United States v. William McBride, Jr.
826 F.3d 293
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- William McBride pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery charges and agreed in a plea agreement that he was a career offender under USSG §4B1.1 based on at least two prior bank-robbery convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2113.
- The Presentence Report and McBride’s counsel both treated him as a career offender; the career-offender status produced an advisory Guidelines range of 188–235 months (versus 100–125 months otherwise).
- The district court sentenced McBride to 216 months' imprisonment. McBride later challenged the career-offender designation under Johnson v. United States.
- McBride conceded the career-offender status in his plea papers and at sentencing, so he waived most appellate challenges except those grounded exclusively in Johnson, which was decided after his sentencing.
- The central legal question is whether a § 2113(a) bank-robbery conviction qualifies categorically as a "crime of violence" under USSG §4B1.2(a)'s physical-force clause after Johnson invalidated the residual clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McBride waived his Johnson-based challenge | McBride contends waiver shouldn't bar a Johnson claim that could not have been raised earlier | Govt: McBride explicitly agreed he was a career offender, thus waived the issue | Waiver applies except for claims that depended on Johnson; Johnson-based claim reviewed for plain error |
| Whether § 2113(a) convictions qualify as "crimes of violence" under the physical-force clause of USSG §4B1.2(a) | McBride: § 2113(a) convictions qualify only via the now-invalid residual clause, not the physical-force clause | Govt: § 2113(a) bank robbery (including by intimidation) involves threatened or used physical force and is a crime of violence | Court: Bank robbery by "force and violence" or by "intimidation" under § 2113(a) involves the threatened use of physical force and qualifies under the physical-force clause |
| Whether Maddalena controls the categorical analysis | McBride: earlier Sixth Circuit precedent (Maddalena) supports finding § 2113(a) a crime of violence | Govt: relies on Maddalena | Court: Maddalena relied on conduct and predates Taylor; it is not controlling for categorical analysis post-Taylor/Descamps |
| Whether § 2113(a) is categorically a crime of violence in all its permutations | McBride: (implicitly) prior convictions were violent | Govt: § 2113(a) broadly criminalizes some nonviolent conduct (e.g., entering to commit nonviolent felonies) | Court: § 2113(a) may be divisible; some variants may be nonviolent, but McBride conceded his priors fell within the violent elements, so court need not decide divisibility here |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established the categorical approach for prior-offense inquiries)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (clarified when the modified categorical approach applies for divisible statutes)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (distinguishes waiver and forfeiture of rights on appeal)
- Maddalena v. United States, 893 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1989) (earlier Sixth Circuit panel decision finding §2113(a) robbery could be a violent predicate but relied on conduct-based analysis pre-Taylor)
- Gilmore v. United States, 282 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2002) (interprets "intimidation" in §2113(a) as conduct and words calculated to create impression resistance would be met by force)