13 F.4th 647
7th Cir.2021Background
- Consolidated appeals from two prisoners who sought shorter sentences under the First Step Act; both filed motions for reconsideration within the appeal window, were denied, and then appealed.
- Notices of appeal were filed within 14 days of the denial of the reconsideration motions but more than 14 days after the original district-court decisions.
- The government moved to dismiss, arguing that a motion to reconsider does not suspend finality or extend the time to appeal (pointing to Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5) and Rule 35 limitations).
- The court held that motions to reconsider decisions under the First Step Act do suspend finality and extend the appeal period because the First Step Act relief is external to Rule 35 and therefore not constrained by Rule 4(b)(5).
- Applying that rule to the merits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts: (1) in Hible the judge did not abuse discretion in relying on the PSR and considering prior convictions; (2) in Turner the statutory minimum (including powder-cocaine quantity) still required life imprisonment absent executive clemency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a motion to reconsider a First Step Act decision suspends finality and extends the time to appeal | Motions to reconsider do suspend finality; Supreme Court precedent (Healy/Dieter/Ibarra) treats such motions as tolling appeal time | Motions after sentencing are governed by Rule 35 and Rule 4(b)(5), which do not extend appeal time | Held: Yes. First Step Act motions are outside Rule 35, so reconsideration suspends finality and extends appeal time |
| Whether Rule 35 / Rule 4(b)(5) controls First Step Act motions | First Step Act relief is independent of Rule 35; Rule 4(b)(5) thus doesn’t apply | Treat First Step Act reductions as sentencing adjustments governed by Rule 35 and its timing limits | Held: Rejected. Rule 35 is limited to immediate post-sentencing motions; First Step Act relief is not confined by Rule 35 |
| Whether district court erred in Hible by relying on the PSR and prior conviction when denying further reduction | Hible: court should not have relied on PSR accuracy because prior challenge unresolved | Gov: Hible waived challenge in plea bargain; prior conviction and PSR are permissible bases for discretion | Held: No abuse of discretion. Waiver upheld; district court properly considered PSR and non-retroactive recidivist rules |
| Whether Turner’s sentence could be reduced below the statutory minimum given quantities and commutation | Turner sought judicial reduction below the statutory minimum | Gov: Statutory minimum (life for powder quantity + priors) remains; only the President can provide greater relief | Held: District court correct. Statutory penalty still requires life absent executive clemency; Turner remains subject to commuted 30-year term unless further clemency granted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964) (motions to reconsider in criminal cases toll appeal time)
- United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976) (reaffirming tolling effect of reconsideration motions)
- United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1 (1991) (same)
- United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2010) (recapping effect of Healy/Dieter/Ibarra)
- United States v. Townsend, 762 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rule 35 confines post-sentencing reconsideration immediately after sentence)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (relief under a retroactive guideline is not a full resentencing)
- Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020) (motion for reconsideration is part of original collateral proceeding and does not create a successive petition)
- United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2020) (district courts may revise entire sentencing package when one count is eligible for First Step Act relief)