United States v. William Cordova
420 U.S. App. D.C. 138
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- Appellants Cordova, Gutierrez, and Sorto (MS-13 members) were tried and convicted for conspiracy, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, murder, assault, and weapons offenses arising from multiple shootings in D.C.
- The district court ordered early weekly disclosure of Jencks Act materials but issued (and the record lacks) a protective order restricting defendants’ personal possession of those materials; review was limited to presence of counsel/paralegals and materials could not be taken back to jail.
- Gutierrez sent a letter referencing a ‘‘Lady of Sivar’’ and listing the judge, prosecutors, witnesses, and codefendants; the government treated it as potentially threatening; Gutierrez moved to recuse the trial judge, which was denied.
- The court held a preliminary, off-the-record in-chambers conference with counsel on jury instructions; the court summarized the result on the record and later reconstructed the limited off-the-record discussion.
- Each defendant initially had two court-appointed attorneys after indictment (capital-case appointments); after the government notified it would not seek death, the court removed the second appointed counsel; defendants sought relief under 18 U.S.C. §3005.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protective-order limits on defendants’ access to Jencks materials (Sixth Amendment) | Restrictions prevented meaningful participation and effective assistance; limited private review impeded defendant-led identification of impeachment topics | Court balanced witness safety and security concerns; counsel had full access and could consult defendants; court afforded multi-day early disclosure | No reversible error — no plausible prejudice shown; any limitation offset by early disclosure and counsel access |
| Motion to recuse judge based on Gutierrez’s letter | Letter was a threatening communication listing the judge and others; recusal required because impartiality might reasonably be questioned | Letter was stale, ambiguous, and not acted on; court/Marshals found no active threat; routine protective measures did not demonstrate bias | Denial of recusal affirmed — reasonable observer would not question impartiality; no abuse of discretion |
| Off-the-record in-chambers jury-instruction conference (Rule 43 / presence right) | Excluding defendants from the in-chambers conference violated their right to be present and impaired appellate record | The conference addressed legal/instructional questions; parties placed disputed instructions on the record later; no showing of prejudice | No plain error — conference fell within Rule 43(b)(3) exception for conferences on questions of law and no prejudice shown |
| Dismissal of second court-appointed attorney after government declined death penalty (18 U.S.C. §3005) | §3005 guarantees two counsel for capital crimes and requires keeping both even if government later declines death | Statute’s purpose is to protect defendants while death penalty is being pursued; once government renounces death, the court may dismiss second counsel | Affirmed — §3005’s two-attorney appointment is tied to the case’s capital nature; court may dismiss second appointed counsel after government renounces death penalty |
Key Cases Cited
- Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (protective orders permissible to prevent unwarranted disclosure)
- Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (Jencks Act timing does not implicate constitutional barrier)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (plain-error review requires prejudice affecting substantial rights)
- Celis v. United States, 608 F.3d 818 (no Sixth Amendment violation where court balanced protective-order interests and defense had effective cross-examination)
- Holland v. United States, 519 F.3d 909 (factors for recusal when judge receives threats)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (judicial rulings ordinarily do not require recusal absent deep-seated antagonism)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance claim requires showing of prejudice)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (right to counsel and prejudice inquiry)
- Perez v. United States, 612 F.3d 879 (jury-instruction conferences concern questions of law)
- Boone v. United States, 245 F.3d 352 (discussing §3005 and two-attorney rule in capital cases)