United States v. William Rogers, 86 F.4th 259

Jan 2017: Rogers was seized in a motel room with methamphetamine and taken into police custody.
He was later released (apparently for failure to indict under Kentucky law); a grand jury nevertheless returned an indictment in Feb 2018 for the 2017 conduct.
Mar 2018: During a traffic stop officers discovered methamphetamine, learned of an outstanding warrant based on the Feb 2018 indictment, and arrested Rogers; he pleaded guilty to two state felony drug offenses and received concurrent sentences imposed the same day.
Nov 2020: Rogers was released; in 2021 he pleaded guilty in federal court to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
The Presentence Report treated Rogers as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on the two prior state drug convictions, which raised his Guidelines range; district court applied the enhancement and imposed a 240-month sentence (below Guidelines).
On appeal Rogers argued the two state offenses should count as a single prior sentence because they were not separated by an "intervening arrest" as that term is used in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rogers)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't)	Held
Whether Rogers's earlier custodial detention counts as an "intervening arrest" under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), so that the two state convictions count as separate prior sentences for career-offender purposes	The pre-indictment custody/release (and the later indictment) means there was no proper "arrest" for § 4A1.2(a)(2); alternatively, a mere traffic stop (if that were the relevant event) is not an "arrest"; a timely indictment or formal notice is required	The Guidelines focus on a custodial arrest (being taken into police custody) occurring before the second offense; Rogers was in custody in 2017 before the 2018 offense, so an intervening arrest separated the offenses	The Sixth Circuit affirmed: an "intervening arrest" requires a custodial arrest before the second offense; Rogers’s 2017 custodial detention qualifies, so the two prior convictions count separately for the career-offender enhancement

United States v. Powell, 798 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2015) (rejecting expansive definitions of "arrest" such as issuance of a summons; endorses custodial understanding)
United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (traffic stop issuing a citation is not a formal arrest for intervening-arrest rule)
United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (treats a traffic stop/citation as an "arrest" for Guidelines purposes)
United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2017) (views "arrest" as ordinarily custodial; traffic stop not sufficient)
United States v. Ley, 876 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2017) (adopts a custodial-arrest reading for intervening-arrest rule)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (common-law discussion of arrest as physical seizure)
Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (distinguishes application of force from show of authority in arrest context)
United States v. Sands, 948 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2020) (use of modern ordinary meaning for statutory terms in Guidelines context)
United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021) (interpretation of undefined Guidelines terms by ordinary meaning)