and the trast, argument, at oral the United States claimed under the common law defense “principles that the of Dow postulated excep- based on the combatant activities doctrines,” have further life other *56 simply two of the same tion are variations specifically argued principles that principle; they are both a common law by courts in their “given effect” immunity Boyle provides from suit. And recognition of the federal common law de- added). potentially (emphasis See also with their duties and from 102 S.Ct. ference disabling liability,” v. threats of Harlow Creighton, Fitz- 483 U.S. Anderson 2727, gerald, 102 S.Ct. (1987) (noting (1982) added), (emphasis L.Ed.2d 396 immunity govern- qualified "shield[sI" that again that officials are “shielded damages liability”). ment "from civil officials damages,” liability civil id. at from Therefore, for that methodology preempting state law the same reasons im- of the federal common law applying the federal common law denial defense recognized immediately appeal- munity, pointed out in Saleh is as Saleh. able, exemption inasmuch as the from suit majority heavily relies on the Su effectively appeal, on will be unreviewable immunity statement that an preme Court’s immunity the denial of the law-of-war is from typically from suit must be derived immediately appealable, indepen- either statutory explicit “an or constitutional dently part parcel or as of the Saleh Ante, guarantee that trial will not occur.” similarity language defense. Thus, majority at 217. conclude would “[wjhat asks, striking. Dow is the law preemption that cannot be an immu Saleh governs army invading which an an ene- suit, nity “no because there is con my’s country,” and concludes “[i]t Supreme Boyle tention that the Court in country; not the civil law of the invaded [], from is de preemption which Saleh is not the civil law the conquering coun- rived, any explicit guaran relied such law, try: military it is law of war.” —the tee embodied statute or the Constitu at 170. Dow continued to reason Ante, Retreating tion.” at 217. almost protection “for the of the officers and immediately categorical from this state army” supremacy soldiers of the of the ment, however, then admits common law of war over the civil law “is as in a Supreme footnote Court has efficiency army essential to the recognized implicit immunity an from suit supremacy of the civil law at home.” “ immunity pedi when such has a ‘good added). (emphasis Similarly, Id. Saleh law,’ gree in public which more than emphasizes necessary “elimination of Ante, up implicitness.” makes for its battlefield, preempt tort from the both to 217 n. (quoting Digital Equip., foreign regulation state or of federal war- 1992). Yet, it continues time conduct and to free com- to overlook the fact that recognized uncertainty manders from the doubts and need in Dow and other mili cases to free subjection in potential inherent to civil tary operations from the stan duties and added). suit.” at 7 (emphasis represent dards state tort law the same “potential subjection” The freedom from public pedigree kind of law led the civil ability per- suits and the Supreme recognize qualified Court to im performing military sonnel and contractors munity, which is a common law defense efficiently, act functions to without the dis- concededly immediately and is appeal- po- traction and inhibition inherent in the able issue. As the Court recent imposition tential of state tort standards of instructed, ly “We consult the common law active, duty foreign onto an war zone can- identify governmental those functions by reviewing liability not be vindicated historically that were impor viewed as so judg- of officers or after a final entities tant and vulnerable to interference ment. litigation means of that some form of abso liability lute from civil was need performed

ed to ensure that The denial of one of the three immu- independence and without fear of conse nities un- claimed CACI and L-3 is — Paulk, quences.” Rehberg doubtedly immediately appealable under —, 182 L.Ed.2d the collateral order doctrine. Not has *57 (2012) (internal immunities, quotations marks denial of such even on omitted). 12(b)(6) motions, traditionally been found see, immediately duty to ask appealable, e.g., to be first whether the district Behrens, 305-06, 834, courts and then whether our court have immunity claim but the substance of each jurisdiction Article III to hear these eases. example type of the of col- paradigm is a Methyl Tertiary Butyl See In re Ether immediately lateral order that was held 112, Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 121-22 appealable Cohen. The immunities (2d Cir.2007) (“We conclude that review of protect judi- the defendants from claimed question required removal] is pursuant [a operations, cial intervention into battlefield independent obligation to our satisfy protection necessarily which would be jurisdiction ourselves of the of this court by subjecting opera- breached battlefield and the court obligation below.... This above, tives to suit. As noted these immu- extinguished because an appeal [from protected can nities vindicated and sovereign immunity] the denial of is taken interlocutory by allowing appellate review. interlocutory on an basis and not from a judgment”); final Kwai Fun Wong v. Ill States, (9th United 373 F.3d 960-61 Upon necessary recognition of our Cir.2004) (“Resolution subject matter appellate jurisdiction to im consider the jurisdiction necessary is ... to ensure basis, interlocutory munities on we meaningful review of the district court’s must, at and as once the next immediate interlocutory rulings if appel because subject jurisdic step, consider our matter jurisdiction, late courts lack they cannot tion, subject jurisdic as well as the matter review the of these properly appeal merits every tion of the district courts. “On writ (internal rulings” ed quotation marks omit appeal, of error or the first and fundamen ted) (alterations in original)); Hospitality question jurisdiction, tal that of first of House, Gilbert, Inc. v. court, and then court from (5th Cir.2002) (“[W]here, inas the instant question which the record comes. This case, interlocutory we have appellate juris the court is bound to ask and answer diction to review a district court’s denial of itself....” Steel Co. v. Citizens a Bet immunity, Eleventh Amendment we Env’t, ter first determine whether there is federal (1998). pro Article III subject jurisdiction matter over the under judicial power only vides extends ease”); lying Timpanogos Tribe Con “Controversies,” to “Cases” or U.S. Const. (10th Cir.2002) way, 286 F.3d Ill, 2,§ art. “requirement (“[Jjurisdiction is a question threshold jurisdiction be established as a threshold which an appellate court must resolve be matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and lim addressing fore the merits of the matter judicial power its of the of the United before it.... appellate [B]ecause we have excep States’ and is ‘inflexibleand without jurisdiction interlocutory over the appeal ” tion,’ 94-95, 118 id. at (quoting S.Ct. 1003 of defendants’ assertion of Eleventh Swan, Mansfield, L.M.R. C. & Co. immunity, appel Amendment we also have 28 L.Ed. 462 jurisdiction late to determine whether the (1884)). subject district had jurisdic court matter

Even when faced a collateral underlying order tion over the Tribe’s claim instance”).5 immunity appeal, we are not relieved of defendants the first ju- soning determining subject juris- 5. Some of these courts have considered matter questions by exercising pendent "necessary meaningful risdictional diction is to ensure jurisdiction appellate question, immunity question. over rea- review” of the See Kwai *58 us, military, by contractors of the worked side presently cases before In the military carry side with the out these courts to en- have asked civilian plaintiffs military operations under the ultimate su- action tort law causes of tertain state military pervision and command of the taken in connection with on conduct based in “during period of armed conflict and against another ongoing an active and war They connection with hostilities.” were sovereign. plaintiffs’ To entertain the military engaged by pursue interro- time, impose, for the first claims would under the command and control of gations zone, tort duties onto an active war state military personnel respect persons array by a broad of interferences raising And, by military. detained consistent judiciary military into the functions mili- with the close connection between the textually committed our Constitution contractors, tary military and the the com- President, and the Execu- Congress, the allege and the plaints I, 8,§ Branch. See U.S. Const art. tive conspired civilian contractors in their Congress to (authorizing els. 11-14 declare abuse of the detainees. war, navy, to raise armies and create a II, military); art. to make rules for the id. gave my panel For reasons I in (providing § 2 that the President “shall be Shimari, concurrence Al 658 F.3d at army of the Commander-in-Chief J., (Niemeyer, concurring), 420-25 and the States, navy of the and of the United given by Judge King majori reasons in his states, militia of the several when called ty Taylor opinion Kellogg Brown & the actual into Service United Services, (4th 402, 412 Root 658 F.3d Cir. States”). implicate Because these cases 2011), I political would conclude that the “textually demonstrable constitu- several question deprives doctrine both court authority tional to the commitment[s]” subject and the district courts of matter department^],” no “political have jurisdiction to hear these cases. also See place federal courts and must be dis- EPA, Massachusetts jurisdiction. missed for lack of Baker v. (2007) (“It Carr, learning justiciable is ... familiar that no (1962). L.Ed.2d 663 ‘controversy’ parties exists when seek ad judication a political question”); Tiffany plaintiffs The these cases were seized (4th States, v. United 931 F.2d military, having a war zone been Cir.1991) (“Of legion governmental activity suspected possess- of hostile or of endeavors, perhaps clearly the most ing intelligence. useful The function of judicial marked for provi deference are detaining interrogating persons such security sions for national and defense.... intelligence undoubtedly to obtain was crit- strategy employed and tactics on the military strategies ical to the success of clearly subject judi battlefield are campaigns. judgment of whom to review”); Kellogg cial Carmichael v. about, interrogate, inquire what to and the Servs., Inc., Brown & Root 572 F.3d techniques comfortably to use fell within (11th Cir.2009). powers of the Commander-in-Chief Accordingly, undoubtedly and his subordinates the chain of com- while we have L-3, appellate jurisdiction mand. And CACI and as civilian under Cohen to con- 960-61; House, Wong, Timpanogos jurisdiclion. Hospitality F.3d at Fun See 298 F.3d Tribe, at 1201. Other courts have at 429-30. The result is the same under pow- considered it because of their inherent approach. either obligation er and under Steel Co. to consider *59 appeals stage at this in the sider subject juris- lack matter

proceedings, we cases, as did

diction over these the district I

courts. would therefore dismiss these subject

appeals jurisdic- for lack of matter

tion and remand the cases to the district

courts with orders likewise dis- subject

miss the cases for lack of matter

jurisdiction.

Judge Judge Wilkinson and Shedd have they join opinion.

indicated

TCR SPORTS BROADCASTING

HOLDING, L.L.P., Mid-Atlantic d/b/a Network,

Sports Petitioner,

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION; United States America, Respondents, Incorporated,

Time Warner Cable

Intervenor. Baseball;

Office of the Commissioner of Project; Litan;

Media Access Robert Hahn, Supporting

Robert Amici Peti-

tioner.

No. 11-1151.

United of Appeals, States Court

Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 2012. May

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: May 14, 2012
Citation: 679 F.3d 205
Docket Number: 09-1335A
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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