HILLMAN v. MARETTA
No. 11-1221
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 3, 2013
569 U. S. ____ (2013)
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012
Syllabus
NOTE: Whеre it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HILLMAN v. MARETTA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
No. 11-1221. Argued April 22, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013
The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) establishes an insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA permits an employee to name a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, and specifies an “order of precedence” providing that an employee‘s death benefits accrue first to that beneficiary ahead of other potential recipients.
Warren Hillman named then-spouse, respondent Judy Maretta, as the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy. After their divorce, he married petitioner Jacqueline Hillman but never changed his named FEGLI beneficiary. After Warren‘s death, Maretta, still the named beneficiary, filed a claim for the FEGLI proceeds and collected them. Hillman sued in Virginia court, seeking recovery of the proceeds under Section D. Maretta argued in response that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The parties agreed that Section A is pre-empted. The Virginia Circuit Court found Maretta liable to Hillman under Section D for the FEGLI policy proceeds. The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Section D is pre-empted by FEGLIA because it conflicts with the purposes and objectives of Congress.
Held: Section D of the Virginia statute is pre-empted by FEGLIA. Pp. 6-15.
(1) To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’ purposes and objectives, the nature of the federal interest must first be ascertained. Crosby, 530 U. S., at 372-373. Two previous cases govern the analysis of the relationship between Section D and FEGLIA here. In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655, a California court granted a decedent‘s widow, who was not the named beneficiary of a policy under the federal National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 (NSLIA), an interest in the insurance proceeds as community property under state law. This Court reversed. Because NSLIA provided that the insured had a right to designate a beneficiary and could change that designation at any time, the Court reasoned that Congress had “spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.” Id., at 658. The Court addressed a similar question regarding the federal Servicemen‘s Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 (SGLIA) in Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46. There, a Maine court imposed a constructive trust on insurance proceeds paid to a servicemember‘s widow, the named beneficiary, and ordered that they be paid to the decedent‘s first wife as required by a divorce decree. Holding the constructive trust pre-empted, the Ridgway Court explained that Wissner controlled and that SGLIA made clear that “the insured service member possesses the right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter that choice at any time by communicating the decision in writing to the proper office.” Id., at 56. Pp. 7-9.
(2) The reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with equal force here. NSLIA and SGLIA are strikingly similar to FEGLIA, which creates a scheme that gives highest priority to an insured‘s designated beneficiary,
(b) Hillman‘s additional arguments in support of a different result are unpersuasive. Pp. 13-15.
283 Va. 34, 722 S. E. 2d 32, affirmed.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined as to all but footnote 4. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical оr other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11-1221
JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A. MARETTA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[June 3, 2013]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA),
A
In 1954, Congress enacted FEGLIA to “provide low-cost group life insurance to Federal employees.” H. R. Rep. No. 2579, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1954). The program is administered by the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
FEGLIA provides that, upon an employee‘s death, life insurance benefits are paid in accordance with a specified “order of precedence.”
To be effective, the beneficiary designation and any accompanying revisions to it must be in writing and duly filed with the Government. See ibid. (“[A] designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document not so executed and filed has no force or effect“). An OPM regulation provides that an employee may
In 1998, Congress amended FEGLIA to create a limited exception to an employee‘s right of designation. The statute now provides that “[a]ny amount which would otherwise be paid to a person determined under the order of precedence ... shall be paid (in whole or in part) by [OPM] to another person if and to the extent expressly provided for in the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation” or related settlement, but only in the event the “decree, order, or agreement” is received by OPM or the employing agency before the employee‘s death.
FEGLIA also includes аn express pre-emption provision. That provision states in relevant part that “[t]he provisions of any contract under [FEGLIA] which relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any law of any State ... which relates to group life insurance to the extent that the law or regulation is inconsistent with the contractual provisions.”
This case turns on the interaction between these provi
In the event that Section A is pre-empted by federal law,
“If [
Va. Code Ann. §20-111.1 ] is preempted by federal law with respect to the payment of any death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives the payment of any death benefit that the former spouse is not entitled to under [§20-111.1 ] is personally liable for the amount of the payment to the person who would have been entitled to it were [§20.111.1 ] not preempted.”
In other words, where Section A is pre-empted, Section D creates a cause of action rendering a former spouse liable for the principal amount of the insurance proceeds to the person who would have received them had Section A continued in effect.
B
Warren Hillman (Warren) and respondent Judy Maretta were married. In 1996, Warren named Maretta as the beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. Warren and Maretta divorced in 1998 and, four years later, he married petitioner Jacqueline Hillman. Warren died unexpectedly in 2008. Because Warren had never changed the named beneficiary under his FEGLI policy, it continued to identify Maretta as the beneficiary at the time of his death despite his divorce and subsequent remarriage to Hillman.
Hillman filed a claim for the proceeds of Warren‘s life
Hillman then filed a lawsuit in Virginia Circuit Court, arguing that Maretta was liable to her under Section D for the proceeds of her deceased husband‘s FEGLI policy. The parties agreed that Section A, which directly reallocates the benеfits, is pre-empted by FEGLIA. Id., at 36a. Maretta contended that Section D is also pre-empted by federal law and that she should keep the insurance proceeds. The Circuit Court rejected Maretta‘s argument and granted summary judgment to Hillman, finding Maretta liable to Hillman under Section D for the proceeds of Warren‘s policy. Id., at 58a.
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta. 283 Va. 34, 46, 722 S. E. 2d 32, 38 (2012). The court found that FEGLIA clearly instructed that the insurance proceeds should be paid to a named beneficiary. Id., at 44-46, 722 S. E. 2d, at 36-38. The court reasoned that “Congress did not intend merely for the named beneficiary in a FEGLI policy to receive the proceeds, only then to have them subject to recovery by a third party under state law.” Id., at 44, 722 S. E. 2d, at 37. It therefore concluded that Section D is pre-empted by FEGLIA, because it “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id., at 45, 722 S. E. 2d, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ____ (2013), to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts over whether FEGLIA pre-empts a rule of state law that automatically assigns an interest in the proceeds of a FEGLI policy to a person other than the named beneficiary or grants that
II
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the power to pre-empt state law expressly. See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500-501 (1984). Although FEGLIA contains an express pre-emption provision, see
The regulation of domestic relations is traditionally the domain of state law. See In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593-594 (1890). There is therefore a “presumption against pre-emption” of state laws governing domestic relations, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 151 (2001), and “family and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy
A
To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’ purposes and objectives, we must first ascertain the nature of the federal interest. Crosby, 530 U. S., at 372-373.
Hillman contends that Congress’ purpose in enacting FEGLIA was to advance administrative convenience by establishing a clear rule to dictate where the Government should direct insurance proceeds. See Brief for Petitioner 25. There is some force to Hillman‘s argument that a significant legislative interest in a large federal program like FEGLIA is to enable its efficient administration. If Hillman is correct that administrative convenience was Congress’ only purpose, then there might be no conflict between Section D and FEGLIA: Section D‘s cause of action takes effect only after benefits have been paid, and so would not necessarily impact the Government‘s distribution of insurance proceeds. Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 963 N. E. 2d 470, 477-478 (Ind. 2012).
For her part, Maretta insists that Congress had a more substantial purpose in enacting FEGLIA: to ensure that a duly named beneficiary will receive the insurance proceeds and be able to make use of them. Brief for Respondent 21-22. If Maretta is correct, then Section D would directly conflict with that objective, because its cause of action would take the insurance proceeds away from the named beneficiary and reallocate them to someone else. We must therefore determine which understanding of
We do not write on a clean slate. In two previous cases, we considered federal insurance statutes requiring that insurance proceeds be paid to a named beneficiary and held they pre-empted state laws that mandated a different distribution of benefits. The statutes we addressed in these cases are similar to FEGLIA. And the impediments to the federal interests in these prior cases are analogous to the one created by Section D of the Virginia statute. These precedents accordingly govern our analysis of the relationship between Section D and FEGLIA in this case.
In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950), we considered whether the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 (NSLIA), 54 Stat. 1008, pre-empted a rule of state marital property law. Congress had enacted NSLIA to “affor[d] a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of the United States.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 658. A California court granted the decedent‘s widow, who was not the named beneficiary, an interest in the insurance proceeds as community property under state law. Id., at 657.
We reversed, holding that NSLIA pre-empted the widow‘s state-law action to recover the proceeds. Id., at 658. In pertinent part, NSLIA provided that the insured “‘shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance [within a designated class], ... and shall ... at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries.‘” Ibid. (quoting
In Ridgway, we considered a similar question regarding
In holding the constructive trust pre-empted, we explained that the issue was “controlled by Wissner.” Id., at 55. As in Wissner, the applicable provisions of SGLIA made clear that “the insured service member possesses the right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter that choice at any time by communicating the decision in writing to the proper office.” 454 U. S., at 56 (citing Wissner, 338 U. S., at 658). We also noted that SGLIA established an “‘order of precedence,‘” which provided that the benefits would be first paid to “such beneficiary or beneficiaries as the member ... may have designated by [an approрriately filed] writing received prior to death.” 454 U. S., at 52 (quoting
B
Our reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with equal force here. The statutes we considered in these earlier cases are strikingly similar to FEGLIA. Like NSLIA and SGLIA, FEGLIA creates a scheme that gives highest priority to an insured‘s designated beneficiary.
Section D interferes with Congress’ scheme, because it directs that the proceeds actually “belong” to someone other than the named beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their recovery by a third party. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 55; see
One can imagine plausible reasons to favor a different
But that is not the judgment Congress made.3 Rather than draw an inference about an employee‘s probable intent from a range of sources, Congress established a clear and predictable procedure for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary of his life insurance shall be. Like the statutes at issue in Ridgway and Wissner, FEGLIA evinces Congress’ decision to accord federal employees an unfettered “freedom of choice” in selecting the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds and to ensure the proceeds would actually “belong” to that beneficiary. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 56. An employee‘s ability to name a beneficiary acts as a “guarantee of the complete and full performance of the contract to the exclusion of conflicting claims.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 660. With that promise comes the expectation that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them.
There is further confirmation that Congress intended
We have explained that “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616-617 (1980). Section 8705(e) creates a limited exception to the order of precedence. If States could make alternative distributions outside the clear procedure Congress established, that
In short, where a beneficiary has been duly named, the insurance proceeds she is owed under FEGLIA cannot be allocated to another person by operation of state law. Section D does exactly that. We therefore agree with the Virginia Supreme Court that it is pre-empted.
III
We are not persuaded by Hillman‘s additional arguments in support of a different result.
Hillman contends that Ridgway and Wissner can be distinguished because, unlike the statutes we considered in those cases, FEGLIA does not include an “anti-attachment provision.” Brief for Petitioner 38-41. The anti-attachment provisions in NSLIA and SGLIA were identical, and each broadly prohibited the “attachment, levy, or seizure” of insurance proceeds by any legal process.
These discussions of the anti-attachment provisions, however, were alternative grounds to support the judgment in each case, and not necessary components of the holdings. See Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 60-61 (describing
Next, Hillman suggests that Wissner and Ridgway can be set aside because FEGLIA contains an express pre-emption provision and that conflict pre-emption principles ordinarily do not apply when that is so. Brief for Petitioner 45-47. As noted, the court below did not pass on the parties’ express prе-emption arguments, and thus we similarly address only conflict pre-emption. See supra, at 7. And we need not consider whether Section D is expressly pre-empted, because Hillman is incorrect to suggest that FEGLIA‘s express pre-emption provision renders conflict pre-emption inapplicable. Rather, we have made clear that the existence of a separate pre-emption provision “‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.‘” Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 65 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. ____, ____ (2012) (slip op., at 14).
Hillman further argues that Ridgway is not controlling because a provision of FEGLIA specifically authorizes an employee to assign a FEGLI policy, whereas SGLIA‘S implementing regulations prohibit such an assignment. See
Finally, Hillman attempts to distinguish Ridgway and Wissner because Congress enacted the statutes at issue in those cases with the goal of improving military morale. Brief for Petitioner 47-51. Congress’ aim of increasing the morale of the armed services, however, was not the basis of our pre-emption analysis in either case. See Wissner, 338 U. S., at 658-659; Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 53-56.
*
*
*
Section D is in direct conflict with FEGLIA because it interferes with Congress’ objective that insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary. Accordingly, we hold that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The judgment of the Virginia Suрreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11-1221
JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A. MARETTA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[June 3, 2013]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
The Court correctly concludes that
The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary nothwithstanding.”
Applying these principles, it is clear that the ordinary meaning of FEGLIA directly conflicts with Section D. FEGLIA provides that life insurance benefits are paid according to a particular “order of precedence.”
Section D directly conflicts with this statutory scheme, because it nullifies the insured‘s statutory right to designate a beneficiary. The right to designate a beneficiary encompasses a cоrresponding right in the named beneficiary not only to receive the proceeds, but also to retain them. Indeed, the “right” to designate a beneficiary—as well as the term “beneficiary” itself—would be meaningless if the only effect of a designation were to saddle the nominal beneficiary with liability under state law for the full value of the proceeds. But Section D accomplishes
The direct conflict between Section D and FEGLIA is also evident in the fact that Section D‘s only function is to accomplish what Section A would have achieved, had Section A not been pre-empted. Section A provides that,
“upon the entry of a decree of annulment or divorce from the bond of matrimony ... any revocable beneficiary designation contained in a then existing written contract owned by one party that provides for the payment of any death benefit to the other party is revoked. A death benefit prevented from passing to a former spouse by this section shall be paid as if the former spouse had predeceased the decedent.”
Va. Code Ann. §20-111.1(A) (Lexis Cum. Supp. 2012).
Both parties agree that FEGLIA pre-empts this provision. Brief for Petitioner 4-5; Brief for Respondent 2; see also 283 Va. 34, 52, 722 S. E. 2d 32, 35 (2012). And for good reason: if an insured has designated his former spouse as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, Section A purports to “revok[e]” that designation in the event of divorce or annulment. By purporting to so alter FEGLIA‘s statutory order of precedence, Section A is clearly pre-empted by federal law. Tellingly, it is precisely in this context—and only in this context that Section D operates. See
*
*
*
For these reasons, I agree with the Court‘s conclusion that Section D is pre-empted and, therefore, concur in the judgment.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11-1221
JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A. MARETTA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
[June 3, 2013]
JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. Because one of the purposes of the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) is to implement the expressed wishes of the insured, I would hold that a state law is pre-empted if it effectively overrides an insured‘s actual, articulated choice of beneficiary. The challenged provision of Virginia law has that effect.
By way of background,
Interpreted in light of our prior decisions in Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950), and Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46 (1981), FEGLIA seems to me to have two primary purposes or objectives.
The first is administrative convenience. It is easier for an insurance administrator to pay insurance proceeds to the person whom the insured has designated on a specified form without having to consider claims made by others based on some other ground. But
The second purpose or objective is the effectuation of the insured‘s expressed intent above all other considerations. That was the basis for the decisions in Wissner and Ridgway, as I understand them. In both cases, there was a conflict between a person whom the insured had designated as his beneficiary and another person whose claim to the proceeds was not based on the insured‘s expressed intent, and in both cases, the Court held in favor of the designated beneficiary.
The present case bears a similarity to Wissner and Ridgway in that petitioner‘s claim depends upon a state statute that automatically alters the ultimate recipient of a divorced employee‘s insurance proceeds. To be sure, Virginia‘s provision may well reflect the unexpressed preferences of the majority of insureds whose situations are similar to that of the insured in this case—that is, individuals who, after divorce and remarriage, fail to change a prior designation of a former spouse as the beneficiary of the policy. But FEGLIA prioritizes the insured‘s expressed intent. And it is telling that, on petitioner‘s theory, she would still be entitled to the insurance pro
In affirming the decision below, the Court goes well beyond what is necessary and opines that the party designated as the beneficiary under a FEGLIA policy must be allowed to keep the insurance proceeds even if the insured‘s contrary and expressed intent is indisputable—for example, when the insured writes a postdivorce will specifically leaving the proceeds to someone else. See ante, at 11. The Court‘s explanation is as follows: “Congress sought to ensure that an employee‘s intent would be given effect only through the designation of a beneficiary or through the narrow exceptions specifically provided in the statute.” Ibid., n. 3. In other words, Congress wanted the designated beneficiary—rather than the person named in a later will—to keep the proceeds because Congress wanted the named beneficiary to keep the proceeds. Needless the say, this circular reasoning does not explain why Congress might have wanted the designated beneficiary to keep the proceeds even when that is indisputably contrary to the insured‘s expressed wishes at the time of death. I am doubtful that any purpose or objective of FEGLIA would be honored by such a holding, but it is not necessary to resolve that question in this case.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.