United States v. William Rand, 924 F.3d 140

William N. Rand pled guilty to three counts of securities fraud and was sentenced to 168 months, a $300 special assessment, and $99,707,758.04 in restitution.
The written judgment stated restitution would be due during imprisonment, but the district court orally announced payments would begin 60 days after release (minimum $50/month or 10% of gross salary).
The district court later amended the judgment to reflect the oral payment plan announced at sentencing.
The government discovered $1,684.57 in Rand’s inmate trust account, moved under the MVRA and related enforcement provisions for a turnover order to apply those funds to restitution, and the district court granted the motion three days later.
Rand appealed pro se, arguing (1) the sentencing postponement barred pre-release collection; (2) the funds were exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(9) and (d); and (3) the three-day ruling denied him due process.

Issue	Rand's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court’s oral postponement bars pre-release turnover of inmate funds	Oral postponement means no collection until release	Postponement did not negate the restitution lien or bar earlier collection when defendant acquires means	Held for Government: postponement did not preclude turnover; lien and statutory enforcement permit earlier collection
Whether inmate trust funds are exempt from turnover under tax-levy exemptions	Funds are wages/income exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(9) and (d)	Statutory scheme for criminal-judgment enforcement incorporates only specified tax exemptions; the cited exemptions were not adopted	Held for Government: the listed tax exemptions in 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) are exclusive; Rand’s cited exemptions do not apply
Whether the district court denied due process by granting turnover three days after the government’s motion	Rapid grant deprived Rand of notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond	No additional process required here; response would not have changed result given the lien and non-exempt status	Held for Government: no abuse of discretion; Rand failed to show a response would have altered the outcome

Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1997) (standard of review for turnover orders and deference to district court discretion)
United States v. Clayton, 613 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 2010) (reversal for turnover order only if based on legal error or clearly erroneous factual findings)
United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying turnover to inmate trust accounts under MVRA)
United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2002) (Attorney General’s duty to enforce restitution vigorously)
Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483 (2013) (Congressional enumeration of exceptions precludes implied additional exemptions)
United States v. Lockhart, [citation="584 F. App'x 268"] (5th Cir. 2014) (MVRA intended to facilitate victim recovery)
United States v. Messervey, [citation="182 F. App'x 318"] (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing Texas turnover statute as a tool for enforcing criminal debt)
United States v. Reed, [citation="403 F. App'x 965"] (5th Cir. 2010) (consideration of whether an omitted response would have affected the district court’s decision)