United States v. William Sellars, Jr.
708 F. App'x 788
4th Cir.2017Background
- Sellars pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm, under a plea agreement that included an appellate-waiver (except for ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, sentence exceeding statutory maximum, or sentence based on an unconstitutional factor).
- The original PSR classified Sellars as an armed career criminal, yielding a Guidelines range of 188–235 months; Sellars objected to firearm and premises enhancements but counsel withdrew those objections at the first sentencing because the ACC classification controlled the range.
- The district court sentenced Sellars to the 180-month statutory minimum after granting a downward variance; this sentence was vacated on appeal and remanded in light of United States v. Newbold.
- On remand the PSR removed the ACC classification, recalculated the Guidelines (applying the firearm and premises enhancements) to 97–121 months, and the district court sentenced Sellars to 107 months; Sellars appealed.
- Sellars argued the district court erred by refusing to receive evidence on his objections to the firearm and premises enhancements at both the first and second sentencing hearings, and alternatively framed the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Sellars' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sellars can challenge rulings at his first sentencing after his sentence was vacated and remanded | Sellars argues the district court erred in not entertaining evidence at the first sentencing on the enhancements | Government argues Sellars cannot challenge the vacated first sentencing because the sentence was set aside and resentencing reopened issues | Court: No—rulings from the vacated first sentencing are unappealable on this appeal (reopened on remand) |
| Whether Sellars can challenge procedural handling (refusal to receive evidence) at the second sentencing despite appellate waiver | Sellars contends Newbold made the enhancements consequential, so procedural errors at second sentencing are reviewable and outside waiver | Government argues procedural law didn’t change and the claim falls within the appellate waiver | Court: Claim is barred by the appellate waiver; Newbold did not change procedural rules and was decided before second sentencing |
| Whether Sellars’ claim fits the plea-waiver exception for "changes in the law to his benefit" | Sellars claims Newbold is a change in law that nullifies ACC status and thus exempts his challenges | Government contends Newbold does not create a new procedural rule exempting his claims from the waiver | Court: Too attenuated—Newbold does not exempt these procedural objections from the waiver |
| Whether Sellars can pursue ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal | Sellars reframes his claim as ineffective assistance because counsel withdrew objections | Government argues ineffective-assistance claims are not cognizable on direct appeal absent clear record showing prejudice | Court: Ineffective-assistance claim not cognizable on direct appeal—Sellars did not show conclusive prejudice; such claims should be raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 |
Key Cases Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (framework for counsel submitting a brief when no meritorious issues exist)
- United States v. Newbold, 791 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 2015) (applied Simmons in ACC predicate analysis)
- United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (standard for determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense for ACC purposes)
- United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2013) (vacatur and remand for de novo resentencing frees district court from prior sentencing determinations)
- United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2013) (ineffective-assistance on direct appeal requires that ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the record)