United States v. William Mabie, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12174

Background

William Mabie was convicted in three consolidated matters: (1) a 2008 Eastern District of Missouri conviction for mailing threats (88 months); (2) a 2015 Southern District of Illinois “threat case” under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) for threatening letters sent from prison (three counts, 180 months); and (3) a 2016 Southern District of Illinois “assault case” for assaulting and spitting on a deputy U.S. marshal (72 months). The three sentences run consecutively, totaling 340 months.
The government in the 2015 threat prosecution added a specific-intent element to its indictment and sought to introduce prior threat-related communications and voicemail evidence from the Missouri matter under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to prove context, motive, and knowledge.
Mabie objected to the 404(b) evidence; the district court held a Gomez hearing, admitted the evidence with limiting instructions, and the jury convicted.
In the assault trial, Mabie repeatedly alternated between pro se and counsel, became disruptive, asked to proceed pro se after trial began (denied), and demanded to leave the courtroom (denied); he was removed after a tirade, which the jury observed.
Both district judges imposed above-guidelines sentences (including a statutory maximum in the threat case) after considering Mabie’s extensive pattern of threatening communications, his conduct in court and prison, and threats against law enforcement. Mabie appealed multiple evidentiary, procedural, and sentencing claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Rule 404(b) other-act evidence in the threat case	Mabie: evidence from the Missouri case was improper propensity evidence and prejudicial	Government: evidence was admissible to provide background/context and to show motive/knowledge; 403 balance favors admission	Court: admission proper under Gomez; government showed non-propensity purpose and district court did 403 balancing; limiting instructions cured risk of unfair prejudice
Denial of request to proceed pro se (assault case)	Mabie: trial court wrongly refused his midtrial demand to represent himself	Government: court acted within discretion to deny belated/self-serving self‑representation request given disruption risk	Court: no abuse of discretion — request was untimely and defendant’s disruptive conduct supported denial
Denial of request to be absent from trial (assault case)	Mabie: court erred by forcing him to remain, causing the jury to witness his removal and tirade	Government: no constitutional right to be absent; defendant could have waived presence but has no right to demand absence	Court: no constitutional right to be absent; no error in denying request; any prejudice was caused by Mabie’s own misconduct
Substantive reasonableness of consecutive, above-guidelines sentences	Mabie: sentences unreasonable; assault double-counted and threats lacked evidence of intent to act	Government: courts considered Mabie’s extensive, escalating threats, conduct, and lack of remorse; public protection warranted consecutive/lengthy terms	Court: sentences substantively reasonable given pattern of threats, violent statements (including threats to kill a deputy marshal), and repeated misconduct; no abuse of discretion

Key Cases Cited

Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (requires non-propensity chain of reasoning and Rule 403 balancing for 404(b) evidence)
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (specific-intent/knowledge requirement for federal threat statutes)
Parr, 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008) (background/context evidence may be relevant to intent)
Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2001) (timing matters for Faretta/self-representation claims; courts balance disruption risk once trial begins)
Smith, 230 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2000) (defendant’s right to attend trial is guaranteed, but case law does not recognize a right of absence)
Lewis, 842 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing sentence reasonableness)